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The Role of Volunteers and Political Participation in the 2012 Jakarta Gubernatorial Election

Ahmad Suaedy

Abstract: The changes that occurred in the Jakarta 2012 election may be seen as a change in Indonesia’s social movements and election tradition. They marked a social movement with special characteristics; specifically, a ‘partisan’ movement, led by the successful Jokowi–Ahok ticket. The partisan social movement also changed the tradition of money politics, which has always coloured general and local elections in Indonesia. This paper found four main factors in Jokowi–Ahok’s victory. The first was their reputations and track records of leadership and consistency, which, secondly, encouraged unpaid volunteers to motivate the public to participate in the election and vote for the pair. Thirdly, in contrast to previous social movements in Indonesia, the volunteers did not just work to overthrow the current leadership and replace it, and then distance themselves, but instead continued to monitor the candidates; some managed government directly, while others took watch dog position. Fourthly, the relationship between volunteers and local government was not necessarily oppositional. As such, they were partisan not only in that they were supporters of a pair of candidates, but also in their promotion and support of openness, anti-corruption efforts and provision of maximum public services.

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Keywords: Indonesia, participation, partisan social movement, volunteer

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Introduction

The changes that occurred in the 2012 Jakarta gubernatorial election can be seen as a change in social movements in politics rather than just ordinary political changes. The social movement with special characteristics, which could be described as ‘partisan’. This phenomenon changed the tradition of social movements in Indonesia, which have so far remained separated from political parties or candidates in an attempt to cause radical change and uphold claims of being non-partisan. On the other hand, the involvement of volunteers also changed the tradition of elections in Indonesia, which have traditionally been expensive and corrupt due to money politics.

This research¹ focuses on volunteers of the non-official Jokowi–Ahok campaign team. These volunteers were connected to the official team created by political parties through a very loose and flexible structure or perhaps what Geoff Norquay (2008) calls “organising without an organisation”. The volunteers seem to be more united by their common purpose and commitment to what they have referred to as the “New Jakarta” (Jakarta Baru), abbreviated as “JB”, which is also associated with Jokowi (Joko Widodo)–Basuki (Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, often called Ahok), the running mates for governor and vice-governor in the 2012 Jakarta gubernatorial election. The “New Jakarta” slogan emerged out of a combination of the track records of Jokowi and Ahok and the aspirations their supporters and volunteers have for Jakarta in the future (see, for example, Ganz 2009).

Partisan Social Movements

To date, the study of social movements in Indonesia has mostly focused on non-partisan groups that are independent of or neutral to political parties and candidates in the political process (Budiman et al. 2001; Kusuma et al. 2003; Gardono 2006). These movements have pushed for change from outside the formal political system because they felt the system itself was unable to produce change (Wiktorowicz 2007). As such, non-partisan social movements are often more limited in terms of the change they can bring about, the objectives they strive for, and their difficulty in ensuring that the impact of change is permanent and wide-

1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the International Seminar ‘Social Political and Economic Reform in Southeast Asia: Assessment and The Way Forward,’ Jakarta, 9–12 March 2013, organised by the LIPI-JSPS Asian Core Program and CSEAS-Kyoto University.

spread across the system. These movements often result in reinforcement of the influence and authority of the initiator of change and to transform the movement into a closed organisation, which ultimately depends on the initiator (Suaedy 2009: 15–24).

Social movements “mobilize resources and engage in collective action in order to make an impact” on the political process (Amenta 2005: 29) and the democratic system requires and even nourishes social movements because democracy does not always guarantee equality and justice for everyone (Goldstone 2003: 1–24). Social movements in a democratic country can, of course, be non-partisan or partisan. The partisan social movements that have direct relationships with certain candidates or political parties, or with bureaucrats, can have a higher chance of achieving their agenda and bringing permanent and systematic change to the formal democracy controlled by the oligarchs because the movements have partners in the formal system and can constantly check what is going on in the formal politics (Goldstone 2003: 1–24). The leaders who are engaged in these movements may be closer to what Antonio Gramsci calls organic intellectuals. According to Gramsci, these organic intellectuals differ from traditional intellectuals, who possess knowledge and technical skills, because they refer to their activism rather than their sophisticated knowledge in their struggle against hegemony (Jones 2006).

Here, partisan social movements refer to movements in which the actors side with a political party or a candidate in an electoral democracy with an agenda for change that differs from the existing and well-established system. The candidates supported by these movements are not always from within their own membership but sometimes the actors of the movement place trust in leaders from other groups or political parties as being able to bring about desired changes (Ganz 2009). Leaders are expected to be agents of change to the oligarchic political structure, and the volunteer associations are essential in the movements. Volunteerism in the associations could be “a source of renewal of civic values on which polity depends”, which contributes to the creation of collective capacity – a key to making democracy work in tandem with the protection of the individual liberties (Ganz 2009: 2–3).

The term volunteering, as used in this paper, refers to a collective desire to create systematic change through the procedures that already exist, but with the awareness that the change cannot come from the dominant actors and institutions. The volunteers described in this paper were generally not field officers paid by the parties supporting the Jokowi–Ahok pair, nor the officers tasked by the campaign team to monitor polling booths. Instead, they organised themselves spontane-

ously and sought to influence the public to vote for the best candidates, regardless of their party affiliation. As the election process continued, the volunteers met and made direct and indirect contact with the paid officers who were officially tasked with monitoring polling booths; with the supporters who were independently monitoring the election and were being paid by a third party; and with individuals who had been directly recruited to handle specific issues, either in the campaign team or in government after the election was over. The emergence of these volunteers in the 2012 Jakarta gubernatorial election was phenomenal and had a significant influence on the election results. This paper aims to analyse this partisan social movement by these volunteers: how they emerged and organised themselves during the election campaigns and how they continue to keep checks on the new Jokowi–Ahok administration.

