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Article

The Transformation of Averroes's Epitome of the *Organon* from the Arabic into the Hebrew World: The Example of the Example

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Abstract

Averroes's epitome of the *Organon*, originally composed c.1157, had a complex reception in the Hebrew world, comprising an early translation by Jacob ben Makhir in 1289, a subsequent revision by unnamed 'Scholars', a self-professed new translation by Samuel ben Judah of Marseilles in 1329, and a soft revision found in a manuscript copied by Ezra Gatigno in 1356. This article looks into the stability of this transmission through a micro-analysis of the 'argument by example' in the *Rhetoric*. The discussion centers on the material challenges posed by the Arabic language (both in Arabic and in Hebrew characters), demonstrating how the graphical interchangeability of similar terms precipitated a series of interventions and decisions, from the preservation of lacunae to conjectural emendation. Beyond lexical variance, the analysis highlights how the translators' differing grasp of the syntactic functions of Arabic particles led to divergent logical segmentations of the argument. Two appendices extend this inquiry: the first reevaluates Gatigno's intellectual profile by assessing his knowledge of Arabic, while the second employs Abraham de Balme's sixteenth-century Latin translation as an aide to better understand the textual history of Samuel ben Judah's version.

Keywords

medieval logic, philosophical manuscripts, Arabic-into-Hebrew translations, Samuel ben Judah of Marseilles, Ezra Gatigno

1. Introduction

In the colophon to his self-proclaimed 'new translation' of Averroes's epitome of the *Organon* in 1329, Samuel ben Judah of Marseilles describes a process according to which the first Hebrew translation (made by Jacob ben Makhir in 1289) was revised by unnamed scholars of his time, which is the version that was available to him. Samuel reports that since this revision was insufficient, he undertook to retranslate the work from scratch.¹ This account confused scholars for many years, since it seems to have gone against the evidence from the manuscripts that have come down to us (as well as from the *editio princeps* from 1559), between which no significant differences were

¹ For a discussion of Samuel ben Judah and an English translation of his colophon, see Berman 1967.

found to justify positing the existence of more than one translation.² In a companion study, I argue that there is enough evidence to support at least part of Samuel's narrative and that three distinct versions of the Hebrew text can indeed be identified.³ Whether or not these differences allow us to call them different 'translations' depends on one's understanding of the term – though Samuel's translation was definitely not made from scratch. One can plausibly say, though, that the scholars operated on Jacob ben Makhir's Hebrew version while consulting an Arabic manuscript, and that Samuel operated on the scholars' version while consulting an Arabic manuscript. To these three layers, we can add a fourth, which is the Hebrew text found in a manuscript copied in 1356 by Ezra Gatigno in Zaragoza.⁴ In this version, we can identify a few further interventions in the text that are based on yet another consultation with an Arabic manuscript.

With these distinctions in place, there is now a basis for taking the scholarship a step further and asking how the respective episodes of revision affected arguments in Averroes's work. To this end, the present contribution takes Averroes's explanation of the argument by example, which is part of the *Rhetoric* portion of the epitome, as a case study. After presenting the Arabic according to the two surviving manuscripts that contain it, the discussion will go back and forth between the subjective aspect of the copyists' and translators' choices, the accidental aspect of mechanical errors, and the impersonal aspect: namely, philosophical analysis of different end results. Two side discussions that stem from the analysis are (i) a better understanding of Ezra Gatigno and his early scholarly pursuits; and (ii) a preliminary (and somewhat ironic) understanding of where Abraham de Balmes's (d.1523) Hebrew-into-Latin translation of the work is situated within all the different versions. Appendices A and B, respectively, are the beginnings of these discussions.

2. Overview of the sources

All that survives of Averroes's epitome, including the Hebrew translations, comes from the Jewish world. The work in Arabic is only preserved in manuscripts in which the Arabic is written in Hebrew characters, and the Latin translation – made according to the Hebrew – is the work of the Jewish scholar Abraham de Balmes.⁵

There are two manuscripts in Arabic (in Hebrew characters):

- 1) Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Cod. arab. 964, written in semi-cursive Sephardic script, dating from the fourteenth to fifteenth century.
- 2) Paris, BnF, héb. 1008, a bilingual copy that contains a facing Hebrew translation, copied in Zaragoza in 1356 by the scholar and biblical commentator Ezra Gatigno.⁶ The Arabic is on the verso side, and the Hebrew is on the recto side of the next folio (see Fig. 1).

² See the account of this confusion in Manekin and Biesterfeldt 2002, §§ 98–99.

³ Meyrav forthcoming.

⁴ For Ezra Gatigno, see Schwartz 1996, 51–53.

⁵ This section summarises a much more detailed account in Meyrav forthcoming.

⁶ For a discussion of this manuscript and its methodological challenges, see Eichner 2012, 240–242.




Fig. 1: Paris héb. 1008 (Ezra Gatigno's copy), fols 2^v–3^r.

Most – but not all – of the differences between these manuscripts can be explained by copyist errors and/or different deciphering of Arabic words that can be read in different ways into Hebrew characters. Unlike other works by Averroes, which show evidence of self-revisions over a long period of time, the Arabic manuscripts of the epitome show no such process, though some small revisions can be noted here and there. Nevertheless, the fact that only two manuscripts survive does not enable us to say with confidence that no such revision occurred.

We possess sixteen manuscripts of the Hebrew translation, though not all are complete. They are divided into four groups (A–D in the list below), depending on the version of the text they contain. The first three groups correspond to one or another of the versions mentioned in Samuel ben Judah of Marseilles's colophon, and the fourth contains the version written in Gatigno's hand:

A) Jacob ben Makhir's original translation from 1289, which survives only in one, incomplete manuscript: New York, Jewish Theological Seminary 2294 (semi-cursive Sephardic script from the fourteenth or fifteenth century). This manuscript does not contain the passage under discussion in the present paper, and therefore will not concern us here.⁷

⁷ The portion of the work under discussion in the present paper does not survive in four of the manuscripts. Since the manuscript that contains Jacob ben Makhir's original translation (New York, Jewish Theological Seminary 2294) does not have this part, my discussion is relevant only from the second ('scholars') version onwards. The other three are New York, Jewish Theological Seminary 2346 (semi-cursive Sephardic script from the fourteenth or fifteenth century); Oxford, Bodleian Library, Mich. 288, fols 25^r–106^v (semi-cursive Sephardic script from the fifteenth century); and St. Petersburg, Russian Academy of Sciences, B 95 (Karaitic script, copied from the printed edition in 1868).

B) A revision made by people to whom Samuel refers as ‘the scholars of our time’, which was by far the most circulated, surviving in thirteen manuscripts, as well as the basis for the 1559 print from Riva di Trento.⁸

C) Samuel ben Judah of Marseilles's translation/revision from 1329, which survives in one manuscript: Paris, BnF, héb. 956 (semi-cursive Sephardic, fifteenth century), fols 313^v–350^r.⁹

D) The Hebrew portion of Paris héb. 1008, which contains additional sporadic revisions. This version is based on the scholars' version. It is an open question whether Ezra Gatigno was responsible for these revisions or whether he was reproducing revisions made by someone else. I offer a preliminary discussion of this in Appendix A.

The Latin translation was made by Abraham de Balmes and its *editio princeps* was published in 1522/3.¹⁰ Unlike some other translations by de Balmes with extant manuscripts, the printed text is the only surviving testimony of his translation of Averroes's epitome. It is briefly discussed in Appendix B.

