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The Role of Religion and Ethnicity in Jakarta's 2012 Gubernatorial Election

Ken Miichi

Abstract: The victory of Joko Widodo ('Jokowi') in Jakarta's 2012 gubernatorial election has been described as a "triumph of democracy" as Joko and his running mate Basuki Tjahaja Purnama ('Ahok'), a Chinese Christian, successfully won the election despite negative ethno-religious campaigns against them. How exactly did the ethno-religious boundary influence the election? By analysing the results of the election in relation to ethnicities and religions using the 2000 National Census, the author reveals an ethno-political map of Jakarta, for political analysis a potentially important but still under-researched area. The article then proceeds to examine the 'religionisation' process of the election campaign. The incumbent governor, Fauzi Bowo, carefully established his religious image and tried to mobilise support through religious symbols and persuasion, even though the electoral results seemed to be divided along ethnic lines. Joko also participated in a number of religious campaigns, albeit in a different way that was more subtle. Because ideological differences between Islamic and secular nationalist parties have become blurred and the general 'religionisation' of Indonesian society has continued, religious campaigns are becoming more important in domestic politics, even for 'less-Islamic' politicians like Joko.

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Keywords: Indonesia, Islam, ethnicity, election, Jakarta, Joko Widodo, Fauzi Bowo

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Introduction

Jakarta's 2012 gubernatorial election was widely covered by the mass media, probably generating more controversy in Indonesia than any other election since the general election in 1999. It brought fresh sensitivity and hope to politics. The result was described as a "triumph of democracy" over ethno-religious intolerance (see, for example, *Tempo* 2012a and *The Jakarta Post* 2012). Elected governor Joko Widodo ('Jokowi') and vice-governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama ('Ahok') set Jakartans' expectations about change. Joko's popularity has continued to rise, currently even making him the front-runner for the 2014 presidential election, according to most polls. The gubernatorial election of 2012 caused serious concern about ethno-religious harmony in the capital of the Republic, however. A series of negative campaigns were staged against the "less-Islamic" Javanese candidate (Joko) and his Chinese Christian colleague (Basuki) by supporters of the incumbent governor, Fauzi Bowo, and his running mate, Nachrowi Ramli, who claimed they were "native" Betawi Muslims. As Joko and Basuki won the election in the end, it was generally assumed that ethno-religious campaigns did not work or that their impact had been greatly reduced.

However, it is necessary to remember that the results of these two rounds of the gubernatorial election were very close (Joko–Basuki won 42.6 per cent of the votes and Fauzi–Nachrowi 34.1 per cent in the first round and 53.8 per cent and 46.2 per cent respectively in the second one). This article will demonstrate how ethno-religious campaigns by Fauzi Bowo did actually appeal to the sentiment of most Betawi, and how Joko's team also certainly realized the importance of religion in the electoral campaign, carefully trying to establish and sell religious images, albeit in a different way. Although the new style of campaigning conducted by Joko and Basuki is worth examining in itself, how it accommodates existing and ongoing identity politics is equally important.

What role did religion and ethnicity play in the election, then? Why and how did the ethno-religious campaign emerge in increasingly cosmopolitan Jakarta? This paper will attempt to answer these questions by examining the election results and actual ethno-religious campaigns in detail using both quantitative and qualitative methods. My hypothesis is that because ideological differences between Islamic and secular nationalist parties have become blurred and the general 'religionisation' of Indonesian society has continued to take place, religious campaigns became more important in domestic politics, even for a 'less-Islamic' politician such as Joko. At the same time, it was up to the candidates to decide whether or not to intensify the existing religious and ethnic divisions. In

the 2012 gubernatorial election, incumbent Fauzi changed his strategy and emphasized his religious image in the second round in a bid to get re-elected.

The following sections will initially analyse the quantitative results of the 2012 Jakarta gubernatorial election in relation to ethnic and religious distributions along with other sociological data to reveal an ethno-political map of Jakarta, a potentially important but still under-researched aspect of politics. I shall then examine the 'religionisation' process of campaigns with the aid of qualitative data and personal observations. I argue that Fauzi carefully established his religious image and tried to mobilise support through religious symbols and persuasion. Joko and Basuki also participated in religious campaigns, albeit in a different way.

Through this analysis, I want to add a unique case study on local politics in Indonesia after democratisation or reformation (*reformasi*) in 1998. Aspinnall (2011) summarises that although ethnic politics still counts in arenas such as local elections, overall, it declined as democracy became consolidated in Indonesia. He also suggests that the role of religion, especially Islam, in ethnic politics can be viewed as a marker of ethnic identity. This study further explores the relationship between Islam and ethnicity and how religious boundaries are influential in a particular local context, which can also lead to comparative studies. At the same time, a political analysis of religious images in Jakarta reveals different aspects of local politics, which have been described by Hadiz (2010), for example, who emphasized that local leaders were oligarchs even after democratisation and decentralisation. He suggested that local oligarchs maintained control, even after direct elections, and they paid scant attention to how new players like Joko and Basuki emerged by utilising the mass media and adapting the local context. This paper can also contribute to the study of Islamic politics in Indonesia. There are several studies on Islamic parties that argue about pragmatic adaptation of Islamist parties (Platzdasch 2009) and a shrinking ideological gap between Islamic and nationalist parties (Mietzner 2008). While I basically agree with these points, in the case of direct election of local heads and the President, this paper argues that political parties often act with different sets of logic from parliamentary elections. Additionally, this study explores the way Islamic symbols have been increasingly used and gained importance in media politics and political marketing.

Background: The Relationship between Religion, Ethnicity and Politics in Contemporary Indonesia

The position of religion, especially Islam, has been problematic in Indonesian politics since the very early period of the Republic. During Sukarno's era, political parties had been divided by strong tension between secular nationalist and Islamic parties. The regime change in 1965/66 occurred at the peak of the tension and many members of Islamic parties and organisations took part in the massacre that killed at least 500,000 people, many of whom were alleged to be communists (see Cribb 1990; Kammen and McGregor 2012). Although these Islamic groups expected their interests and values to be adequately represented in the new regime, the New Order elites considered Islamic groups as potential opposition and severely constrained them. The United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP) was created as a representative of Islamic interests, but it was continually hindered and suppressed by the regime. During the New Order, however, syncretistic and nominal Muslims represented by Javanese mysticism had gradually declined and been integrated into the more standardised Sunni Islam. Religious facilities such as Islamic prayer rooms (*musholla*) in offices and the number of pilgrims to Mecca increased tremendously (see Liddle 1996; Hefner 2011). It was in the mid- to late 1980s that the regime warmed towards orthodox Muslims as long-term Islamisation proceeded on the one hand and the unity of the Indonesian nation-state became accepted generally on the other, with the exception of several notable regions.¹