Competition in the Jakarta Election

On 11 July, 2012, the night before the Jakarta gubernatorial election, a number of survey institutes predicted Foke (Fauzi Bowo)–Nara (Nachrowi Ramli) as the most likely of the five contesting pairs to win the election, partly because Foke was the incumbent governor of the Jakarta province (Nainggolan 2012). In fact, several observers, as well the campaign team for Foke–Nara, expected the pair would win with at least 51 per cent of the vote. However, when the final count was announced by the General Election Commission on 18 July 2012, Jokowi–Basuki (pair no. 3) had won with 42.0 per cent of the vote. Foke–Nara (no. 1) had to be satisfied with second position, with 34.1 per cent (Umar 2012).

Jakarta gubernatorial election law regulates that if no pair obtains more than 50 per cent of the votes, a second round of elections will be contested by the two pairs with the most votes.² In this case, the pair with the largest number of votes (Jokowi–Ahok), and the pair with the second largest votes (Foke–Nara) had to run off in a second round of votes

Jokowi–Ahok beat Foke–Nara by more than 8 per cent in the first round, but right up to the night before the second round (held on 20 September, 2012), some pollsters still doubted that Jokowi–Ahok could win the election. This was because, following their unexpected defeat to

2 Law 29/2007 made a special regulation for the Jakarta gubernatorial election that differed from local head elections in other areas, where a pair of local head and vice-local head candidates can win the election if they obtain more than 30 per cent of the votes.

Jokowi–Basuki, Foke–Nara had created a new and aggressive strategy, exploiting some advantages they had, including sectarian issues. Besides both being Muslim, both Foke and Nara are also Betawi, an indigenous ethnic group in Jakarta. Since the 1998 *reformasi*, sectarian issues such as *putra daerah* (original inhabitants) and Islamic piety have been frequently and successfully manipulated to mobilise voters in elections in many parts of Indonesia (see Aspinall and Mietzner 2010). This again applied in metropolitan Jakarta (Arifin 2007).

Foke was an incumbent provincial governor and a member of the supervisory board of the ruling Democratic Party (Partai Demokrat, PD) headed by the president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY). That is why he had extensive resources, both in terms of funds and political support. Meanwhile, his running mate for vice-governor, Nara, was the chairman of the provincial office of PD in Jakarta and also chairman of the Betawi Consultative Body (Badan Musyawarah Masyarakat Betawi, Bamus Betawi), the umbrella organisation for major Betawi social organisations.³ In addition, Foke–Nara could garner support not only from the political parties that supported them in the first round, PD, People’s Conscience Party (Hati Nurani, Hanura), National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, PKB), but also other major political parties that lost in the first round like Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS) and National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional, PAN), and Party of the Functional Groups (Partai Golongan Karya, Golkar). Jokowi–Ahok was supported only by the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, PDIP) and the Greater Indonesia Movement Party (Gerakan Indonesia Raya, Gerindra), both in the first and second rounds.⁴ In the second round, the Faisal–Biem team publicly refused to support the Foke–Nara ticket, although it did not explicitly endorse Jokowi–Ahok (Basri 2012).

Others outside the official Foke–Nara campaign team raised these sectarian issues. A typical example was Rhoma Irama, a famous *dangdut* singer who openly opposed any non-Muslim leadership in Indonesia. During a sermon in a mosque, Rhoma claimed that it was unlawful for Muslims to choose a *kaafir* or infidel leader (Irama 2012). He asserted that Jokowi’s mother was a Christian (an allegation Rhoma later said was quoted from a source on the Internet) (Irama and Jokowi 2012a), while

3 In many informal discussions, the incumbents, who also held strategic positions in PD, the ruling party, enabled the unfair use of resources, power and money.

4 Jokowi had described the second round of voting as a fight between an elephant (Foke–Nara) and an ant (Jokowi–Ahok).

his partner, Ahok, was both Chinese and Christian (Irama and Jokowi 2012b).⁵

Officials from the Indonesian Ulema Council (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI, the top Muslim clerical body in Indonesia) and its Central Jakarta branch also urged Muslims in Jakarta to elect a Muslim leader, even to the point of a split between clerics within the organisation over whether, for Islamic reasons, Muslims should support Foke–Nara (Roma Irama and MUI are discussed in *Gatra Magazine* 2012a). Marzuki Alie, the speaker of the People’s Representative Council (DPR) (Alie 2012) and a member of the Democratic Party’s Advisory Council, also implored voters to elect Muslim candidates; namely Foke–Nara.

More vehement references to sectarian issues that supported Foke–Nara and sought to discredit Jokowi–Basuki were made by preachers at various religious sermons, including Friday sermons at various mosques, as well as via anonymous text messages (*Gatra Magazine* 2012b: 88–89). In general, the argument ran along the line of “choosing a leader of the same religion (and ethnicity)” to direct votes towards Foke–Nara.

Jokowi–Ahok also demonstrated resourcefulness. In the second round, the voluntary groups behind Jokowi and Ahok, or the “community without form”,⁶ became more knowledgeable and also increasingly well organised. Community engagement expanded to reach a wider audience with continual meetings, posting of sympathetic messages on various social media platforms and “*blusukan*” visits to people’s homes.⁷ Various independent monitoring agencies were also established that worked to support transparency and prevent manipulation of voting. They did not specifically support Jokowi–Ahok, but their activities were

5 In his response during a live discussion on television, while Jokowi forgave Rhoma for the allegations, he stated that both his father (deceased) and his mother had made the Hajj 13 years previously, and that he himself had gone on the pilgrimage but did not need to exhibit that to the public. See Irama and Jokowi 2012b.

6 This phenomenon has been referred to variously as “organisations without form (OWF)”, “communities without form (CWF)”, “people power”, “people’s coalition” or even just “volunteers”. Jokowi himself acknowledged that “volunteers” were the most important element in his election as governor of the Indonesian capital city, Jakarta. In this paper, I have used the term “partisan social movement”.

7 Interview with members of the campaign team, Eva Kusuma Sundari (13 February 2013). The term “*blusukan*” in Javanese means to go around from one rural area to another. During the campaign, Jokowi preferred to visit rural regions, run-down places and the poorer areas within Jakarta to meet with the people face to face and engage them in dialogue, listening to their complaints and suggestions, rather than making campaign speeches from stages.

in tune with the Jokowi–Ahok campaign and helped strengthen the pair’s popularity.