3. Averroes's argument

The context of the present case study is Averroes's account of the misuse of examples in the construction of a syllogism in the *Rhetoric* portion of the epitome. Before discussing Averroes's argument, I will quote the text in Arabic in Hebrew characters, alongside Charles Butterworth's English translation, with some modifications intended to explicate some aspects of Averroes's wording.¹¹ The quoted text is based on Munich arab. 964, but it is not a critical one: the transliteration is standardised with obvious inconsequential mistakes silently corrected. Only variants in Paris héb. 1008 pertinent to the discussion are recorded (and translated), as footnotes at the end of each numbered segment.

⁸ The manuscripts are listed according to a rough chronological order with an inner geographical sub-division: Paris, BnF, héb. 917, fols 1^r–93^v (cursive Sephardic script from the fifteenth century); Paris, BnF, héb. 918, fols 1^v–32^v (semi-cursive Sephardic script from the fifteenth century); Oxford, Bodleian Library, Mich. 355, fols 1^r–95^v (semi-cursive Sephardic script from the fifteenth century); Parma, Biblioteca Palatina, Cod. Parm. 2623, fols 16^v–48^r (semi-cursive Sephardic script from the fifteenth century); Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Cod. hebr. 281, fols 1^r–73^r (semi-cursive Sephardic script, copied in Northern Italy in 1476); Leipzig, Universitätsbibliothek, B.H. fol. 14, fols 128^v–173^r (Byzantine script from the late fifteenth century); Oxford, Bodleian Library, Or. 77, fols 1^v–72^v (Byzantine script, 1484); Paris, BnF, héb. 919, fols 1^r–68^r (Byzantine script, 1485); Moscow, Russian State Library, Guenzburg 1172 (Karaitic script, seventeenth-eighteenth century), 105^r–114^v (contains only the parts on *Sophistics*, *Topics*, *Rhetoric*, and *Poetics*); New York, Columbia University, X 893 Ar 4, fols 1^r–44^r (Ashkenazi script, eighteenth century, copied from the printed edition).

⁹ For a discussion of this manuscript, see Berman 1978, 368–372.

¹⁰ Averroes 1522–1523. For de Balmes, see Licata 2014.

¹¹ Averroes 1977.

Butterworth, with modifications (71–72)	Munich arab. 964, fols 82 ^v –83 ^r
<p>[1] It is clear from what preceded in the <i>Book of the Syllogism</i> that the apodeictically conclusive statement is the one in which the particular is explained by the universal.</p>	<p>[1] ובין ממה תקדם פי כתאב אל קיאס אן אל קול אל מנתג' באל צ'רורה' אנמא הו מא יבין פיה אל ג'זאי באל כלי</p>
<p>This being the case, no other statement follows apodeictically from the example, nor is it essentially conclusive.</p>	<p>ואד' כאן ד'לך כד'לך פאל מת'אל ליס ילזם ענה באל צ'רורה' קול אכ'ר אצ'טרארא' ולא הו מנתג' באל ד'את</p>
<p>[2] An example of that is our judging that the heavens are generated due to their similarity to generated bodies with respect to space-occupancy^a, alteration, continuity, and other things.</p>	<p>[2] ומת'אל ד'לך אנא מתי חכמנא עלי אל סמא אנהא מכונה למשאבהתהא ללאג'סאם אל מכונה' פי אל תחייז' ואל תגיר ואל אתצאל וגיר ד'לך</p>
<p>For the heavens in this statement are the minor term in the syllogism, since they are the subject of the desideratum; being generated^b is the major term, since it is the predicate of the desideratum; and the middle term is space-occupancy and alteration^c.</p>	<p>פאל סמא פי הד'א אל קול הי אל טרף אל אצגר פי אל קיאס אד' כאנת הי מוצ'וע אל מטלוב ואל מכוני' הו אל טרף אל אעט'ם אד' כאן הו מחמול אל מטלוב ואל חד אל אוסט הו אל תחיו ואל תגיר²</p>
<p>Now when we compose the syllogism, we say this: 'The heavens are space-occupying^d; the space-occupying^e is generated; therefore, the heavens are generated.'</p>	<p>פמתי אלפנא אל קיאס קלנא הכד'א אל סמא מתחיוז' ואל מתחיוז' מכוני' פאל סמא מכונה</p>
<p>^a space-occupancy] choosing ^b generated] let(?) ^c space-occupancy and alteration] alteration ^d space-occupying] confused ^e space-occupying] confused</p>	<p>* תחיוז] תכיר ² מכוני] מכרי ³ אל תחיו ואל תגיר] אל תגיר ⁴ מתחיוז'] מתחיר ⁵ מתחיוז] מתחיר</p>
<p>[3] But it is not sufficient for our saying 'the space-occupying^a is generated' to be taken as indefinite, if we want 'the heavens' to be encompassed apodeictically under it; rather, we should take it universally, i.e., 'every space-occupying^b is generated.'</p>	<p>[3] לכן קולנא אן אל מתחיוז' מכוני' ליס יכפי פיה אן יוכ'ד' מהמלא' אן ארדנא אן תנטוי אל סמא באל צ'רורה' תחתה כל חתי נאכ'ד'ה כליא' והו אן כל מתחיוז' מכוני'</p>
<p>Now if this universal had resulted from our scrutiny of some space-occupying^a things in the way empirical^d premises are attained, then to state it explicitly by an example would be superfluous – unless it were taken as a means of instruction and guidance for bringing about certainty concerning the universal.</p>	<p>פאן כאנת חצלת הד'ה אל כליה' ענדמא תצפחנא בעץ' אל מתחיוז'ת' עלי מא שאנה אן יחצל אל מקדמאת אל תג'רביה' פאל תצריח באל מת'אל פי ד'לך פצ'ל אלא אן יוכ'ד' עלי ג'ה'ה אל תפהם ואל ארשאד לוקוע אל יקין באל כליה'</p>
<p>But if our having perceived some of the space-occupying^a things as generated did not lead us to certainty about the universal, and this premise remained indefinite for us, nothing would follow apodeictically from our perceiving it, except as a first impression.</p>	<p>ואן כאן לם יקע לנא יקין כלי ענדמא אחסנא בעץ' אל מתחיוז'ת' מתכונה' ובקית ענדנא הד'ה אל מקדמה' מהמלה' פלם ילזם ען אחסאסנא ד'לך שי באצ'טראר בל פי באדי אל ראי</p>
<p>^a space-occupying] confused space-occupying] confused ^c space-occupying] confused ^d empirical] evident¹² ^e space-occupying] confused</p>	<p>* מתחיוז] מתחיר ² מתחיוז] מתחיר ³ מתחיוזאת] מתחיראת ⁴ תג'רביה'] ביינה' ⁵ מתחיוזאת] מתחיראת</p>

¹² Butterworth translated this as 'particular', relying upon the term חלקיות (*helqiyot*) found in the Hebrew scholars' version, which translates the Arabic جزئية/جزئية (*juz'iyah*); see Averroes 1977, 72, 186. His translation finds support in Averroes's middle commentary on the *Rhetoric*, where Averroes discusses examples in the context of particular premises and does not mention the term we have here, تجريبية/تجريبية (*tajribīyah*; 'empirical'), at all. See Averroes 1960, 46–47. Here, I follow only what is found in the Arabic manuscripts, regardless of the question of their correctness.