In post-authoritarian Indonesia, the secular/Islamic state debate caused a rift and controversial issues like the re-introduction of the Jakarta Charter (*Piagam Jakarta*), which contained a clause obliging adherents of the faith to observe Islamic *sharia*, into the 1945 Constitution (see Ichwan 2003) are no longer relevant. The National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, PKB) and the National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional, PAN), formed after 1998 by members of two major Islamic organisations, Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, advocate either a balance between nationalism and Islam or an acceptance of

1 A grave, uncovered war in Papua cannot be ignored here, although it is a rather exceptional case after the independence of East Timor, while the 2004 tsunami caused peace in Aceh by compulsion. On recent developments and the complicated relationship between Jakarta and the locally elected government in Papua, see IPAC (2014) and Anderson (2014).

pluralism within Indonesian society. There are several Islamist parties that aim to establish Islamic political authority and to enforce Islamic law, but they accommodate existing democratic institutions, joining coalition and power sharing (see Platzdasch 2009). In contrast, nationalist parties have increasingly emphasized religious matters (see Mietzner 2008). Islamic parties significantly reduced their support in the 2009 election. Although Islamic parties did slightly better in the 2014 general election, the tendency has not changed overall.²

Ethnic politics in Indonesia is highly divergent and complex since regional ethnic maps are extremely diverse, and individual identities can be manifold. Migrations and mixed marriages are common. Some aristocracies have survived and even become more important in some regions since democratisation. Religion can also be viewed as a boundary marker of ethnic identity in many local contexts in Indonesia. Religious and ethnic boundaries crossed over in the violent conflicts in Central Sulawesi and Maluku provinces, among several other communal conflicts that took place not long after democratisation in 1998 (see van Klinken 2007 and McRae 2013). It should be noted, however, that politicisation and mobilisation of ethnicity have subsequently declined. 'Soft', non-violent ethnic politics has been prevalent instead, especially since the direct election of local government heads was introduced in 2005 (Aspinall 2011). In many local elections, candidates exploit the appreciation of *adat* (local custom) and the *putera daerah* sentiment (indigenous ethnic group; literary, 'sons of the region'), which often make ethnic divisions more evident (Davidson and Henley 2007). Likewise, emphasizing Islamic symbols can be viewed as asserting local identities. More than fifty regencies/municipalities introduced local by-laws on prostitution, gambling, alcohol, reading the Koran, paying *zakat* (alms or religious tax), wearing Muslim clothing and the conduct of women in public (Salim 2007; Bush 2008).

In the 2012 Jakarta gubernatorial election, the "native" Betawi sentiment was emphasized and religious identity was contested. This must be examined in light of the aforementioned national trends, but at the same time, it also shows peculiarities of local politics in Jakarta and characteristics of the 2012 gubernatorial election. Jakarta has been treated as a showcase of national politics, but its peculiarities have not been seriously examined in its own right. Indeed, voters in Jakarta reflected na-

2 By analysing opinion surveys, I have argued that Islamic parties failed in elections because of internal conflicts, blurring differences between 'secular' nationalist and Islamic parties, and the decay of traditional religious authority (Miichi forthcoming).

tional trends and have demonstrated more amplified swings than anywhere else in the region. A “secular”, nationalist party, Indonesia Democratic Party of Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, PDIP) won in 1999, the Islamist Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS) won in 2004 and the Democratic Party (Partai Demokrat, PD), which claimed to be a “religious nationalist”, won in 2009. Greater demographic mobility and easier access to mass media characterise politics in Jakarta, the capital of the Republic and a mega-city.

At the same time, Betawi people, the *putra daerah* of Jakarta, were known for their strong support for the Islamic opposition party, PPP, during Suharto’s period in power. While PPP’s 1977 victory in Jakarta represented urban resistance against the ruling state party at that time, viz. the Functional Group (Golongan Karya, or ‘Golkar’ for short), whose victory was observed nationally, PPP was also associated with the Muslim identity of Betawi. Young Betawi people such as a famous preacher called Zainuddin Hamidi, known as Zainuddin MZ and a former student activist called Ridwan Saidi became icons of the party in Jakarta.³ Rhoma Irama, a superstar *dangdut* singer, also campaigned for PPP. Although he was not Betawi, Rhoma had equally attracted Jakartan votes.⁴ Interestingly, Ridwan Saidi and Rhoma Irama had re-emerged and stirred up some controversy in the 2012 election. As I will discuss later, support for PKS is particularly strong in areas with a relatively high concentration of Betawi citizens. Demographical elements should thus be considered when analysing the rise of PKS in Jakarta in the 2004 general election. In fact, the result of the gubernatorial election reflected the very nature of political demography in Jakarta.

3 Liddle (1978) did not adopt any explanations emphasizing Jakarta’s particularities, but found that large cities tended to have a lower number of votes for Golkar in the elections.

4 Rhoma Irama was later banned from performing on state-run television and radio programmes. After eleven years, he eventually turned to Golkar and appeared on television again in 1988. He is also renowned for introducing Islamic songs to popular *dangdut* and for becoming a preacher later. Rhoma’s return to television was one of various symbolic moves that Suharto’s New Order government took in order to approach Islam at the end of the 1980s. See Weintraub (2010).

Overview of the 2012 Gubernatorial Election in Jakarta

The first round of election was held on 11 July 2012, followed by a run-off on 20 September 2012 as none of the pairs of candidates had managed to obtain more than fifty per cent of the votes first time round.⁵ There were actually six pairs of candidates, but support from political parties was mixed and divided. Fauzi Bowo, the incumbent governor of Jakarta, chose Nachorowi Ramli, a former general and head of the provincial legislature (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, DPRD) from President Yudhoyono's Democratic Party (Partai Demokrat, PD), as his candidate for the vice-governor's office. Hidayat Nurwahid, a former chairman of the People's Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, MPR) and a former president of PKS, ran together with Didik Rachbini, an intellectual and a former member of parliament from the National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional, PAN). The governor of South Sumatra, Alex Noerdin, and former Lieutenant General (Marine) Nono Sampurno were supported by Golkar and PPP. There were two other independent pairs running for office as well. PKS did not make any coalition with other parties, and PAN officially supported Fauzi, as a loyalist party of Yudhoyono's government. Joko, meanwhile, was the mayor of Solo, Central Java, running under the ticket of PDI-P. Basuki, his running mate, a member of parliament from Golkar and a former regent of East Belitung, Bangka Belitung Province, was supported by the Greater Indonesia Movement Party (Gerakan Indonesia Raya, or 'Gerindra' for short).