The activities of these voluntary groups were particularly active during the second round and definitely contributed to Jokowi–Ahok’s victory. According to Haryadi, an observer of the Jakarta Election from Airlangga University in Surabaya, if Jokowi and Ahok had only been supported by PDIP and Gerindra, they would not have won without the hard work and intense involvement of their volunteers (Haryadi 2012a). Jokowi and Ahok themselves acknowledged the central role of volunteers, as well as their parties, Gerindra and PDIP (Haryadi 2012b).

Volunteers worked informally and unofficially, and helped official supporters, for instance by monitoring polling booths.⁸ They worked conventionally (by overseeing vote collection and counting from ballot boxes to the Election Commission) and unconventionally (by using modern communication devices such as sending messages through social media from the polling stations and Quick Counts by various survey organisations). They also worked hand in hand with reporting institutions, some of which produced reports independently generated from these unconventional methods. An example was the report by the Jakarta FeD (e-Democracy Forum),⁹ an online site that reports directly through online media and includes photographs of the paper counts (Form C-2) of each polling station; these were accurate and thorough, allowing results to be tallied on the spot.

According to Hasan Hasbi Batu Pahat (director of the Cyrus Network, Jokowi–Ahok’s political consultant) the Jokowi–Ahok campaign team from PDIP and Gerindra also mobilised voluntary witnesses for each polling station. A total of 45,000 official volunteers from Jokowi–Ahok’s campaign team offered to act as witnesses and observers at polling stations, which meant at least three at each polling station (Interviews with Pahat, 12 July 2013). However, unofficial volunteers outnumbered official volunteers, and were formed under the initiative of individuals

8 By law, official witnesses carry a mandate and have the right to protest or question processes at polling stations, or transferring of votes to subdistricts, districts and the regional General Election Commission units. Meanwhile, voluntary witnesses only provide moral support to official witnesses at polling booths and also accompany votes to the subdistrict and district branches, or to the General Election Commission.

9 FeD Jakarta 2013. From the moment that voting began, FeD Jakarta provided direct reporting through its website, giving data, polling booth addresses, the number of voters who had attended a polling booth, running tallies of votes for each pair, the number of no-votes, and photos of the count sheets from each polling booth (Form C-2).

and groups in the community, both among the upper-middle class and the lower-middle classes. JASMEV.com, a platform for Jokowi–Ahok Social Media Volunteers tasked with organising volunteers online, recorded at least 100,200 volunteers who officially registered through the site (*jasmev.com* 2013). This number did not include volunteers who did not register (discussed later).

Who Are Jokowi and Basuki?

Jokowi was serving his second term as Mayor of Surakarta (Solo), Central Java, representing PDIP, when he ran for the Jakarta governorship. Prior to being mayor, Jokowi had been an exporter of wood furniture from Surakarta for 23 years. Jokowi ran in the mayoral race having received a letter of recommendation from the central board of PDIP without any payment to the party. Jokowi chose the local branch head of PDIP in Solo, Fransiskus Xaverius Hadi Rudyanto (then the mayor of Solo) as his vice-mayoral candidate. Jokowi self-financed the entire electoral process.¹⁰

Jokowi ran for a second term in 2010 and, without spending any money on his campaign, won by a landslide – 92 per cent of votes. “The survey results suggested that more than 80 per cent of people would elect me, so why would I campaign?”, Jokowi said (Endah 2012).¹¹ He had made Surakarta into a city that was friendly to the petit traders and the poor, and limited the presence of the mega-malls that tended to displace them. Jokowi also turned Surakarta into a clean and ordered city, which became a cultural centre with revitalised local and traditional arts. He was even nominated as the best mayor in the world by the City Mayors Foundation in 2012 (for which he won third prize) (*worldmayor.com* 2012).

Perhaps the most prominent move from Jokowi was the promotion of the Esemka car, engineered by students of a vocational high school (Sekolah Menengah Kejurusan, SMK) in Solo several months before the Jakarta election. Jokowi intended to promote this locally-produced car as a “national car” (Ayuningtyas 2012). For several weeks, this programme to build a national car was featured in newspapers and on televisions in Jakarta and in regional areas across Indonesia, putting Jokowi in the national spotlight. Even though the production of new vehicles must

10 It is unclear how much Jokowi paid to finance his 2005 Surakarta election campaign.

11 Among the many books published on Jokowi recently is Supriyoo et al. 2012.

pass emission and roadworthiness tests in Jakarta, and it was not clear whether this particular car would pass those tests, the news about Jokowi and his programme continued to circulate for some time. Jokowi initially displayed no interest in running for the governorship of Jakarta, despite urging from many parties. He was eventually nominated by the head of the PDIP party, Megawati Sukarnoputri. Jokowi did feel quite confident he could win (Endah 2012).

Meanwhile, Basuki aka Ahok was the Regent of East Belitung, a regency in the Bangka-Belitung province in 2005. He was a regent for approximately one and a half years before running for governor of Bangka-Belitung. Basuki, like Jokowi, impressed the Bangka-Belitung community with his high accountability and strong commitment to improving the welfare of his people, especially the poor. He developed systems that provided them with greater access to services and information and has continued to have a positive impact. In the following election in 2009, Basuki nominated himself via one of the largest political parties Golkar (Golongan Karya Party, Party of the Functional Groups) to become a member of the national parliament (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR). Through his official website (<www.ahok.org>), he publicly disclosed his income and the funds he had used while acting as a member of parliament and later as vice governor; this led people to appreciate his transparent behaviour and public accountability. Presenting himself as clean, transparent, and professional (*bersih, transparan, profesional*), Ahok was often interviewed and asked to comment on television concerning corruption, public service, and the desirable behaviour of a public servant.