In this passage, Averroes explains that we cannot compose a demonstrative syllogism when one of the premises is based on a similarity that we happen to find between things. This is because an example does not guarantee the universal application of a certain premise. To illustrate this, Averroes brings a case in which people argue that the heavens are generated based on characteristics that they share with generated bodies. The explication of the syllogism shows that the major premise, which should link the minor premise and the conclusion, does not apply universally, and hence nothing scientific can proceed from it. Averroes continues by stating that if indeed the premise applies universally, then there is no point in arguing by example, since we already have the universal at hand. The only reason to argue by example is pedagogical and rhetorical: for instruction, guidance, and persuasion.¹³

A close look at the text as it is found in the manuscripts reveals a number of philological problems that give reasons to reconsider some aspects of it in its present form. In the Munich manuscript, after the initial listing of properties that the heavens share with generated bodies, the text focuses on the property of תחיוז (*tahayyuz*; 'space-occupancy'), the owner of which is called מתחיוז (*mutahayyiz*; 'space-occupier'). In the Paris manuscript, תחיוז is not mentioned at all. Instead, the text first has תכיר (*takhayyur*; 'choice'), and then the property-holder is called מתחיר (*mutahayyir*; 'confused'). This renders the Paris text neither consistent (as the term changes midway through the argument) nor coherent (neither 'choice' nor 'confusion' is relevant to generated bodies in the present context).

Another problem is the presence of תגיר (*taghayyur*; 'alteration') in the text. On its first occurrence, it appears alongside another term in both manuscripts (*tahayyuz* in Munich and *takhayyur* in Paris). In Munich, its second occurrence is also coupled with *tahayyuz*, whereas the second occurrence in Paris is by itself.

To simplify matters, the following table gives the terms in context:¹⁴

Context	Munich arab. 964	Paris héb. 1008
Properties shared by generated bodies and the heavens	תחיוז (<i>tahayyuz</i> ; 'space-occupancy') + תגיר (<i>taghayyur</i> ; 'alteration')	תכיר (<i>takhayyur</i> ; 'choice') + תגיר (<i>taghayyur</i> ; 'alteration')
The middle term of the syllogism	תחיוז (<i>tahayyuz</i> ; 'space-occupancy') + תגיר (<i>taghayyur</i> ; 'alteration')	תגיר (<i>taghayyur</i> ; 'alteration')
Subsequent discussion of the shared property	מתחיוז (<i>mutahayyiz</i> ; 'space-occupier')	מתחיר (<i>mutahayyir</i> ; 'confused')

¹³ For Aristotle's own view of the example, see Rossi 2025, esp. 724–727; see also Ierodiakonou 2002, 141–144.

¹⁴ I am not discussing the property of אתצאל (*ittiṣāl*; 'continuity') because it does not play a part in the argument, nor does it pose textual problems.

How did this come to pass? We should keep in mind that both Arabic witnesses have come down to us in Hebrew characters, while Averroes wrote in Arabic characters. This means that at some point – and perhaps in different instances – the Arabic characters were transcribed into Hebrew characters, and the transcription was dependent upon the copyist's deciphering of the Arabic characters. When we work back from the Hebrew characters to the Arabic ones, the origin of the problem surfaces: in Arabic characters, *taḥayyuz* and *takhayyur* are written تحيز and تخير respectively. Given that Arabic copyists had a habit of not always dotting the letters, since both words have the same skeletal form (*rasm*) بحر, to which several diacritical points could be added to create many different words, there is a wide range of possible misreadings and misinterpretations.¹⁵ The same holds for *mutaḥayyiz* (متحيز) and *mutaḥayyir* (متحير), which are only distinguished by a single dot.

However, things do not end there, as two philosophical problems merit further discussion. The first is that in Munich arab. 964, Averroes seems to use two middle terms, whereas in a syllogism there is only one ('the middle term is space-occupancy [*taḥayyuz*] and alteration [*taghayyur*']). In Paris héb. 1008, only one middle term is mentioned ('the middle term is alteration [*taghayyur*']'), but this term is abandoned as the text progresses. Granted, one could argue that Averroes is simply stating two possible middle terms, but there is something philosophically uncomfortable in the fact that 'alteration' is mentioned in the text at all, because in several of his works, Averroes stresses that the heavens *do not* undergo alteration and that the only change that occurs to them is change in place.¹⁶ Could it be that *taghayyur* was never in Averroes's original text? As with the previous cases, it is graphically similar to *taḥayyuz* (تحيز and تغير respectively), and it is not far-fetched to think of the two terms being recorded as options by an indecisive copyist and then incorporated into the text. The fact that Paris has only one of them seems to support this hypothesis.

Finally, one should keep in mind that Averroes introduces the current example according to his custom of using examples lifted from arguments concerning the creation or eternity in the Islamic theological tradition, a tendency explored in detail by Steven Harvey.¹⁷ The term *taḥayyuz* is strongly linked to the tradition of *Kalām* and is not part of Aristotelian terminology.¹⁸ As such (and as we will see when we move to the Hebrew translation), it would not be the most natural deciphering of the string of letters composing it, especially if not all of the letters were dotted. In short, I would seriously consider the possibility that *taghayyur* and *taḥayyuz* are two alternative readings of the same string of letters, which was originally only *taḥayyuz*. This is the optimal scenario concerning both philosophical and terminological coherence, but optimality is not the best philological criterion.

As the discussion above shows, the Arabic text as it existed in the Jewish world was already challenging. We will now see how problems are intensified and then diffused in the Hebrew trans-

¹⁵ Another example for this could be Munich arab. 946's مكون (= מכוון, *mukawwan*; 'generated') and Paris héb. 1008's variant מכרי (= מכרי, *mukran*; 'let' or 'rented'), which is meaningless in the present context.

¹⁶ Averroes 1983, 1.6 (85–94).

¹⁷ See Harvey 1997. A similar example (based on corporeality rather than space-occupancy) is found in the *Art of Logic* attributed to Maimonides. See Maimonides 1938, chapter 7.

¹⁸ Space-occupancy is a key concept in *Kalām* literature and it is taken to be one of the defining properties of the atom. For its various meanings in *Kalām* literature, see Dhanani 1994, 63–64.

lations of the text. My discussion will be divided into two parts. I will first explore the Hebrew translation of Averroes's discussion of the syllogism constructed from the example (segment 2 in the text above), and then the Hebrew translation of Averroes's discussion of the status of the major premise (segment 3 in the text above).

4. Construction of the syllogism

A person reading the Hebrew translation of Averroes's passage will have a different experience depending on the manuscript they use. This is true not only of the different versions, but also of an internal division between manuscripts that contain the same version.

4.1 Scholars' version

All manuscripts of the 'scholars' version' exhibit the problematic nature of the passage in its original guise, but this is not apparent in all cases without some further analysis. In two cases, Leipzig B.H. fol. 14 and Paris héb. 917, the Hebrew text shows no material sign of problems, but reading it reveals that its content is ungrammatical. I offer here an English translation of the relevant text in Leipzig B.H. fol. 14 (see Figs 2a and 2b):¹⁹




Fig. 2a: Leipzig B.H. fol. 14 ('scholars' version'), fol. 182^v (detail); cf. Paris héb 917, fols 89^{r-v}.