Ultimately, the election became a straight fight between two sets of candidates: Fauzi–Nachorowi and Joko–Basuki. Hidayat Nurwahid was unable to expand the support beyond his party, PKS. Alex Noerdin was not well known in Jakarta, and his career as the governor of South Sumatra was outshone by Joko's. Alex's share of votes in the gubernatorial election was far lower than the support of Golkar and PPP in the 2009 election, even lower than that of an independent candidate, Faisal Basri, a famous economist. As discussed later, some of the PPP-affiliated *ulama* (Islamic scholars) expressed support for Fauzi from the very first round. Sympathizers of PDIP and Gerindra were loyal to their parties' decision, and nearly 90 per cent of the supporters voted for Joko–Basuki in the

5 It is only in presidential and Jakarta's gubernatorial elections that a set of candidates need to obtain more than fifty per cent to win. In other local elections, the highest number of votes required is only around thirty per cent.

second round, according to an exit poll.⁶ Joko and Basuki led the election on 11 July with 42.6 per cent of the votes and eventually won over Fauzi and Nachorowi in the second round, obtaining 53.8 per cent in the run-off held on 20 September.

Table 1: Major Candidates and Results

Name	Background	Political parties	First round (%)	Second round (%)
Fauzi Bowo Nachrowi Ramli	Incumbent, bureaucrat, Betawi PD district head, Betawi	PD, PAN	34.1	46.2
Joko Widodo Basuki Purnama	Mayor of Solo, Javanese Former regent of East Belitung, Chinese Christian	PDIP, Gerindra	42.6	53.8
Hidayat Nurwahid Didik Rachbini	Chair of MPR Intellectual, former MP from PAN	PKS	11.7	
Alex Noerdin Nono Sampurno	Governor of South Sumatra Former Marine officer	Golkar, PPP	4.7	

Source: Author’s own compilation.

There were some commonly acknowledged chronic urban issues in Jakarta such as traffic jams, flooding, education and medical care. Every candidate promised similar kinds of offers like free education and medical care, although no-one could promise any quick solution for traffic congestion and flooding. Thus, there was no significant difference between the candidates’ proposed policies. Although Joko’s health-care cards (*Kartu Jakarta Sehat*, KJS), which provided free medical care for poor families, attracted considerable interest, this was probably not due

6 Non-affiliated voters also predominantly supported Joko–Basuki with 68.1 per cent of the votes. Sympathizers of political parties who supported Fauzi–Nachorowi were less loyal. In particular, more than half of PAN and PKB’s sympathizers voted for Joko–Basuki. Sympathizers of PD (38.8 per cent) and PKS (35.1 per cent) showed less support for Fauzi–Nachrowi than Golkar (70.8 per cent) and PPP (87.1 per cent). These Golkar and PPP affiliates might have supported Fauzi–Nachrowi from the very first round despite the parties’ own decision. *Tempo* 2012b.

to any significant difference in his policy,⁷ but rather because his unique campaigns caught the media's attention.

Although Joko had not been very familiar to people in Jakarta previously, his candidacy received increasing media attention when he brought a small, locally produced car called Esemka to Jakarta in February 2012. The interesting thing about this was that it was built by students from a vocational high school in Solo. Additionally, when he registered as a candidate on 19 March, he went to the Jakartan branch of the General Elections Commission (Komisi Pemilihan Umum, KPU) by public transport, in contrast to the long queue of luxurious cars used by other candidates. He often appeared in popular markets, conversing with residents, making amiable and down-to-earth comments. Basuki's own pragmatic and straightforward approach complemented this behaviour and made the two men an excellent team. Joko and Basuki successfully exploited populist sentiments, creating a casual and 'non-bureaucratic' image, unlike Fauzi and Nachrowi. Joko and Basuki carried out unique and unprecedented campaigns together, successfully attracting both conventional and new media. They proposed the idea of a "New Jakarta" (*Jakarta Baru*), highlighting current problems in Jakarta and calling for change through a new leadership and different ideas. Some of these ideas were not very novel, actually, but they made an impression on people and gave them hope that the candidates would bring about a significant change. Joko always uses simple, down-to-earth words free of any high-handed attitude, making his message appear convincing and sincere. Videos of Joko's speeches, presentations and other creative video clips have been uploaded to YouTube and shared through social media such as Twitter and Facebook. Several videos of his were even watched by more than 100,000 viewers in just a few weeks.

Fauzi and Nachorowi, on the other hand, relied more on conventional ways to mobilise support by putting pressure on government employee through administrative channels and making appeals to mass organisations and religious authorities. Indications of vote buying and tuggery abounded in their campaigns. Fauzi's team called on representatives of neighbourhood associations (RT/RW) and instructed them to drum up votes for them. It was reported that the subsidy paid to community organisations increased as Fauzi's term in office as governor

7 Fauzi Bowo had offered a similar policy in which poor families could obtain free medicine, which he did by promoting the idea of a certificate for such families (SKTM). This was criticized by his opponents due to its complicated registration procedure, however. See *Tribunnews.com* 2012c and *kompasiana* 2012.

neared an end.⁸ As Nachorowi was the head of the Betawi Consultative Body (Badan Musywarah Betawi, Bamus Betawi) and a member of the advisory board of the Children of Betawi Communication Forum (Forum Komunikasi Anak Betawi, or 'Forkabi'), he and Fauzi were able to attract support from Betawi *preman* ('thugs' or 'petty gangs') organisations. The biggest Betawi social organisation, the Betawi Brotherhood Forum (Forum Betawi Rempug, FBR), claimed that their 350,000 members would garner 3.5 million votes for Fauzi (*Kompas.com* 2012a).