Basuki did not go through a long candidacy process with Gerindra. Basuki was a member of DPR from the Golkar Party, but decided to leave Golkar and DPR in the lead-up to the Jakarta gubernatorial election to join Gerindra and seek nomination as vice-governor of Jakarta province. Ahok is well known as a former regent of East Belitung, a regency (*kabupaten*) in the Bangka-Belitung province, and for having been close to his people and financially transparent (Purnama 2011). Ahok is Chinese and Christian and believes that Indonesia is not a prejudiced country and does not discriminate against minorities. On several occasions, Ahok highlighted the fact that although 93 per cent of residents of Bangka-Belitung were Muslim, they elected him as regent, and even as a DPR member. He also noted that his nomination as a vice-gubernatorial candidate in Jakarta was not an issue, even though Jakarta is the home of ethnic Betawi and Muslims are in the majority in Jakarta (Purnama 2011).

Checkered Shirts, and Jakarta Health and Education (Smart) Cards

News that Jokowi would run as candidate for governor of Jakarta attracted widespread interest among people who had heard about his term as a mayor of Surakarta. They heard that Jokowi's programmes had solved many longstanding problems that his predecessors had failed to fix, notably the regulation of street vendors and the maintenance of traditional markets catering to poorer traders and consumers (Jokowi 2012a). Jokowi had also introduced cards to help people in lower socio-economic groups easily access free education and health. He provided the community with services through which they could quickly and easily obtain ID cards and licenses, similar to the service received at banks. Jokowi also consistently limited the growth of malls and chain retail stores controlled by big businesses to protect the poor. He also promoted cultural arts and performances, as well as municipal facilities to attract tourists, paying attention to the city's safe and convenient transportation and cleanliness (Endah 2012). News of Jokowi's success and his concern for his people spread through information outlets, including social media and YouTube. This was substantially validated when he won various awards for such achievements as serving the people, fighting against corruption, and promoting a clean city (*Wikipedia* 2013).

The calls to nominate Jokowi as governor came not from Jakartans but strongly from Surakartans, both those residing in and outside Surakarta. A long time prior to this, several researchers and political consultants had suggested Jokowi's name as an appropriate candidate.¹² After the decision was made that Jokowi would run as a candidate, Megawati called on all PDIP elements, including governors, mayors/regents and members of parliament across Indonesia, to support Jokowi.¹³ Jokowi-Basuki's unblemished track records had given new hope and built trust among the people of Jakarta who were unsatisfied with the performance of the incumbents, accelerating their political participation with some optimism for politics.

One of Jokowi's most striking acts was to wear a simple and inexpensive "checkered shirt (*baju kotak-kotak*)", bought from a popular but humble Tanah Abang Market, as his official clothing, in order to brand his and Ahok's campaign (Endah 2012). On registration day, instead of

12 Interview with members of the campaign team Eva Kusuma Sundari (12 February 2013). Also see *Tempo Magazine* 2012: 101–103.

13 Interview with members of the campaign team (12 February 2013).

the expensive shirts that other candidates usually wore, Jokowi and Basuki wore checkered shirts, which soon became their trademark. For Jokowi, the checkered shirts also served as a convenient sign for the campaign team and volunteers. However, the shirts were not distributed for free (to gain support), but were sold, with the volunteers using the proceeds to further fund their campaigns. Although many people received free checkered shirts, this was generally not through the campaign team, but from supporters who had bought the shirts and distributed them to the people of their own volition.

Registration at local election commissions usually involves long processions of new and expensive as candidates arrive to register themselves. In contrast, Jokowi chose to ride on public transport, the Metromini and Kopaja vehicles – very simple means of transport without air conditioning that the lower classes use on a daily basis in Jakarta. This further distinguished Jokowi from other candidates, as well as the common political process and the election in general.

While campaigning and debating and meeting the people, Jokowi discussed two main programmes: the Jakarta Health Card (*Kartu Jakarta Sehat*, KJS) and the Jakarta Smart Card (*Kartu Jakarta Pintar*, KJP). The KJP was a guarantee of free education for all school-age children through high school who held a Jakarta ID card. The programme not only provides free education for the poor, but the schools are also given all the necessities for schooling, such as uniforms, books and money for everyday transportation (Jokowi 2012a). The KJS is a card with which all Jakarta residents can obtain free medical treatment in all hospitals and clinics, both public and private. This card can only be used in grade-three hospitals, so as to stop the rich and the elite from choosing the free service as they would usually choose a higher grade. The poor are not only given free treatment in grade-three hospitals, but are also guaranteed all types of treatment, from dialysis to chemotherapy.

Trust, Collective Action and Going to Ballot

Immediately after the first round of voting, *Kompas*' Research and Development (Nainggolan 2012) section commented that the results of the first round had overturned survey predictions that the incumbent pair Foke–Nara would win. The review suggested that Jokowi and Basuki's success was due to swing voters who had made their decision at the last minute. However, there was no decrease in the number of people who abstained from voting compared to previous general and regional elections. One and a half more people did not vote than voted for Jokowi–

Ahok (KPU 2012a). There was only a decrease in abstention in the second round, estimated at approximately 4 per cent (Anggraini 2012).

It is hard to estimate exactly how many people volunteered for Jokowi–Ahok, except for those officially sworn in to be witnesses at polling stations. Most voluntary groups were established of their own accord. Those who worked individually and those who worked in groups were both motivated to be involved in the election process primarily by Jokowi and Ahok’s reputable track records in managing and building their own cities/regencies, their openness and closeness to their people, as well as their distance from corruption, including in the candidacy period. They were motivated less by Jokowi’s awards from various institutes in different fields, and more by his commitment and sincerity in building his region and favouring the poor when he was a mayor and a regent.

As a result, although a number of volunteers indicated that they did not trust political parties or the election process, and they of course knew that Jokowi–Ahok were nominated by political parties, they supported Jokowi–Ahok in the election. Jokowi–Ahok’s track record had given them hope for improved management of Jakarta that would favour the less privileged classes. Some older volunteers said that they had rarely voted, or were voting for the first time, largely because of their distrust in parties, politicians and the rampant manipulation and money politics within the democratic system, but Jokowi and Ahok had renewed their trust in the democratic political process. In fact, as a strategy to avoid society’s mistrust of political parties and politicians, a number of activists from parties or politicians themselves temporarily became volunteers, leaving their political party identities behind.