Fig. 2b: Leipzig B.H. fol. 14 ('scholars' version'), fol. 182^v (detail); cf. Paris héb. 917, fol. 89^{r-v}.

¹⁹ Here and below, the blue circles indicate where one should find the term 'alteration'/'space-occupancy' in the context of the properties shared by generated bodies and the heavens. The yellow circles indicate where one should find them in the context of the middle term of the syllogism.

It is clear from what preceded in the *Book of the Syllogism* that an apodeictically conclusive statement is one in which the particular is explained by the universal. This being the case, no other statement follows apodeictically from the example, nor is it essentially conclusive. An example of that is our judging that the heavens are generated due to their similarity to generated bodies *and alteration* (*we-hishtanut*), continuity, and other things. For the heavens in this statement are the minor term in the syllogism, since they are the subject of the desideratum; being generated is the major term, since it is the predicate of the desideratum; and the middle term is *and alteration* (*we-hishtanut*). Now when we compose the syllogism, we say this: 'The heavens are *altering* (*mishtanim*); the *altering* (*mishtaneh*) is generated; therefore, the heavens are generated.'

As can be seen from the text in these manuscripts, space-occupancy disappears and the entire argument is based on the notion of alteration. However, the ungrammatical text of the first two occurrences of alteration (circled in blue) suggests that something has gone wrong. The change from space-occupancy to alteration in the latter two cases will be revisited at the end of this section.

In two other manuscripts – Oxford Or. 77 and Moscow Guenzburg 1172 – an awareness of a problem can be seen in one instance, when we find a gap where a word should have been present. We still only see alteration in the text, but there is a material indication that something is missing, at least in one case. Figs 3a and 3b show how it looks in the Bodleian manuscript:




Fig. 3a: Oxford, Bodleian Library, Or. 77, fol. 68^v (detail); cf. Moscow Guenzburg 1172, fol. 112^v.




Fig. 3b: Oxford, Bodleian Library, Or. 77, fol. 69^v (detail); cf. Moscow Guenzburg 1172, fol. 112^v.

An example of that is our judging that the heavens are generated due to their similarity to generated bodies [*blank space*] and alteration (*we-ha-hishtanut*), continuity, and other things. For the heavens in this statement are the minor term in the syllogism, since they are the subject of the desideratum; being generated is the major term, since it is the predicate of the desideratum; and the middle term is *and alteration (we-ha-hishtanut)*. Now when we compose the syllogism, we say this: ‘The heavens *are altering (mishtanim)*; the *altering (mishtaneh)* is generated; therefore the heavens are generated.’

In three manuscripts (Munich hebr. 281, Paris héb. 918, and Parma 2623), we find two gaps, indicating two omissions.²⁰ Fig. 4 shows how this looks in Munich hebr. 281:




Fig. 4: Munich hebr. 281, fol. 68^v (detail); cf. Paris héb. 918, fol. 30^{va}; Parma 2623, fol. 46^{va}.

An example of that is our judging that the heavens are generated due to their similarity to generated bodies [*blank space*] and alteration (*we-ha-hishtanut*), continuity, and other things. For the heavens in this statement are the minor term in the syllogism, since they are the subject of the desideratum; being generated is the major term, since it is the predicate of the desideratum; and the middle term is [*blank space*] and alteration (*we-ha-hishtanut*). Now when we compose the syllogism, we say this: ‘The heavens *are altering (mishtanim)*; the *altering (mishtaneh)* is generated; therefore the heavens are generated.’

Even the printed version (Fig. 5) contains traces of an omission – also reflected in New York, Columbia X 893 Ar 4, which is copied from the print – though the gap is left in the second occurrence rather than in the first (or in both):

²⁰ For the character and significance of this trio of manuscripts, with further references, see Meyrav 2022, 190–195.

כוליד בעצם דמיון זה שאנחנו כאשר שפטנו על השמים
 שהם מתהוים להתדמותם בגשמים המתהוים ההשתנות
 והדבקות וזולת זה הנה השמים בזה המאמר הוא הקצה
 הקטן בהקש אחר אשר היה הוא נושא המבוק והמתהוה
 הוא הקצה הגדול א' אשר היה הוא נושא המבוק והגבול
 האמצעי הוא ההשתנות הנה כאשר חברנו ההק' אמרנו
 כן השמים משתנים והמשתנה מתהוה אם כן השמים
 מתהו' אבל אמרנו שמהשנ' מתהו' לא יספיק בו שימצא

Fig. 5: Averroes (1559), fol. 65^r (detail); cf. New York, Columbia X 893 Ar 4, fol. 40^v.

An example of that is our judging that the heavens are generated due to their similarity to generated bodies *and alteration* (*we-ha-hishtanut*), continuity, and other things. For the heavens in this statement are the minor term in the syllogism, since they are the subject of the desideratum; being generated is the major term, since it is the predicate of the desideratum; and the middle term is *· and alteration* (*we-ha-hishtanut*). Now when we compose the syllogism, we say this: 'The heavens are *altering* (*mishtanim*); the *altering* (*mishtaneh*) is generated; therefore the heavens are generated.'

So far, we have focused on manuscripts that exhibit awareness of a problem, but do not show us what it is. Where did space-occupancy go? The answer is found in the margins of two manuscripts, Oxford Mich. 355 and Paris héb. 919. Fig. 6 offers the detail from the Oxford manuscript:




Fig. 6: Oxford, Bodleian Library, Mich. 355, fol. 87^r (detail); cf. Paris héb. 919, fol. 65^r.

An example of that is our judging that the heavens are generated due to their similarity to generated bodies [*blank space*] and alteration (*we-ha-hishtanut*), continuity, and other things. For the heavens in this statement are the minor term in the syllogism, since they are the subject of the desideratum; being generated is the major term, since it is the predicate of the desideratum; and the middle term is *and alteration* (*we-ha-hishtanut*). Now when we compose the syllogism, we say this: ‘The heavens are *altering* (*mishtanim*); the *altering* (*mishtaneh*) is generated; therefore the heavens are generated.’

[In the margin: ‘*ar’ fi al-tahayyuz*]

This marginal note allows us to hypothesise about what happened: initially, the translator encountered the word *al-tahayyuz* and did not know how to translate it. Therefore, he left a blank space where it was supposed to be and put the Arabic word (in Hebrew letters) in the margin, so that either he or a reader acquainted with the word could at some point fill in the gap. As time passed, as happens with manuscripts, either the gaps were reduced, or the note was dropped, or both.

But what about the latter two cases, where the Hebrew has ‘alteration’, which does not occur in the Arabic? As we have seen, the Arabic sources have either (Munich arab. 964) מתחייז (*mutahayyiz*; ‘space-occupier’) or (Paris héb. 1008) מתחיר (*mutahayyir*; ‘confused’), with the latter assumed to be a corruption of the former. There are two ways to explain this. The first possibility is mechanical: perhaps the translator/transcriber had מתגיר (= متغير, *mutaghayyir*; ‘altering’) rather than מתחייז (= متحيز, *mutahayyiz*) in front of him, given their graphical similarity in Arabic script. Another option – which is more speculative, but also possible – is that the translator (whether Jacob ben Makhir or the scholars) understood the structure of Averroes’s argument and hence decided to compensate for his misunderstandings of the Arabic word by using another property of bodies that Averroes had initially listed. In other words, perhaps the translator decided to convey the sense of Averroes’s argument despite his linguistic shortcomings.