It was particularly important that Fauzi's team emphasized the ethno-religious origins of the candidates and used slogans like "Smart people choose unambiguous ones!" (*Orang cerdas pilih yang jelas!*), implying that Joko and Basuki were outsiders with unclear (and therefore dubious) or unauthentic ethno-religious backgrounds. In fact, religion became a focal point of their campaigns as competition intensified. Other than the obvious target of Basuki as a Chinese Christian, rumours such as "Joko's mother wasn't a Muslim" and "Zionists financed Joko and Basuki" were circulated in printed and electronic messages as part of negative campaigns against the candidates. The issue attracted widespread attention, especially after Rhoma Irama – the aforementioned popular *dangdut* singer – urged people to "choose a leader who has the same faith" (*memilih kandidat yang seiman*) at a mosque gathering. Rhoma is not only known as a popular singer, but is also famous as an Islamic preacher (*mubaligh*) based in Jakarta. He supported Fauzi and even appeared in his TV-commercial campaign. Rhoma Irama's controversial speech was recorded, posted on YouTube and widely reported by the mass media. Nachrowi likewise made insensitive, provocative comments on ethnic issues several times. For example, he said: "Leave the Betawi if you're not going to choose a Betawi [candidate]" (*Silakan Keluar Betawi Kalau tak Pilih Betawi*) (*Tribunnews.com* 2012a). He also made a pointed reference to Basuki as he denigratingly mimicked a Chinese on a TV show. Both Rhoma Irama and Nachrowi were summoned for questioning by the Election-monitoring Committee (Panitia Pengawas Pemilihan Umum, Panwaslu) on the grounds of provoking religious discrimination and hatred.

It was often concluded that these ethnic-religious campaigns did not work and Joko and Basuki won because they became media darlings (see Ali 2012, *The Jakarta Post* 2012b, *Tempo.co* 2012a). Since Joko continues to rise in popularity and is even expected to run as a presidential candidate

8 See *Kompas.com* 2012b, *Centroone.com* 2012. Yet most candidates, including Joko, promised to 'empower' RT/RW, which meant more money would be allocated to neighbourhood associations.

in 2014, this theory seems convincing. However, having analysed the results of the election more carefully, I conclude that ethno-religious campaigns still played a significant role and that media effect was only part of the story.

Analysis of the Election Results: Ethnicity Matters

Although Joko won in all four municipalities, losing only in the Pulau Seribu regency, a closer look at the election results in detail shows an apparent ethno-religious – especially ethnic – divisions. To ensure this, an analysis of detailed election results also matched with the 2000 National Census, including sociological data.⁹ Note that there are several limitations in using the 2000 National Census: (1) there may be changes in demography after 2000, and (2) since those who abstained from voting (*golput*, white ballot group) cannot be counted, it is less likely that these changes and irregularities influence the overall tendency as I cover every district in Jakarta. What's more, no information such as *golput* seems to have existed among particular ethnic or religious groups. The 2000 National Census is particularly important for my analysis as it was the first one to enquire about ethnicity since the census conducted in 1930 during the period of Dutch colonial rule. One peculiarity of Jakarta is that the Betawi – the 'native' *putra daerah* of Jakarta – make up approx. 2.3 million people, representing 27.6 per cent of Jakarta's total population of 8.3 million, naturally a much higher percentage than the national average. Yet the number of Javanese – the largest group in Jakarta, representing about 35.2 per cent of the urban population – also increased rapidly in the latter half of the 20th century (Table 2). More importantly, the 2000 census reveals sub-district ethno-religious compositions in Jakarta, which is key in analysing the gubernatorial election in 2012. While the overall religious composition in Jakarta is not very different from the national one, Muslims dominate in Jakarta with 85.7 per cent, slightly less than the national average of 88.2 per cent.

9 All of the census data in this paper has been quoted from the following sources: Statistics Indonesia (Badan Pusat Statistik, BPS), *2000 Population Census Results Tables & Coordinates by Census Block*, C 2004. Detailed results of gubernatorial elections in 2007 and 2012 are based on official data acquired from the Jakarta Provincial Election Committee (*Komisi Pemilihan Umum* (KPU) Provinsi DKI Jakarta).

Table 2: Ethnic Composition in Jakarta and at the National Level (in Per Cent)

	Java	Betawi	Sunda	Chinese	Batak	Minang kabau
Jakarta (1961)	25.4	22.9	32.9	10.1	1.0	2.1
Jakarta (2000)	35.2	27.6	15.3	5.5	3.6	3.2
National (2000)	41.7	2.5	15.4	0.9	3.0	2.7

Source: The ethnic composition in 1961 is based on an estimate by Lance (1967). The 2000 data is based on the results of the 2000 National Census.

Joko beat Fauzi by 8.5 per cent in the first round and 8.6 per cent in the second. One way to explain this constancy is coincidence: although media coverage on Joko intensified and his popularity increased in general, it was also balanced out by the mobilisation of votes in other political parties. Golkar, PKS and PPP turned to Fauzi after the defeat of their own candidates, for example. Only PDIP and Gerindra, which had originally nominated Joko and Basuki as their candidates, officially supported this pair throughout the campaign.¹⁰ Thus, mobilisation of political parties may have added some votes for Fauzi in the second round. However, the demography of support for the two sets of candidates did not change much between the two rounds of the election. I argue that it was ethnicity and religion that divided the support.

As mentioned above, Fauzi, the incumbent governor, emphasized his ethnic background as he joined forces with another Betawi, Nachorowi. In the 2007 election, when Fauzi was elected through the first direct election, he did not particularly highlight or exploit this ethnicity issue. After all, Fauzi's running mate, Prijanto, was Javanese (non-Betawi). Their rivals were Dani Anwar, a Betawi from Tanah Abang, Central Jakarta who ran as vice-governor, and Adang Daradjatun, a Sunda from nearby Bogor. In their campaigns, Adang and Dani both wore Betawi attire for their campaign poster.¹¹ Additionally, because Adang and Dani were only supported by the Islamist PKS, a negative campaign developed, prompting fears that Adang–Dani would enforce Islamic law (*syariat* or *sharia*) if they came to power in Jakarta (see *DetikNews* 2007). Thus,

10 Only PKS wavered between Fauzi and Joko. It was reported that PKS asked for money in exchange for its support of Joko, but was rebuffed by Joko's team. *Tempo* 2012c.

11 Still, support for Fauzi among the Betawi electorate was 62.8 per cent, according to an exit poll, which was higher than the overall result (57.9 per cent). *Lingkaran Survei Indonesia* (2007: 7).

Christians and Buddhists overwhelmingly supported Fauzi in 2007, but their votes completely switched to his rival candidate in 2012.¹²


I analysed the correlation between the proportion of ethnic groups in every sub-district (*keurahan*) according to the 2000 National Census and voting behaviour in 2012. As a result, a strong correlation was found between the proportion of the Betawi population and the support for Fauzi–Nachrowi (Figure 1 and Table 3). The sub-districts containing more Betawi Muslims tended to vote for Fauzi. In contrast, there is a correlation between the Chinese population and support for Joko and Basuki (Figure 2 and Table 3). These tendencies did not change significantly between the first and second round. However, support for Joko among the Javanese population was not as clear-cut as this. I was only able to find a weak correlation between the proportion of Javanese and the support for Joko in the second round (Figure 2 and Table 3).