Volunteers had a range of different religious affiliations, ethnicities, social classes, professions, hobbies, origins and education. Some were from political parties or were friends of party activists who had cast aside their party identities, while others had no affiliation at all to political parties, or had initially sympathised with another pair of candidates before shifting. The volunteers’ areas of operation also differed, being defined either by geographical territory, segments of society, or virtual/real world. Each group of volunteers was generally formed out of the initiatives of several people, with a number of others joining later. Their methods also varied. Some worked in a systematic and organised manner within a group of volunteers, while others worked alone, only contacting a group if they needed campaign items such as t-shirts, or checkered shirts, brochures or other information. No volunteers, except those officially sworn in to be witnesses at polling stations, received any pay-

ment. Some were given checkered shirts or free t-shirts at events, but many more also purchased their own, helped distribute or sell checkered shirts to supporters, the proceeds of which went back to fund their activities.¹⁴

In the first round, the relationship between the volunteers and the campaign team was not as consolidated as it became in the second round. The volunteers tended to work sporadically on their own, although several had met with Jokowi and Ahok and their supporters. Only Jokowi and his “Siluman Team/Invisible Team”¹⁵ – that is, those who engaged in “underground” research and mapping – had the support of a number of key figures in several volunteer communities. However, in the second round, they established more systematic relationships and communication that not only relied on arbitrary, private communication with Jokowi–Basuki and their invisible team, but was also more structured. Although there was no strict control, the campaign team periodically provided feedback to volunteers about important issues that needed to be raised with the community, especially concerning negative news about Jokowi or Ahok, such as the poverty rate in Solo and the rumour that Jokowi’s mother was Christian.¹⁶ The team also reminded volunteers to always abide by Jokowi’s ethics. Jokowi himself always told volunteers not to break the rules, not to use foul language or insult others or break the law by putting up banners and stickers on the streets.

Jokowi also received a lot of help from the “Siluman Team”.¹⁷ This team was important for communication between Jokowi, his volunteers and the community of supporters. Jokowi brought this team from Solo and tasked them with mapping the volunteers and community, as well as issues in society. They also investigated the support bases of other candidates to find out how much support they had in society. It was this

14 Hasan Nasbi Batu Pahat, Director of Cyrus and a consultant for Jokowi–Ahok, claimed to have made a profit from the sale of checkered shirts. From an initial 300,000,000 IDR (30,000 USD) that his institute used to buy Cyrus checkered shirts, he made about 1.5 billion IDR (150,000 USD), and sought no compensation for his consulting services. Interview 12 July 2013.

15 “*Siluman*” literally means “invisible”. It refers to a group of people who are very close to Jokowi and work to collect data and analyse it before Jokowi or Ahok wish to make a field trip. This team also advises which groups need to be met and what decisions are good for certain groups or regions. It is from this data and analysis that the two make their decisions. This “invisible” manner was not unique to Jokowi in the Jakarta election; he had also used it when he was mayor of Solo, and at least a year after becoming governor of Jakarta.

16 Jokowi’s opponents used these two cases to delegitimise his candidacy.

17 Interview with two members of the “Siluman team” (10 March 2013).

team that told Jokowi where his volunteers were and which communities he should approach to connect Jokowi with relevant volunteers. Before Jokowi met with these communities, the team had already prepared a list of issues and solutions to be discussed. Therefore, at every visit, Jokowi always had a prepared set of data and a number of solutions.

The central communication hub for volunteers was located at a former office of PDIP at Diponegoro Street, while the centre for the campaign team – where communication between the campaign team and the volunteers was established – was located at 22 Borobudur Street. Because numerous volunteers operated in the virtual world, such as on Facebook and Twitter, a coordinator named Kartika Djoemadi (aka Dee),¹⁸ was designated to coordinate the virtual world through a virtual community platform called JASMEV.com. JASMEV stands for “Jokowi–Ahok Social Media Volunteers” and refers to the volunteers who supported Jokowi–Ahok’s campaign via social media. The institution then conducted an inventory of and online registration for volunteers.

Dee compared election to a war on three levels. The first was a land war, which is the struggle for public trust through face-to-face meetings or through print media. The second level was an air war, which is the competition in mainstream media, especially television. Both Jokowi and Ahok could be directly involved in the land and air “wars”. Volunteers could arrange for either Jokowi or Ahok to meet with people in various situations. Jokowi was loved by the media, so it was not hard to achieve coverage in the mainstream media, even without ‘buying’ it. In fact, the media often chased after Jokowi and Ahok for stories.

The third level was a cyber war, a term that particularly described the war in social media. This war barely involved Jokowi and Ahok directly; although both have Twitter and Facebook accounts, communication was more one-way than reciprocal. Both did and still use their accounts to inform supporters about their programmes or to seek input, but not to communicate directly with individuals. This is where the virtual world volunteers stepped in to provide two-way communication with fans and critics alike. The relationship between these volunteers and the campaign team was purely concerned with supply of the strategic issues that needed to be raised, but there was no strict control. Jokowi or Ahok only met them once or twice to suggest that their postings remain ethical and refrain from raising sectarian issues, insults or using coarse languages. Jokowi suggested responding gently with rational and accurate data when provoked.

18 Interview with Dee (3 April 2012).

In the land war, the territorial reach of volunteers varied according to their abilities. A group of volunteers was not necessarily only active in the region in which they lived and the surrounding areas since they did not have to be organised structurally or territorially. Recruitments of volunteers and networks, for example, were carried out through friendships, family relationships or even chance introductions. Volunteers would then go their separate ways to mobilise others, but would continue to communicate and coordinate. Each group could ask the campaign team to schedule a meeting with Jokowi or Ahok, so that voters could meet with the two candidates. These meetings were sometimes formally prepared with tents, chairs and sound systems set up, but at other times were more relaxed, taking place in open locations with people sitting on mats, or gatherings in front of houses or in alleys, and would move quickly between different places. Jokowi also often visited marginal locations such as slums, garbage dumps, riverbanks, through narrow alleys and areas susceptible to flooding. Unlike public campaigns by other candidates, who generally gave formal speeches from a staged hall, Jokowi and Ahok preferred direct, informal dialogues and avoided using rented buildings, entertainment stages or making formal speeches.