4.2 Samuel ben Judah’s version

Samuel’s version, at least in the form that has come down to us in Paris héb. 956, is quite different from the scholars’ version of the text, as shown in Fig. 7:




Fig. 7: Paris héb. 956, fol. 348^r (detail).

An example of that is our judging that the heavens are generated due to their similarity to generated bodies with respect to *he'atzer*, *equality (showi)*, continuity, and other things. For the heavens in this statement are the minor term in the syllogism, since they are the subject of the desideratum; being generated is the major term, since it is the predicate of the desideratum; and the middle term is *space-occupancy (he'ahez)* and *equality (showi)*. Now when we compose the syllogism, we say this: 'The heavens are *space-occupying (ne'eħazim)*; the *space-occupying (ne'eħaz)* is generated; therefore the heavens are generated.'

The version preserved in this manuscript presents several variants vis-à-vis the one transmitted in the so-called scholars' version. Samuel eliminated 'alteration' from the text. Other variants, in turn, might be accidental. The term שווי (*showi*; 'equality') could be a corruption of שנוי (*shinnuy*; 'alteration') given the two words' graphical similarity.²¹ Regarding space-occupancy, there is one novelty and one perplexity. The novelty is Samuel's use of האהז (*he'ahez*) to translate *tahayyuz*. I do not know of the use of this term in other works, nor of the use of the Hebrew root 'h-z in this context. The meaning of the Hebrew root is 'to hold' or 'to occupy', with the additional benefit of sounding close to the Arabic original. The perplexity is the appearance of the term העצר (*he'atzer*), which I have left untranslated. Its meaning is something like 'stoppage', but I could not think of an explanation concerning how it could come to be except, perhaps, that it is a corruption of האהז. Terminological innovation is more susceptible to corruption if the term is unfamiliar to the copyist. Whatever the reasons, the end result is that what we have of the scholars' version eliminates space-occupancy, and what we have of Samuel's version eliminates alteration. But things do not end there.

4.3 Ezra Gatigno's version

As mentioned earlier, there are indications in Ezra's manuscript that his version of the Hebrew text was slightly revised. The passage under discussion here is a case in point (see Fig. 8):




Fig. 8: Paris heb. 1008 (Ezra Gatigno's copy), fol. 91r (detail).

²¹ This is consequential when retracing the transmission history. See Appendix B below.

An example of that is our judging that the heavens are generated due to their similarity to generated bodies in *space-occupancy* (*aḥizat maqom*), *alteration* (*we-ha-hishtanut*), continuity, and other things. For the heavens in this statement are the minor term in the syllogism, since they are the subject of the desideratum; being generated is the major term, since it is the predicate of the desideratum; and the middle term is *space-occupancy* (*aḥizat maqom*) and *alteration* (*we-ha-hishtanut*). Now when we compose the syllogism, we say this: 'The heavens are *altering* (*mishtanim*); the *altering* (*mishtaneh*) is generated; therefore the heavens are generated.'

As can be seen, Ezra's version has a different expression for space-occupancy to Samuel's. The expression אַחִיזַת מְקוֹם (*aḥizat maqom*) is remarkably precise, as its literal meaning is 'holding of place'. It is more expansive than Samuel's choice of *he'ahez* (coming from the same Hebrew root), which – like its Arabic counterpart *tahayyuz* – does not contain the expression 'space', but merely implies it. *Aḥizat maqom*, just like *he'ahez*, is a technical term not currently recorded in Hebrew philosophical vocabulary.

Ezra's version has the text start with space-occupancy and alteration, and then continue with alteration. This creates a middle ground between Samuel's version, which privileged space-occupancy, and the scholars' version, which privileged alteration. But this does not mean that Ezra's version is a blend of the scholars' version and Samuel's version; a closer look reveals that all Ezra's version does is to fill the two gaps in the scholars' version, leaving the rest of the text untouched. In this case, at least, there is no evidence to suggest that he had access to Samuel's version.

5. Discussion of the major premise

While the problems discussed in the previous section were mostly concerned with the confusion between space-occupancy and alteration, the second half of our passage (segment 3 of the text) poses a different set of problems. Although some of the differences found in each of the versions can be explained philologically, some others seem to reflect a different understanding of the function of Arabic particles, resulting in different understandings of the logical structure of Averroes's argument, which is not very clear in the Arabic sources in the first place. I will first quote the text and italicise the differences among the various versions in Hebrew, followed by English translations of the respective Hebrew versions (divided into segments by roman numerals).

Ezra Gatigno: Paris héb. 1008, fol. 92 ^r	Samuel ben Judah: Paris héb. 956, fol. 348 ^{r-v}	Scholars' version according to Paris héb. 917, fol. 98 ^v	Arabic: Munich arab. 964, fols 82 ^v –83 ^r [variants in Paris héb. 1008, fol. 91 ^r]
<p>אבל אמרנו שהמשתנה מתהווה לא יספיק בו שתמי אם רצינו שנכלול השמים בהכרח תחתיו אבל עד שנקחהו כללי והוא שכל משתנה מתהווה</p>	<p>אבל אמרנו שהנאחז מתהווה לא יספיק בו שיהיה סתמי אם רצינו שנכלול השמים בהכרח תחתיו אבל עד שנקחהו כללי והוא שכל נאחז מתהווה</p>	<p>אבל אמרנו שהמשתנה מתהווה לא יספיק בו שימצא סתמי אם רצינו שנכלול השמים בהכרח תחתיו אבל עד שנקחהו כללי והוא שכל משתנה מתהווה</p>	<p>לכן קולנא אן אל מתחיז [מתחירה] מכון [מתכון] ליס יכפי פיה אן יוכ'ד' מהמלא אן ארדנא אן תנטוי אל סמא באל צ'רורה תחתה בל חתי [מתי] נאכ'ד'ה כליא וְהוּ אן כל מתחיז [מתחיר] מכון [מתכון]</p>
<p>כי הנה בהגעת זה הכללי אצל מה שחקרנו קצת המשתנים [GAP] על מה שדרכו שיגיעו ההקדמות החלקיות בבאור בדמיונים אלא שילקח על צד ההכנה וההיישרה לנפילת האמת בכללות ואם היה שלא יפול לנו אמת כללי אצל מה שהרגשנו קצת המשתנים מתהווים וישאר אצלנו זאת ההקדמה סתמית הנה לא יתחייב מהרגשתנו זאת דבר בהכרח אבל בתחלת הדעת</p>	<p>הנה אם היה הגעת זה הכללי אצל מה שחקרנו קצת הנאחזים על צד מה שדרכו שיגיעו ההקדמות הנסיוניות הנה הביאור בהמשל בזה מותר אם לא שילקח על צד ההבנה וההיישרה לנפילת האמת בכללות ואעפ"י שלא יפול לנו אמת כללי אצל מה שהרגשנו קצת הנאחזים מתהווים וישאר אצלנו זאת ההקדמה סתמית הנה לא יתחייב מהרגשתנו זה הדבר בהכרח אבל בתחלת הדעת</p>	<p>כי הנה בהגעת זה הכללי אצל מה שחקרנו קצת המשתנים הבדל על מה שדרכו שיגיעו ההקדמות החלקיות בבאור בדמיון אלא שילקח על צד ההכנה וההיישרה לנפילת האמת בכלל ואע"פ שלא יפול לנו אמת כללי אצל מה שהרגשנו קצת המשתנים מתהווים וישאר אצלנו זאת ההקדמה סתמית הנה לא יתחייב מהרגשותינו זה דבר בהכרח אבל בתחלת הדעת</p>	<p>פאן [+כאנת] חצלת הד'ה אל כליה ענד מא תצפחנא בעץ' אל מתחיוזאת [מתחיראת] עלי מא שאנה אן יחצל [תחצל] אל מקדמאת אל תג'רביה [GAP + בינה] פאל [באל] תצריח באל מת'אל פי ד'לך פצ'ל אלא אן יוכ'ד' עלי ג'ה'ה אל תפהים ואל ארשאד לוקוע אל יקין באל כליה ואן כאן לם יקע לנא יקין כלי [כלי יקין] ענד מא אחססנא בעץ' אל מתחיוזאת [מתחיראת] מתכונה ובקית ענדנא הד'ה אל מקדמה מהמלה פלם [לם] ילזם ען אחססנא ד'לך שי באצ'טראר בל פי באדי אל ראי</p>