The correlation between the Muslim population and the support for Fauzi–Nachorowi was also strong (Table 3). The opposite is also true, however: the Muslim population correlated negatively with the support for Joko–Basuki due to the overwhelming support that non-Muslims showed for Joko and Basuki. At the same time, this shows that support for Fauzi was not limited to Betawi voters; there was a certain number of Javanese who supported him as well. According to a survey by LSI-Tempo conducted before the second round, 28 per cent of those who supported Fauzi were Javanese (who must be overwhelmingly Muslim) (*Tempo* 2012b). However, support for Fauzi did not extend to other Muslims in any significant way; there is no correlation between the Sundanese population and their support for Fauzi or Joko, for instance (Table 3). Fauzi failed to attract Sundanese support even though these voters were predominantly Muslim.

According to several surveys, those who supported Joko tended to be relatively wealthy and well educated (Lembaga Survei Indonesia 2012: 59; *Tempo* 2012b). My own limited data also shows that sub-districts with a more highly educated population tended to support Joko (Table 3). These educational and economic factors may be related to the ethnic factor, too. The proportion of those who acquired higher education correlated negatively with the Betawi population.

12 Nearly 80 per cent of Christians and Buddhists supported Fauzi, according to an exit poll. *Lingkaran Survei Indonesia* (2007: 7).


Fig. 1: Scatter Diagram Showing the Proportion of the Betawi Population and the Votes for Fauzi and Nachorowi in the First Round and Second Round



Note: Y: Share of votes for Fauzi in the first and second round. X: Share of the Betawi population in a sub-district according to the 2000 National Census. N=262 (i.e. 261 sub-districts and Pulau Seribu).

Source: Figures made by the author based on ethnicity data of the 2000 National Census and the results of 2012 Gubernatorial Election in Jakarta.

Fig. 2: Scatter Diagram Showing the Proportion of the Chinese and Javanese Population and Votes for Joko and Basuki in the First Round



Note: Y: Share of votes for Joko in the first round. X: Proportion of the Chinese and Javanese population in a sub-district according to the 2000 National Census. N=262 (261 sub-districts and Pulau Seribu).

Source: Figures made by the author based on ethnicity data of the 2000 National Census and the results of 2012 Gubernatorial Election in Jakarta.

Table 3: Pearson's Correlation between the Support for Fauzi and Joko, and Ethnicity, Religion, and Education


	Java	Betawi	Sunda	Chinese	Muslim	Higher education
Fauzi 1	-0.219**	0.688**	-0.068	-0.444**	0.585**	-0.282**
Fauzi 2	-0.207**	0.739**	-0.032	-0.567**	0.724**	-0.259**
Joko 1	0.006	-0.671**	0.118	0.740**	-0.852**	0.083
Joko 2	0.208**	-0.738**	0.032	0.565**	-0.722**	0.258**

Note: N=262 (i.e. 261 sub-districts and Pulau Seribu), ** P<0.01. Rate of higher education is those who attained education higher than college (diploma).

Source: All the data on ethnicity, religion and education used here is based on the 2000 National Census.


Demographical observations strengthen this argument. In the second round, Fauzi won in all 6 sub-districts in the islands of Pulau Seribu, 8 out of 31 sub-districts in North Jakarta, 20 out of 44 sub-districts in Central Jakarta, 13 out of 56 sub-districts in West Jakarta, 25 out of 65 sub-districts in East Jakarta and 28 out of 65 sub-districts in South Jakarta. He mostly won in sub-districts where Betawi people dominated. Sub-districts where more than 30 per cent of the population was Betawi correlated significantly with those where Fauzi won in the second round (Figure 4).

Fig. 3: Results of the Second Round



Source: Figure made by author based on the results of 2012 Gubernatorial Election in Jakarta.

Fig. 4: Sub-districts Containing More than 30 Per Cent Betawi Muslims and Sub-districts Where Fauzi Won in the Second Round



Source: Figures made by the author based on ethnicity data of the 2000 National Census and the results of 2012 Gubernatorial Election in Jakarta.

As in the examples above, the ethnic factor clearly had an influence on the election results in several districts (*kecamatan*). I chose two districts in Central Jakarta that exhibit relatively distinct differences in terms of ethnic distributions (Menteng and Tanah Abang) and two districts in South Jakarta where more Betawi live (Jaga Karsa) and fewer Betawi (Pesanggrahan) in relation to the Javanese population. They are also important districts with respect to the 2007 gubernatorial election. Menteng, Central Jakarta was one of the districts where Fauzi won by a relatively wide margin, with the exception of Gondangdia sub-district, where Joko won overwhelmingly by 70.2 per cent. The Betawi inhabitants make up 38–48 per cent of the local population in four other sub-districts, while in Gondangdia, the Betawi only make up 8.9 per cent of the population; the Javanese, in contrast, make up 47.0 per cent of it (Table 4). In Jaga Karsa District, South Jakarta, Fauzi won in all the sub-districts where there were more Betawi residents than Javanese (albeit by a small margin; see Table 5). On the other hand, Fauzi only won by a slight margin in the sub-district of Ulujami (in Pesanggrahan District, South Jakarta), where Betawi Muslims made up the largest ethnic group, while the Javanese constituted the smallest group in all five sub-districts (Table 6). In the 2007 gubernatorial election, Fauzi and his running mate Prijanto won overwhelmingly in Gondangdia with 67.0 per cent of the votes; Ulujami was the only sub-district in South Jakarta where they lost to Adang Daradjatun and Dani Anwar. Although Fauzi claimed he was Betawi and made use of ‘native’ cultural icons in his campaign as Adang–Dani did, he also presented him as a ‘universal, compromise’ candidate; in fact, one of his catchphrases was “Whatever your ethnicity and religion is, Fauzi–Prijanto is your choice” (*Apapun suku dan agamanya, Fauzi Bowo–Prijanto pilihannya*) (see *Detik.com* 2007). In 2012, Fauzi did an about-turn and decided to try and win the votes of the Muslim constituency not limited to the Betawi for his re-election, as I shall see later.