Working Methods of Jokowi–Ahok Volunteers: Three Battlefields

Three examples of volunteer groups active in the “land war” are reviewed here. The first is a group that calls itself “Volunteers for a New Jakarta” (Relawan Penggerak Jakarta Baru, RPJB) and is active in three villages in Condet, East Jakarta. Those villages were Balai Kambang, Batu Ampar and Kampung Tengah, with a partner village in Manggarai. A number of senior NGO activists lived in these three villages. Although the activists had never voted in an election, they heard Jokowi’s story and his gubernatorial candidacy and then rushed to volunteer, approaching members of the community to help promote Jokowi’s programmes that had been successful in Solo for implementation in Jakarta. Many men and women in the three villages became volunteers and established a kind of network through which they then approached other elements of society. They contacted another senior NGO activist who lived in Manggarai, 20 km away, who then established a network there.

During the first campaign period, Jokowi visited the two regions, and although he gave them nothing other than discussions and an explanation of the Jakarta Health (KJS) and Education (KJP) cards, those meetings seemed to satisfy the volunteers. The second campaign period

was more systematic, however, as RPJB coordinated with the campaign team and scheduled a return visit to the areas for Jokowi. They also published a simple weekly newsletter to provide more comprehensive written explanations. Apart from some help from Jokowi's team with printing, no further funding was provided. Jokowi–Ahok did not win the votes in these three villages, in either the first or second round, but these villages were part of a Foke–Nara base as Nara resided there, and had strong support for PD and PKS.¹⁹ At the very least, intervention from RPJB volunteers ensured Foke–Nara did not win outright.

The second example is Haji Ghozali's group in Tanah Abang.²⁰ Ghozali is a second-generation Islamic leader (*imam*) at the Al-Makmur mosque, the largest mosque near Tanah Abang market. As a community leader, Ghozali has extensive contacts amongst civil society but also in government at the provincial, regency and district levels where he lives in Klender. Haji Ghozali also has a house in Klender, East Jakarta, which means he has a network of volunteers for Jokowi–Ahok in Tanah Abang and several areas in Klender. Originally, before he was approached by Jokowi, Ghozali was a supporter of Foke, yet he was also close to Prijanto, the vice-governor of Foke, who resigned part way through his term due to a bad relationship with Foke. Under Prijanto's instructions, Jokowi visited Ghozali's house and appealed for his help before he registered as a candidate. Jokowi twice invited Ghozali to Solo to see how the city was being run under his leadership. Intrigued by Jokowi's approach, Ghozali became a volunteer, although not a formal volunteer under Jokowi's campaign team. He worked in regions where he had good relations with the community, through his associations, religious sermons and during general meetings. His task as volunteer involved distributing information about Jokowi and his programmes and inviting Jokowi to visit certain places to meet people. He also coordinated a number of volunteers to help them extend the areas they reached, both in Tanah Abang and in Klender.

The third example is Edy Ganifullah Hasan,²¹ a man who does odd jobs in the printing industry. He had become an advisor for mass organisations in Jakarta that have been associated with violence and *preman* (“thugs” or “petty gangsters”) organisations such as FBR (Forum Betawi Rempug – Ethnic Betawi Forum), Forkabi (Betawi Youth Communica-

19 Interviews with two senior activists, Hilmar Farid (3 February 2012 and 4 July 2013) and Pitono (4 January 2012).

20 Interviews with H. Ghozali (10 February 2013 and 2 June 2013).

21 Interviews with Edy G. Hasan (10 February 2012, 10 June 2013 and 12 September 2013).

tion Forum), POB (Union of Ethnic Betawi), PMB (Perhimpunan Masyarakat Betawi – Organisation of Betawi People), FPI (Front Pembela Islam – Islamic Defender Front) and so on (see Hadiz 2003; Kristiansen 2003, for the political role of *preman*) living in Johar Baru, Central Jakarta. Although Edy is not actually a *preman* himself, he has extensive connections and is often contacted by *preman* groups in the area. Johar Baru is an area with high population density and diverse ethnic composition, known for daily conflict and violence. After hearing about Jokowi and Ahok, Edy used his extensive knowledge of youth organisations, which are often popular with the unemployed, to support Jokowi's programme and help resolve issues in the region. Under Foke's leadership, there had been no progress in addressing these issues in society. As with the others, Edy worked voluntarily and had no initial direct relationship with Jokowi and Ahok. Edy supported Jokowi because he felt that Jokowi's track record and promises would help address *premanism* and unemployment in the region. Edy delivered a speech at a large meeting at the campaign office at Jl. Borobodur 22, after which he established a relationship with the campaign team and other volunteers, connecting them to the territory over which his network spanned. In the second round of voting, Edy was no longer limited to his territory, but worked across Jakarta with those social organisations that had reputations for being violent troublemakers. After the election was over and Jokowi and Ahok had won, Haji Ghozali and Edy G. Hasan formed a mass organisation under the name "Jakarta People's Aspiration Station" (Terminal Aspirasi Rakyat Jakarta Raya, abbreviated as Teras Raja Jaya), which focuses specifically on cleaning up the environment and removing rubbish from the neighbourhoods. Haji Ghozali is currently the chairman and Edy G. Hasan is the secretary-general.

As in the land war, the virtual world consists of individuals and groups, but the majority of groups were formed out of private initiatives that became groups on Facebook or followers on Twitter, though there were also some who maintained private accounts but stayed in touch with other individuals or groups of volunteers. Others, such as kaskus.co.id, were groups from the beginning, which used the online world as a communication tool.