Scholars' version	Samuels' version	Ezras' version
<p>[i] But if we want 'the heavens' to be encompassed apodeictically under it, it is not sufficient for our statement 'the <i>altered</i> is generated' to exist as an indefinite [statement]. [ii] But [the statement will remain insufficient] until we take it universally, i.e., 'every <i>altered</i> is generated'. [iii] For our arrival at this universal by examining some <i>altering</i> things is different from the manner in which particular premises are arrived at, i.e., through explanation by examples. [iv] However, it [i.e., the explanation] is taken to be in the manner of understanding and the direction towards truth²² befalling a universal – [v] even though we do not arrive at a universal truth from our perception that 'some <i>altering</i> things are generated', and this premise remains, for us, indefinite. [vi] Therefore, nothing results necessarily from this perception of ours, except at the beginning of opining.</p>	<p>[i] But if we want 'the heavens' to be encompassed apodeictically under it, it is not sufficient for our statement 'the <i>space-occupying</i> is generated' to be indefinite. [ii] But [the statement will remain insufficient] until we take it universally, i.e., 'every <i>space-occupying</i> is generated'. [iii] For if this universal were arrived at by examining some <i>space-occupying</i> things in the manner by which empirical premises are arrived at, then the explanation by example would be superfluous, [iv] unless it were taken to be in the manner of understanding and the direction towards truth befalling a universal – [v] even though we would not arrive at a universal truth from our perception that 'some <i>space-occupying</i> things are generated', and this premise remains, for us, indefinite. [vi] Therefore, this thing does not result from our perception by necessity, but [results from it] at the beginning of opining.</p>	<p>[i] But if we want 'the heavens' to be encompassed apodeictically under it, it is not sufficient for our statement 'the <i>altered</i> is generated' to be taken as an indefinite [statement]. [ii] But [the statement will remain insufficient] until we take it universally, i.e., 'every <i>altered</i> is generated'. [iii] For our arrival at this universal by examining some <i>alternating</i> things [gap] is in the manner by which particular premises are arrived at, i.e., through explanation by examples, [iv] though it is taken to be in the manner of preparation and the direction towards truth befalling a universal. [v] If we do not arrive at a universal truth from our perception that 'some <i>altering</i> things are generated', and this premise remains, for us, indefinite, [vi] then nothing results necessarily from this perception of ours, except at the beginning of opining.</p>

These quotations show that the terminological confusion between alteration and space-occupancy has now been settled. Throughout the passage, the scholars and Ezra have alteration, while Samuel has space-occupancy. However, other differences surface.

First, in segment [i], we can see that the Arabic string *يوجد* was read in two different ways: the scholars and Samuel read it as *يوجد* (*yūjadu*; 'is', 'exists'), which the formers translate into *ימצא* ('exists') and the latter into *יהיה* ('is') respectively, the difference in meaning being negligible. Ezra's Hebrew version (Paris héb. 1008) seems to have read the string as *تؤخذ* (*tu'khadhu*; 'to be taken as' in the feminine; *תקה*; *tuqqah*).²³ This is different from the Arabic text which runs parallel to the Hebrew in Paris héb. 1008 as well as Munich arab. 964, which both have *يؤخذ* ('to be taken as' in the masculine). This term is grammatically appropriate to 'our statement' in both languages. The effect that this has on how the text is understood is minimal.

²² I have translated this as 'truth' because it is the literal meaning of the Hebrew word *אמת* (*emet*), which is used here. The original Arabic text has *يقيين* (*yaqīn*; 'certainty').

²³ *תקה* can also be read as the second-person singular: 'you take as'.

Segment [iii] contains two problems, which considerably affect the understanding of the text. The first problem is the question of whether the premises 'arrived at' are 'empirical', as in Samuel and Munich (בנסיונות; تجريبية); 'particular' (חלקיות; *جزئية), as in the scholars' version and Ezra's Hebrew, or 'evident' (ביינה), as in Ezra's Arabic (if we ignore the gap). An argument can be made for each option,²⁴ and at least in the case of تجريبية and *جزئية, one could be a corruption of the other. The second problem is that the string فصل was not only read both as فصل (*fasl*; הבדל; 'difference') in the scholars' text and as فضل (*fadl*; מותר; 'superfluous') in Samuel's case (and Munich arab. 964), but also moved from place to place, a confusion that perhaps led to a gap in Ezra's Hebrew version.

The confusion between 'difference' and 'superfluous' leads us to the final segments [iv-vi], because it has bearing not only on the meaning, but also on the syntactical structure of the text. Combined with different understandings of the grammatical functions of the Arabic particles, we arrive at three different syntactical arrangements of the text: the scholars' version has five sentences (i; ii; iii; iv-v; vi); Samuel has four sentences (i; ii; iii-v; vi); and Ezra also has four sentences, but divided differently (i; ii; iii-iv; v-vi).

Taken all together, these differences amount to three different arguments, each corresponding to a different Hebrew version:

1) According to the scholars' version, the statement 'the *altered* is generated' by itself cannot be categorical without the addition of a universal quantifier. There is a difference between the arrival at a universal through examination of a number of *altering* things (perhaps referring to induction) and the arrival at a particular premise, which is through explanation by examples. If this translation reflects what Averroes is trying to say, then the previous sentence could mean that there is a difference between scientific induction and mere use of examples, since the former leads to a universal and the latter does not lead to anything beyond the particular. Still, we can use this as a means of exemplifying the truth of a universal, even if it itself cannot lead to the universal and therefore cannot be definitive. In sum, the perception that some *altering* things are generated does not produce any scientific knowledge, but it can contribute to the initial formation of opinions.

2) According to Samuel's version, the statement 'the *space-occupying* is generated' by itself cannot be categorical without the addition of a universal quantifier. If we arrive at this universal in the way in which we arrive at empirical premises – which probably means scientific induction – then arguing by example is superfluous (we already have the universal), except as a means to exemplify the truth of a universal, despite the indefiniteness of the statement. The indefinite statement is not a necessary consequent of our perception, but rather something that follows our perception in the initial opinion forming.