Table 4: Ethnic Composition and the Second-round Results in Menteng District, Central Jakarta

Sub-districts	Total	Java (%)	Betawi (%)	Sunda	Chinese	Fauzi (%)	Joko (%)
Menteng	25,080	5,821 (23.2)	9,746 (38.9)	5,085	498	55.0	45.0
Pegangsan	23,148	4,752 (20.5)	10,083 (43.6)	4,115	78	57.2	42.8
Cikini	7,198	1,575 (21.9)	3,219 (44.7)	960	99	56.3	43.7
Gondangdia	5,236	2,460 (47.0)	467 (8.9)	759	336	28.8	70.2

Sub-districts	Total	Java (%)	Betawi (%)	Sunda	Chinese	Fauzi (%)	Joko (%)
Kebon Sirih	13,135	2,415 (18.4)	6,332 (48.2)	2,069	364	58.1	41.9

Note: 'Total' means the total number of inhabitants in the sub-district according to the 2000 National Census. This figure differs from the number of registered voters in the 2012 gubernatorial election.

Source: Author's own calculation based on ethnicity data of the 2000 National Census and the results of 2012 Gubernatorial Election in Jakarta.

Table 5: Ethnic Composition and the Second-round Results in Jaga Karsa District, South Jakarta

Sub-districts	Total	Java (%)	Betawi (%)	Sunda	Chinese	Fauzi (%)	Joko (%)
Jagakarsa	44,071	13,547 (30.7)	20,003 (45.4)	5,058	93	54.0	46.0
Srengseng Sawah	41,824	14,072 (33.6)	15,274 (36.5)	5,978	62	50.5	49.5
Ciganjur	25,735	9,606 (37.3)	10,611 (41.2)	2,621	4	50.1	49.9
Lenteng Agung	49,790	13,507 (27.1)	22,865 (45.9)	6,261	43	51.7	48.3
Tanjung Barat	28,512	7,570 (26.6)	13,903 (28.5)	3,080	50	55.2	44.8
Cipedak	21,104	6,775 (32.1)	9,680 (45.9)	2,035	31	55.3	44.7

Source: Author's own calculation based on ethnicity data of the 2000 National Census and the results of 2012 Gubernatorial Election in Jakarta.

Table 6: Ethnic Composition and the Second-round Results in Pesanggrahan District, South Jakarta

Sub-districts	Total	Java (%)	Betawi (%)	Sunda	Chinese	Fauzi (%)	Joko (%)
Pesanggrahan	25,010	9,961 (39.8)	6,267 (25.1)	3,679	42	41.7	58.3
Bintaro	41,124	16,694 (40.6)	13,319 (32.4)	4,932	39	38.9	61.1
Petukan-gan Utara	49,594	18,017 (36.3)	17,851 (36.0)	5,002	29	42.9	57.2
Petukan-gan Selatan	32,683	12,303 (37.6)	10,384 (31.8)	3,924	150	41.1	58.9
Ulujami	36,984	11,897 (32.2)	13,673 (37.0)	3,625	37	50.5	49.5

Source: Author's own calculation based on ethnicity data of the 2000 National Census and the results of 2012 Gubernatorial Election in Jakarta.

The results achieved in the district of Tanah Abang were divided. Besides the apparent ethnic factor evident in other sub-districts as well, a different kind of political machinery seemed to be at work here (Table 7 and 8). In the first round, Alex Noerdin exceptionally gained a high number of votes in several sub-districts in Tanah Abang, an area known for being a PPP stronghold. In Kebon Melati sub-district, Hidayat recorded one of the highest votes of all in Jakarta. He enjoyed relatively good results in places where the Betawi population was concentrated. Although the popularity of PKS declined after the 2004 general election, the party still managed to maintain some strongholds in the city, most of which were in South Jakarta.¹³ The roles played by political parties were particularly important in the second round as they turned loyalists' votes to either Joko or Fauzi. In the sub-districts of Kampung Bali, Kebon Kacang and Karet Tengsin, the results were reversed in the second round. This was probably because PKS loyalists voted for Fauzi.¹⁴

Table 7: Election Results for Tanah Abang District in the First Round (in Per Cent)

Sub-districts	Fauzi	Joko	Hidayat	Alex
Kampung Bali	30.0	32.0	12.7	17.6
Kebon Kacang	34.1	36.8	15.4	6.1
Kebon Melati	34.7	29.9	21.5	5.6
Petamburan	40.6	26.4	13.0	14.4
Karet Tengsin	36.0	39.4	13.3	5.0
Bendungan Hilir	28.5	44.4	13.2	5.0
Gelora	29.3	53.7	7.8	3.2

Source: Author's own calculation based on the results of 2012 Gubernatorial Election in Jakarta.

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- 13 Besides Kebon Melati, Hidayat obtained more than twenty per cent of the votes in two sub-districts: Sukapura, Cilincing in North Jakarta and Malaka Jaya, Duren Sawit in East Jakarta. There were eight districts besides Tanah Abang where he obtained more than 15 per cent of the votes: Palmerah (West Jakarta), Matraman (Central Jakarta), Tebet, Mampang Parapatan, Pasar Minggu, Pancoran, Jagakarsa and Pesanggrahan (South Jakarta). These are areas with PKS strongholds. I was able to find strong correlations between the Betawi population and PKS support. The In 2007 gubernatorial election, Adang Daradjatun and Dani Anwar, who were supported by PKS, won five out of seven sub-districts in Tanah Abang and received a relatively high amount of votes compared with most of the other sub-districts mentioned here.
- 14 According to a survey conducted by Lembaga Survei Indonesia and Tempo, the majority of those who voted for Hidayat in the first round (66.7 per cent) subsequently turned to Fauzi, but in the case of Alex, it was only 43.5 per cent. These results indicate that PKS had stronger control over its party members than Golkar and PPP. *Tempo* 2012b.

Table 8: Ethnic Composition and Final-round Election Results in Tanah Abang District, Central Jakarta

Sub-districts	Total	Java (%)	Betawi (%)	Sunda	Chinese	Fauzi (%)	Joko (%)
Kampung Bali	11,999	1,635 (13.6)	6,618 (55.2)	1,407	801	53.9	46.1
Kebon Kacang	22,722	5,675 (25.0)	8,314 (38.8)	2,972	939	53.0	47.0
Kebon Melati	28,642	7,207 (25.2)	10,486 (36.6)	5,278	160	59.7	40.3
Petamburan	26,578	6,452 (24.3)	10,203 (38.3)	4,415	422	62.1	37.9
Karet Tengsin	20,361	8,813 (43.3)	5,978 (29.4)	2,386	133	50.4	49.6
Bendungan Hilir	22,423	8,887 (39.6)	5,620 (25.1)	3,755	182	41.3	58.7
Gelora	3,338	1,435 (43.0)	813 (24.4)	445	241	39.2	60.8

Source: Author's own calculation based on ethnicity data of the 2000 National Census and the results of 2012 Gubernatorial Election in Jakarta.