Kaskus.co.id claims to be "the largest Indonesian community" and was established at the end of 1999, at the start of the reformasi. There are allegedly more than three million Kaskus members around the

world.²² As a bulletin board, Kaskus is not just a discussion forum but also a place to advertise goods for sale, a place for football fans to gather, and even has a radio station. The Jokowi–Ahok case was the first time Kaskus had been involved in supporting a candidate in an election. Initially, individuals on Kaskus started to campaign for the pair because of the stories about them in the media. Many members shared similar ideas, and a pro-Jokowi–Ahok group was formed within Kaskus. For more internal, less public matters, this group formed its own restricted group within the Kaskus network, taking the name JbKaskus on Facebook and @JbKaskus on Twitter. Here they formulated materials to campaign for Jokowi–Ahok before going public with them, adhering to Jokowi’s request to avoid negative campaigning against other parties. They eventually grouped under the coordination of JASMEV.com.

Others, such as @RelawanMudaJakarta (@YoungVolunteersOfJakarta) on Twitter, worked in both the real and virtual worlds. This group of volunteers was initiated by Riezky Delastama,²³ a young man with a business in communications and HRD outsourcing, who was also the head of TIDAR, the youth wing of Gerindra, with an office in Kebayoran Baru, Jakarta. In the lead-up to the election, however, Delastama distanced himself from both Gerindra and TIDAR and established a youth volunteer group for Jokowi–Ahok. He worked with about 200 friends to run a number of activities for youths, from social activities like clean-up days to fun activities such as concerts. During these activities they talked about the future of Jakarta and Jokowi–Ahok’s programmes. The 200 members were spread across Jakarta, but the majority resided in Kebayoran Baru. They also created the @RelawanMudaJakarta Twitter account as a tool for communicating and spreading information about Jokowi–Ahok and promoting their programmes.²⁴ Delastama could not estimate the exact number of passive volunteers and sympathisers, but believed there were approximately 3,000 members spread across almost all regions of Jakarta.

Finally, on 28 September 2012, the Jakarta General Election Commission announced the results of the second election, with Jokowi–Ahok

22 Interview with some activists of Kaskus.co.id. Kaskus was described in *PC Magazine Indonesia* as the best and largest online community in Indonesia in August 2005 (4 January 2013 and 10 October 2013).

23 Interviews with Riezky Delastama (20 December 2012 and 3 October 2013).

24 Indonesians are the fourth-largest group of users of Facebook and the fifth-largest group of users of Twitter worldwide, and social media are widely used by politicians, activists and ordinary citizens. For an overview, see Dibley (2012).

wining 53.82 per cent of 4,592,945 votes, while Foke–Nara won 2,120,815 votes (46.18 per cent). Therefore, Jokowi–Ahok had won by 351,315 votes, or 7 per cent (KPU 2012b). On 15 October 2012, the pair were inaugurated as governor and vice-governor of Jakarta.

From Support to Participatory Control: The Role of Volunteers after the Election

The inauguration of Jokowi and Ahok cannot, by itself, be used to measure the success of the above-mentioned partisan social movement, since the election is just the beginning of the planned agenda of change. To date, Jokowi–Ahok’s administration has demonstrated a high level of consistency with its proposed agenda and expectations. In order to help initiate and implement the pair’s promises, some volunteer groups have indirectly joined government programmes.²⁵ The volunteers have remained part of society and received no direct funding from the government or government budgets, but the programmes they have become involved in have helped to promote and monitor the performance of the government at all levels.

Several volunteers joined the Teras Raja Jaya organisation, which is implementing a programme to clean and regulate the environment in Jakarta. Although this programme has been approved by the vice-governor, the fact that the group could not access the local government budget led it to approach companies to cooperate as a form of corporate social responsibility (CSR). The workforce for the programme would primarily be the unemployed, and the cost would be shared with the companies. However, recent developments have shown that Teras Raja Jaya has been unable to implement its plans despite the promise of funding from companies’ CSR programmes. This is because such programmes should follow the formal procedures for inclusion in the government’s annual planned programmes and budget, and then put up for tender openly, which may or may not be awarded to the Teras Raja Jaya organisation. At the beginning of 2014, there was still no certainty that the organisation’s programme would become part of the government’s programme for 2014.

Edy, the secretary-general of Teras Raja Raya, accepted this procedure as a necessary process for transparency and fairness. However, the

25 Some volunteers were interviewed again after a year. This involved in-depth interviews and observations of developments at the town hall and dynamics in society.

group says it will not stop working with the government and will continue to play roles in local government, whether at the city, district or sub-district levels. In addition to working towards improving the environment and cleanliness, Teras Raja Raya has also been involved in monitoring services at local government offices. If roads are damaged, electricity goes off, or ID card and licensing services are unable to keep up with demand, they report to the provincial government and directly to Jokowi or Ahok, or through other channels provided by the government. Their participation in helping the government receives no direct monetary compensation from the budget, which means it can be considered voluntary.

Likewise, @RelawanMudaJakarta proposed a programme to the Jakarta government to renovate and manage public toilets at train stations and bus terminals, markets and tourist attractions by cooperating with foreign companies through their CSR programmes. This group has also been given approval by the vice-governor, on the condition that it does not use the local government budget. However, as was the case with Teras Raja Jaya, without being included into the government's annual plan, it is not easy for the new groups established by these volunteers to realise their programmes, even after receiving letters of approval. The vice governor eventually required new groups to propose these programmes and to partake in a tender process in order to take part as an official part of the government's annual plan, even if they were to be funded by private CSR programmes. However, since the requirements for a tender are strict, none of the programmes proposed by these groups have yet materialised as official government programmes. This does not mean that they have no role in governmental programmes; their role is currently more as a watchdog of government programmes than as a partner in the implementation. As with Teras Raja Raya, members of @RelawanMudaJakarta were also acting voluntarily, particularly in monitoring areas pertaining to public services, from issuing of ID cards and licenses to damaged roads and electricity and phone line outages.

Similar action was taken by Volunteers for a New Jakarta (Relawan Penggerak Jakarta Baru, RPJB), led by Hilmar Farid. After Jokowi-Basuki's victory, this group shifted its focus to local arts and cultures. According to Hilmar, the group worked with the district and subdistrict heads in several areas to revive local culture, which had previously received little attention from the government, particularly in regard to society's traditions and art forms, either of the Betawi community or of migrants from various areas in Indonesia who now live in Jakarta. Initially, the programme was also proposed to the provincial government as a

government programme to revitalise local arts and traditions at the grassroots level.