3) According to Ezra's version, the statement 'the *altered* is generated' by itself cannot be taken to be categorical without the addition of a universal quantifier. In the next sentence, there is a gap that prevents us from understanding the relation between its two parts: the first is arriving at a universal through examination of *altering* things, and the second is the way we arrive at particular premises, which is through explanation by examples. The latter's utility is qualified as preparatory for understanding that a certain universal is true. In sum, if the statement 'some *altering* things are

²⁴ See above, n. 13.

generated', which is arrived at through perception, does not lead to a universally true statement, but remains indefinite, then the only thing that follows from this perception is the initial opinion-forming.

While the overall impression in all versions is roughly the same, there are some differences. It seems that the scholars' version has Averroes explain the difference between scientific induction and generalization based on examples, while Samuel's version has Averroes render arguing by example superfluous once a universal is in hand (the gap in Ezra's text does not enable a meaningful statement in this case). The scholars' text leads to the conclusion that the example has pedagogical rather than scientific value, while Samuel's text leads to the same conclusion, though not through comparison, but by way of what is left once the example's scientific superfluity is established. Finally, Ezra's text echoes the scholars' text, but stresses the conditional relation between the example's failure to arrive at universal truth on the hand, and limiting the scope of examples to opinion formation on the other.

This part of the text does not exhibit significant variation, but taken in aggregation, we have different, subtle modifications of an argument. Since episodes like this run through the entire work, when they are combined, we arrive at a situation in which three texts that seemed identical at 'the beginning of opining' end up being quite different.

6. Conclusion

In his middle commentary on Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, Averroes tells us that 'the example is the rhetorical induction'²⁵ and that unlike induction, the particular statements it uses cannot generate a universal.²⁶ The example has the rhetorical effect of showing something significant about a given subject matter, and the proper use of it is conditioned by our understanding that it cannot graduate towards a scientific proposition. In line with this approach, the present paper does not attempt to arrive at a universal concerning how the Hebrew translation of Averroes's epitome of the *Organon* should be read or the distinctive features of its respective versions. Instead, it is a piece of rhetorical induction, attempting to convince the reader of the advantages of the further pursuit of the methodological approaches it adopts by employing a series of examples in the context of Averroes's discussion of the example. From a limited set of sources, this study has challenged the Arabic text as it has come down to us; shown the inherent mechanical problems of Arabic when converted to Hebrew characters; pointed to traces of translators' struggles in choice of terms with marginal notes and use of gaps; and problematised the syntactic structure of Averroes's argument, which changes with each moment of revision. Though none of this can explain the whole, it can be employed 'as a means of instruction and guidance'.

²⁵ Averroes 1960, 35.

²⁶ Averroes 1960, 46.

Appendix A: Clues about Ezra Gatigno's intellectual persona

So far, I have treated the facing Arabic and Hebrew portions of Paris héb. 1008 as if they were two separate entities, despite the fact that Ezra Gatigno copied them as a multilingual text in which the Hebrew mirrors the Arabic – a unicum in the corpus of Hebrew philosophical manuscripts.²⁷ Since Ezra fashioned a bilingual edition of the work, it would be natural to assume that he was the one who was responsible for the slight revisions we find in his Hebrew text, especially since we do not see them in any other manuscript. One would also expect some sort of relation between the Arabic and the Hebrew. In the example of space-occupancy, the only significant difference in the Hebrew of Ezra's text in comparison to the scholars' version is that the two empty spaces are filled with an expression that aptly conveys the meaning of the Arabic. This indeed gives the initial impression that Ezra changed the Hebrew in front of him by comparing it with the Arabic. However, when we continue reading, space-occupancy disappears and the terminology realigns with the scholars' version, which has 'alteration'.

When we compare the Hebrew with its facing Arabic, we realise that they do not accord. In our example, where Gatigno's text has *aḥizat maqom* ('space-occupancy') twice, the facing Arabic has *takhayyur* ('choice') in the first instance and nothing in the second. Where, as the text continues, the Hebrew has *mishtaneh* ('altering'), the Arabic has *mutaḥayyarah* ('confused'). Looking at the entire passage, it becomes clear that there was no attempt to compare the Hebrew to the Arabic or to correct one according to the other:

²⁷ For 'multilingual manuscripts' see the essays collected in Sövegjártó and Vér 2024.

Paris héb. 1008, fols 91 ^r ; 92 ^r (Hebrew text)	Paris héb. 1008, fols 90 ^v ; 91 ^v (Arabic text)
<p>[1] ומבואר ממה שקדם בספר ההקש שהמאמר המוליד בהכרח אמנם הוא מה שמבואר בו החלק בכל וכאשר היה זה כן הנה הדמיון לא יתחייב ממנו בהכרח מאמר אחר הכרחי ואין הוא מוליד בעצם</p> <p>[2] ודמיון זה שאנחנו כאשר שפטנו על השמים שהם מתהווים להדמותם לגשמים המתהווים באחיזת מקום וההשתנות והדבקות וזולת זה</p> <p>הנה השמים בזה המאמר הוא הקצה הקטן בהקש אחר אשר היה הוא נושא המבוקש והמתהווה הוא הקצה הגדול אחר שהיה הוא נושא המבוקש והגבול האמצעי הוא אחיזת מקום וההשתנות</p> <p>והנה כאשר חברנו ההקש אמרנו השמים משתנים והמשתנה מתהווה אם כן השמים מתהווים</p> <p>[3] אבל אמרנו שהמשתנה מתהווה לא יספיק בו שתקח סתמי אם רצינו שנכלול השמים בהכרח תחתיו אבל עד שנקחהו כללי והוא שכל משתנה מתהווה</p> <p>כי הנה בהגעת זה הכללי אצל מה שחקרנו קצת המשתנים [GAP] על מה שדרכו שיגיעו ההקדמות החלקיות בבאור בדמיונים אלא שילקח על צד ההכנה וההיישרה לנפילת האמת בכלולת</p> <p>ואם היה שלא יפול לנו אמת כללי אצל מה שהרגשנו קצת המשתנים מתהווים וישאר אצלנו זאת ההקדמה סתמית הנה לא יתחייב מהרגשתנו זה דבר בהכרחי אבל בתחלת הדעת</p>	<p>[1] ובין ממה תקדם פי כתאב אל קיאס אן אל קול אל מנתג' באל צ'רורה אנמא הו מא בין פיה אל ג'זי באל כלי ואד'א כאן ד'לך פאל מת'אל ליס ילזם ענה באל צ'רורה קול אכ'ר אצ'טרארא ולא הו מנתג' באל ד'את</p> <p>[2] ומת'אל ד'לך אנא מתי חכמנא אל סמא אנהא מכונה למשאבהתהא ללאג'סאם אל מכונה פי אל תכ'יר ואל תג'יר ואל אתצאל וג'יר ד'לך</p> <p>פאל סמא פי הד'א אל קול הי אל טרף אל אצגר פי אל קיאס אד' כאנת הי מוצ'וע אל מטלוב ואל מכרי הו אל טרף אל אעט'ם אד' כאן הו מחמול אל מטלוב ואל חד אל אוסט הו אל תג'יר [GAP]</p> <p>פמתי אלפנא אל קיאס קלנא הכד'א אל סמא מתחירה ואל מתחיר מכון פאל סמא מכונה</p> <p>[3] לאכן קולנא אן אל מתחירה מתכון ליס יכפי פיה אן יוכ'ד' מהמלא' אן ארדנא אן ננטוי אל סמא פאל צ'רורה תחתה בל חתי יאכ'ד'ה כליא' והו אן כל מתחיר מתכון</p> <p>פאן כאנת חצלת הד'ה אל כליה' ענד מא תצפחנא בעי' אל מתחיראת עלי מא שאנה אן תחצל אל מקדמאת [GAP] ביינה באל תצריה באל מת'אל פי ד'לך פצ'ל אלא אן יוכ'ד' עלי ג'ה' אל תפהים ואל ארשאד לוקוע אל יקין באל כליה'</p> <p>ואן כאן לם יקע לנא כלי יקין ענד מא חססנא בעי' אל מתחיראת מתכונה ובקית ענדנא הד'ה אל מקדמה מהמלה' לם ילזם ען אחססנא ד'לך שי באצ'טראר בל פי באדי אל ראי</p>