The 'Religionisation' of Campaigns

Compared to the 2007 gubernatorial election, I can confirm that voters' ethno-religious sentiment turned out to be strong in the 2012 election. According to an exit poll in 2007, it was only 7.5 per cent who said they had chosen their candidates because of similar backgrounds, including both religion and ethnicity (Table 9). However, in the 2012 election, 25.9 per cent answered they chose Fauzi because he represented their religion, while those who chose ethnicity as the reason of support Fauzi or Joko were only less than 5 per cent (Table 10). How did religion become a legitimate, deciding factor to support particular candidates in the 2012 Jakarta gubernatorial election? In this section, I shall explore the 'religionisation' of the election by highlighting some religious aspects of the campaigns. I have borrowed the term 'religionisation' from Hefner (2012) to describe the result of the Islamisation of non-standard Islam, nominal Muslim, or *abangan*, that has gone on over the last few decades. The Islamisation of non-standard Islam resembles a broader process of a religious transformation taking place in other faith communities in Indonesia and other parts of Southeast Asia – one that can be globally called as 'religionisation'. Today, all the major parties subscribe to a normatively standardised form of Sunni Islam (Hefner 2011: 72), and the 'secular' sphere in Indonesian politics has narrowed as a result.

Table 9: Reason for Vote According to an Exit Poll in the 2007 Gubernatorial Election

Reason for voting	In %
Capability of the candidate	28.5
Characteristics of the candidate	19.5
Program or issue	18.1
Supported by my choice of political party	6.9
Same backgrounds (religion, ethnicity and others)	7.5
Not answered	19.4

Note: N=1,367.

Source: Lingkaran Survei Indonesia 2007.

Table 10: Reason for Vote According to an Exit Poll in the 2012 Gubernatorial Election (Second Round)

Reason for vote	Fauzi–Nara	Joko–Basuki
Program	31.7	31.9
Prioritize people’s interests	9.2	32.7
Represent my religion	25.9	0.5
Honesty	2.9	12.2
All members of family support the candidate	8.6	6.2
Represent my ethnicity	4.6	4.9
Having met directly	4.6	2.1
The original political party that I support	2.3	1.3
Others	10.2	8.2

Note: N=740.

Source: *Tempo* (2012b).

Fauzi had established his religious image throughout his term as governor by approaching local religious leaders and frequently organising religious activities and gatherings.¹⁵ He established Majelis Dzikir Al Fauz around 2010 in response to the booming popularity of *dzikir* or *dbiker* among young Muslims in Jakarta. It was a strategy similar to how President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono formed the *dbiker* organisation Majelis Dzikir SBY Nurussalam before the 2009 general election. *Dbiker* (remembrance, reminder, evocation) is a popular meditative practice most commonly associated with Sufism. *Dbiker* refers to the practice of chanting a divine name or Qur’anic phrase, often combined with ritualised music and dance (*sama*) and visiting (*ziyarah*) the shrine of a saint (Sells 2009). In Indonesia, *dbikir* is often led by Arab descendants, especially *babib* or *sayyid*, who claim to be descendants of the Prophet Mu-

15 See the news posted on Fauzi’s website, for example: “Bang Fauzi Beharap Ulama dan Habaib Jadi Contoh Masyarakat”, <<http://m.bangfauzi.com/berita.php?id=1407>> (posted on 11 November 2008, accessed on 2 March 2013).

hammad. In the mid-2000s, several *dbiker* groups led by young and handsome *habib* started to expand their activities. They sometimes attract tens of thousands of followers and television stations broadcast the events as well. The activities of Majelis Dzikir Al Fauz were not significant in public, but did involve some bureaucracy and caused the number of local branches to grow.¹⁶ Fauzi approached famous *dbiker* leaders through the organisation and often appeared at mass gatherings.

As the re-election campaign approached, Fauzi frequently visited mosques in the morning for *Fajr* prayers. During the holy month of Ramadan, he even visited as many as four mosques a day (see Tempo.co 2012b). His team urged the constituency to choose candidates of “the same faith” and asserted that they had the support of local religious leaders (*ulama*) by using the men’s pictures on campaign posters. Several influential Betawi *ulama* such as Mahfudz Asirun, Mundzir Tamam and Saifuddin Amsir actively campaigned for the incumbent candidate.¹⁷ Amidst these events, Rhoma Irama’s statement about choosing a “leader of the same faith” was further amplified by speeches made by many other preachers at the local level. Fauzi conducted anti-Islamist (i.e. anti-PKS) campaigns and successfully attracted support from Christians and Buddhists alike in 2007. He changed his strategy in 2012, however, choosing to consolidate his Muslim votes instead.

At the same time, there were several influential and even outspoken ethno-religious leaders who supported Joko. Habib Ibrahim Luthfi Alatas, who leads Majelis Taklim Amaul Husna, supported Joko and considered him as his follower. He invited the candidate to his religious activities and prayed (*doa*) for him, although he never stated that he actually supported Joko in public. Interestingly, Luthfi asked Joko not to ask him for his vote; he seemed to believe that Joko’s subtle, low-profile approach would make a better impression on people. After the election, he organised the Ulamas’ Forum for New Jakarta (Forum Ulama Jakarta Baru), which was intended to build reconciliation among religious leaders

16 Rakhmad Zailani Kiki, “Fenomena Majelis Dzikir”, posted on the website of the Jakarta Islamic Centre on 4 March 2011 (<<http://islamic-center.or.id/beta-wi-corner/359-fenomena-majelis-dzikir.html>> (13 September 2013).

17 Mahfudz Asirun is the head of Al-Itqon, which is located in Cengkareng, West Jakarta. Mundzir Tamam is the chairman of the Jakarta division of the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI) and an active member of the Islamic PPP (United Development Party). He often teaches at numerous *majelis taklim* (religious study groups) and many of his disciples work as *ulama* and religious bureaucrats. Saifuddin Amsir is currently one of the vice-heads (*rais*) of NU’s advisory board (*Syuriah*). Interviews with Saifuddin Amsir, 5–7 March 2013 and with Mastur, secretary of NU’s regional branch in Jakarta, 5 March 2013.