As with the two above-mentioned examples, this programme eventually had to be lodged into the government's annual programme and undergo a tender process that would only begin at the beginning of 2014. As a result, RPJB continued to work within its voluntary capacity with the city, district and subdistrict governments to insert local arts and traditions into local government programmes, especially for events such as Independence Day and the anniversary of Jakarta's establishment. The group also held local traditional and art festivals in a number of regions, at the city, district and sub-district levels. Funding for these events came from co-operation with local NGOs and local government, mayors, district and sub-district heads. The group's direct relationship and access to Jokowi and Ahok meant it received information about the facilitation of the programme, but did not receive any funding.

In short, after Jokowi–Ahok won the election, the relationship between and position of these volunteers to Jokowi–Ahok was no longer as supporters without critical power, but rather as participatory watchdogs. Nevertheless, they are not in opposition to Jokowi–Ahok, but criticise their implementation of government, in order to make sure programmes succeed at being transparent and not corrupt, and to maximise public services. If government programmes are not finished or properly attended to – including damaged roads, damaged public transport, or other failures in services – these groups are ready to provide feedback through a variety of channels. Similarly, if there is criticism or misunderstanding about government programmes, these groups also provide information and explanations to society, particularly through social media sites. Also, at various levels in their branches, including neighbourhood and community association units, subdistrict and district levels, they motivate society at grassroots level to participate in activities such as cleaning up and maintaining public facilities. These projects are carried out in cooperation with the local government. Funding sometimes comes from the government or through local community sources on a project basis, but there is no formal contract involving funding for the groups themselves. Although they have a significant role in controlling the performance of officials at various levels and in increasing community participation, the exact relationship of these partisan social movements to the government and their form or participation remains unclear.

Jokowi–Ahok's government also openly and systematically accepted criticism and input from society. On the second floor of the vice-gov-

ernor's office is a large room known as the People's Aspiration Channel (Pangaduan Masyarakat), which is specifically intended to collect feedback and complaints. Many former volunteers are involved in this foundation.²⁶

The room is split into two sections. The first section is assigned to work with inputs and criticism through multimedia, social media, SMS text messages and other channels of communication. There are nine channels, including media clippings, online news, Twitter, Facebook, email, SMS to a provided number, civic centres, petitions, videos and photos, and online report (*Layanan Aspirasi dan Pengaduan Online Rakyat, Laporan!*). These do not include direct inputs from individuals to Jokowi and Ahok through personal text messages or social media accounts. There are approximately 20 full-time workers, excluding the analysts who monitor input and criticism on computers connected to the aforementioned nine channels, as well as Jokowi's and Basuki's private channels. All criticism and input, both formal and private channels, are then converted into relevant data that is immediately accessible to the 20 workers. The second section is for direct face-to-face complaints, for those who cannot or do not want to communicate through social media or communication devices.

Every afternoon, data from both sections are selected, edited, verified (if necessary), and then sent to the vice-governor's desk. The following morning, the data are sent to the relevant local government working units (Satuan Kerja Perangkat Daerah, SKPD) as indicated by the vice-governor. At the same time, the team re-evaluates and checks data from the previous week to see whether complaints have continued or if there has been any improvement. "If there is a complaint that has not been resolved in a week without reason, then the vice-governor will sanction the SKPD accordingly," said Riezka. The results of this analysis are also automatically connected to the President's Work Unit for Monitoring and Directing Development (Unit Kerja Presiden Bidang Pengawasan dan Pengendalian Pembangunan, UKP4).²⁷ Therefore, there is systematic coordination with the monitoring channels in central government. To prevent corruption and promote transparency, the Jakarta government has also worked with the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) (Jokowi 2012c; Samad 2013) and the local State Audit Board (BPK) (Poernomo 2014).

26 Interview with Riezka Novia Bewinda of the Jakarta Government Center for Data and Public Relations 15 November 2013.

27 Interview with Vice Governor Basuki Tjayaya Purnama 16 June 2013 and his staff on 20 June and 2013 and 15 November 2013 on *Laporan!*.

This method helps to ensure that all complaints and criticisms are efficiently recorded and responded to. According to Basuki, steps towards transparency and against corruption have even found support amongst businesspeople and the wealthy elite because they believe that legal clarity helps them grow their businesses. They have, to date, been blackmailed by officials but do not know where their money goes or how much they will have to continue to pay.²⁸ Now, however, although they may have to pay the same amount of money, it is a set amount and is distributed transparently and can be accessed by the public. In fact, according to Basuki, this emphasis on ensuring transparency and fighting corruption has led to a sharp increase in the participation of businesses in helping provide public facilities, for instance through CSR (Purnama 2013; Jokowi 2013b), and also in increasing local revenue (Basri 2014).

Conclusion

In Jakarta, the involvement of volunteers in a partisan social movement has led to public participation in supporting a pair of candidates based on their positive track records and avoidance of money politics. Without those positive attributes, Jokowi–Ahok would not have attracted the great number of people who were willing to voluntarily work for their victory. This has changed the election tradition in Indonesia. Political parties are increasingly aware that while they have a procedural role in the election, success also depends on cooperation with partisan social movements.

I argue that there were four key factors in Jokowi–Ahok’s victory. The first was their reputations and clean track records of leadership and consistency. Secondly, these attributes encouraged unpaid volunteers to motivate the public to participate in the election and vote for the pair. Thirdly, the volunteers did not just work to overthrow the current leadership and replace it and then distance themselves, as has been traditional practice in social movements in Indonesia, but were instead involved in securing victory for the candidates, and then continued to monitor them. Some took positions in directly managing government, with others took critical positions. Fourthly, the relationship between volunteers and local government was not necessarily oppositional. As such, they were partisan not only in that they were supporters of one pair of candidates, but also in their promotion and support of openness, anti-corruption efforts and provision of maximum public services.

28 Interview with Vice Governor Basuki Tjayaja Purnama, 16 June 2013.

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