This being the case, it is also clear that the revisions we find in the Hebrew text here were not made according to the Arabic text in Paris héb. 1008. Hence it is reasonable to assume that Ezra was not responsible for the revisions contained in the Hebrew version he copied and that the person who was responsible for them is still unknown. Otherwise, we would find ourselves in an absurd situation where Ezra revised the Hebrew translation according to one Arabic model, and copied the Arabic text from another Arabic model, making no effort to harmonise the differences.

Further, we have seen that Ezra's Arabic text contains several errors of transliteration into Hebrew characters. This problem did not escape Butterworth, who criticises the quality of the transliteration,²⁸ and it is not exclusive to this text. In the same codex, Ezra also copied Alfarabi's

²⁸ Averroes 1977, 15–16.

logical work شرائط اليقين (*Sharā'it al-Yaqīn*; 'Conditions of Certainty') in Hebrew characters. Mubahat Türker used this as one of the witnesses for her critical edition of the Arabic text of Alfarabi's treatise.²⁹ The textual variants that she recorded betray several errors of transliteration from Arabic into Hebrew. The same holds for another codex that Ezra copied in the same year (1356), Modena, Biblioteca Estense Universitaria, a.J.6.23, which contains Averroes's middle commentaries on *Generation and Corruption*, *On the Soul*, and *Parva Naturalia* – all in Arabic in Hebrew characters. Scholars working with this manuscript have also noted the poor quality of the Hebrew transliteration, which renders many expressions nonsensical.³⁰ This leads to two options: either Ezra copied from a manuscript that already contained the Arabic in Hebrew characters, testifying to an earlier event of bad transliteration that he did not attempt to correct, or he himself was responsible for the transliteration and hence for the incorrect deciphering of insufficiently dotted Arabic words. Both options cast doubt on the level of Ezra's knowledge of Arabic at that time. Since the peak of Ezra's intellectual activity, in the form of his philosophical biblical commentaries and supercommentaries, occurred several years later (in the 1370s),³¹ we can infer that he was probably quite young, and perhaps early in his philosophical studies, when he wrote the flawed texts in these manuscripts. This would also explain why he was the addressee of Joseph Ibn Vivas's (d. before 1372) Hebrew translation of Maimonides's *Art of Logic* – something that Ezra would not have needed if he had sufficient command of Arabic. Ibn Vivas noted that he translated the work as part of Ezra's training in logic,³² so he might also have had a role in this story.

Appendix B: Abraham de Balmes and the study of Samuel's version

As mentioned earlier, Samuel's version of Averroes's epitome of the *Organon* is barely present in the Hebrew sources of the work that have come down to us. However, in an absolute sense, it is by far the most impactful version of the text – even more so than the Arabic original – since it is the version upon which Abraham de Balmes based his translation into Latin.³³ As such, and with necessary qualification due to the fact that it is a translation and also survives only in print, de Balmes's version is an important source for further exploration of Samuel's translation, especially in cases in which the Latin text differs from what we find in Paris héb. 956. The passage under discussion in the present paper offers us a tentative starting point for reconstructing the transmission process of Samuel's translation. In order for the following discussion to be plausible, I suggest the following hypotheses:

1) The Hebrew word העצור (*he'atzer*) in Paris héb. 956 is a corruption of the word האהז (*he'ahez*), which was Samuel's original translation of the Arabic *tahayyuz*. Although this hypothesis can be

²⁹ Averroes 1963. Türker mentions that Georges Vajda, who helped her with this manuscript, raised suspicions about the text (193).

³⁰ See, for example, Averroes 2021, 71–72; 100–102.

³¹ Schwarz 1996, 52–53.

³² Maimonides 1938, קג.

³³ For the evidence and discussion, see Meyrav forthcoming.

defended from a graphical standpoint, depending on the type of Hebrew script, it is not obvious. The likelihood that *he'atzer* is a corruption is reinforced by (i) the fact that the other appearances of *he'ahez* as a translation of *tahayyuz*, and its derivatives, are consistent in Paris héb. 956; (ii) the fact that *he'atzer* does not have an independent meaning that could translate something graphically similar to *tahayyuz* (in either Arabic or Hebrew scripts); and (iii) the fact that *he'atzer* does not carry a meaning in Hebrew that would fit into the text's narrative.

2) The Hebrew word שווי (*showi*) in Paris héb. 956 is a corruption of the word שנוי (*shinnuy*), which was Samuel's original translation of the Arabic *taghayyur*. This hypothesis is easy to defend based on the graphical similarity of the words and the fact that there is no Arabic word that could be translated into *showi* and is graphically similar (either in Arabic or Hebrew characters) to *taghayyur*. 'Equality' in the present case also does not fit in with Averroes's argument.

Let us now look at the terms that Abraham de Balmes is using according to the *editio princeps* of his translation as compared to Paris héb. 956:

Paris héb. 956 (Samuel's version)	Latin (Abraham de Balmes) ³⁴
העצר <i>he'atzer</i>	<i>soliditas</i>
שווי <i>showi</i>	<i>aequalitas</i>
האhez <i>he'ahez</i>	<i>soliditas</i>
נאhez <i>ne'ehaz</i>	<i>solidum</i>


Now, let us project these terms onto the hypotheses concerning the Hebrew of Paris héb. 956:

1) Abraham has *soliditas* where Paris héb. 956 has first *he'atzer* and then *he'ahez*. Since *soliditas* is doubtlessly a translation of *he'ahez*, two options arise concerning the model for de Balmes's translation: (a) de Balmes's model only contained *he'ahez*, or (b) de Balmes's model contained first *he'atzer* and then *he'ahez*, and he decided to unify the terms either because he considered *he'atzer* to be a corruption or because he took both terms to mean the same thing (unlikely but possible with some stretch of imagination).


2) The fact that Abraham has the term *aequalitas* shows beyond doubt that the Hebrew word that he is translating is *showi* rather than *shinnuy*. This means that this corruption already existed in the model with which he was working.

Based on these considerations, if we were to try to come as close as possible to Samuel's original version, one can argue for the utility of de Balmes's translation because his model had at least equal standing in the tradition as that of Paris héb. 956, and perhaps is even closer to the 'source'. They can be considered to have equal standing if de Balmes's model had *he'atzer* and he nevertheless decided to translate it as *soliditas*:

³⁴ Averroes 1522–1523, 25^r.



De Balmes's model can claim superiority if it had only *he'ahez* and did not have the corrupt *he'atzer*:



This brief discussion, of course, barely qualifies as a beginning. But since sources for Samuel's translation are so scarce, one should use whatever is at one's disposal.

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