and to monitor Joko's governorship.¹⁸ Ahmad Shodri, a former head of the Forum of Betawi Habib and Ulama (Forum Ulama dan Habib Betawi, FUHAB), openly supported Joko and campaigned for him enthusiastically.¹⁹ Djan Faridz, Shodri's political patron who had also served as State Minister for Public Housing and been a member of the Regional Representative Council (DPD) from PPP, and the current provincial head of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) also mobilised against Fauzi. He was against PPP's decisions to support Alex Noerdin in the first round and Fauzi in the second one. Djan, who replaced Fauzi as the head of the regional branch of NU, had disagreements with Fauzi over land use in Tanah Abang and the provincial leadership of NU.²⁰ NU's national chairman, Said Aqil Siraj, also implied some support for Joko and Basuki by clearly rejecting Rhoma Irama's plea for exclusive Muslim leadership (see *Tempo.co* 2012c; *Tribunnews.com* 2012b). NU's district branches were divided, and those who supported Joko were severely criticized by a number of vocal Betawi preachers.²¹ Ridwan Saidi, a well-known Betawi intellectual whom I mentioned previously, openly supported Joko and made an effort to separate the religious issue from ethnicity. An outspoken PPP leader during the New Order, Saidi argued that Betawi culture was not necessarily related to Islam and he condemned the negative campaign against Joko and Basuki.²²

Therefore, Joko and his supporters did use and mobilise religious symbols, too, although in a less provocative and more defensive way. Joko interacted with mass Muslim organisations like NU and approached Arabic *dhikir* leaders, just as other candidates did.²³ During the month of Ramadan, Joko arranged small-scale gatherings in Betawi residential areas together with Luthfi or other supportive local preachers to break their

18 Interview with Ibrahim Luthfi Al-Alatas on 12 September 2013. There was a plan to change the name of the forum to the Ulama's Forum for United Jakarta (Forum Ulama Jakarta Bersatu) in November 2013, thus retaining the same abbreviation: FUJB.

19 Ahmad Shodri became head of the province's Jakarta Islamic Centre after the election. He was closely associated with Djan Faridz, whom I shall describe next. Interview with Ahmad Shodri on 7 March 2013.

20 Djan Faridz was said to have the intention of running for the governor's office, but he gave up because he was appointed as a minister. See profile of Djan Faridz at <<http://profil.merdeka.com/indonesia/d/djan-faridz/>> (7 September 2013).

21 Interviews at NU's regional branch in Jakarta.

22 Interview with Ridwan Saidi, 5 March 2013. See also *Kompas.com* 2012.

23 He visited Habib Munzir in hospital on the same day along with Fauzi, for instance. *Tribunnews.com* 2012d.

fast together communally. According to his election consultant, Hasan Nasbi, Joko's most symbolic move was to go on an *umroh* pilgrimage and take his mother with him just after the first round of the election. This was intended as a response to the negative campaigns. Hasan said that at that time, a candidate's religious image was more important than their ethnicity, which only had an influence on a particular group.²⁴ It should be noted, however, that Joko's close advisors like Luthfi Alatas and Hasan Nasbi intentionally created a religious image for him without being obtrusive, maintaining consistency with Joko's amiable, low-profile character in public. The intemperate language of Rhoma Irama and Nachrowi Ramli was considered a blunder. Although his view was slightly exaggerated, Luthfi Alatas thought that Joko could not win the election without the blunders made by Fauzi and his supporters.²⁵

Conclusion

It is very clear from the qualitative analysis that Fauzi's ethno-religious campaign was able to mobilise votes among the Betawi population; a strong correlation was found between the proportion of the Betawi population and the votes for Fauzi–Nachrowi. Although certain numbers of non-Betawi Muslims also backed Fauzi, the support for him did not include other Muslims in any significant way. He was the 'universal, compromise' candidate in 2007, running against a 'hard-core' Muslim Betawi contender, but in 2012 he changed sides as it were, preferring to be a 'hard-core' Muslim Betawi running against the 'universal, non-communal' contenders, Joko–Basuki. Fauzi made an effort to establish his religious image throughout his governorship. I can re-affirm how ethno-religious divisions can emerge as the political fault line, at least temporarily. Joko and his team were well aware of this and also organised a series of religious campaigns, albeit in a different way that was consistent with his more subtle and less intrusive public profile. As Joko's religious campaign might have backfired during the campaign, after the election, Joko and Basuki tried to win over the Betawi inhabitants again by visiting their local communities, wearing Betawi ethnic clothes and attending *dbiker*. There was no serious protest about this from any Betawi ethnic organisation.

Religious rather than ethnic symbols or reasoning were increasingly used in the course of the gubernatorial election. First, since the Betawi

24 Interviews with Hasan Nasbi on August 2012 and March 2013.

25 Interview with Ibrahim Luthfi Al-Alatas on 12 September 2013.

make up less than thirty per cent of the electorate, Fauzi needed to appeal to the larger Muslim population, not just this ethnic group. As Aspinall (2011) argues, this is why ‘soft’ ethnic politics is prevalent in local contests for government power. Consolidation of democracy prompted interethnic cooperation and moderation in Indonesia. He has also mentioned that ethnic politics generally lacks much ideological depth; Islamic reasoning was more convincing than an obscure Betawi identity. This is the second and more profound finding of this study. It should also be noted that Islamic parties did not necessarily lead these religious campaigns. As already discussed in conjunction with local ‘Islamic’ bylaws, religious identities can be emphasized pragmatically in order to exploit local religious sentiment (Bush 2008).

This paper has demonstrated how social cleavages work in electoral politics by comparing electoral results and sociological data. This method can be useful for regions like North Sumatra where calculations on electoral politics are primarily based on ethno-religious divisions.²⁶ The emphasis on identity politics does not necessarily deny existing money politics in elections. Rather, ethno-religious affinity often defines a patron-client relationship. However, as the constituency becomes bigger, as in national or provincial elections in a more urban environment, the impact of vote buying can decrease. The case of Jakarta’s situation has shown some demographic particularities of the capital while providing a comparative example of changing local politics in other provinces and major big cities in Indonesia.

26 See the following prediction of the 2013 gubernatorial elections in North Sumatra: Nainggolan 2013. The results apparently turned out to be more divided along ethno-religious lines. Gatot Pujjo Nugroho and Tengku Erry Nuradi, Javanese interim governor and Malay Muslim aristocrat, won most of the coastal Muslim districts, beating Effendi Simbolon and Jumiran Abdi, a Batak Christian MP and Javanese Muslim bureaucrat who won most of the inland Batak Christian districts. Although Effendi’s team officially emphasized ethno-religious pluralism with the slogan “Colourful North Sumatra” (*Sumut berwarna*), local Christian newspapers and churches campaigned for people to vote for candidates of the same faith. Effendi’s team claimed that Gatot used the government budget for his campaign and sued him at the constitutional court. Interviews with Afifuddin Lubis (former interim mayor of Medan and a member of Golkar), Brilian Mokhtar (local PDIP politician), academics and journalists on 30 August–1 September 2013. See also *The Politica News.com* 2013.

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