



# Journal of Current Chinese Affairs

China aktuell

---

Van Hoeymissen, Sara (2011),  
Regional Organizations in China's Security Strategy for Africa: The Sense of  
Supporting "African Solutions to African Problems",  
in: *Journal of Current Chinese Affairs*, 40, 4, 91-118.  
ISSN: 1868-4874 (online), ISSN: 1868-1026 (print)

The online version of this article and the other articles can be found at:  
[www.CurrentChineseAffairs.org](http://www.CurrentChineseAffairs.org)

---

Published by  
GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Institute of Asian Studies  
in cooperation with the National Institute of Chinese Studies, White Rose East Asia  
Centre at the Universities of Leeds and Sheffield and Hamburg University Press.

The *Journal of Current Chinese Affairs* is an Open Access publication.  
It may be read, copied and distributed free of charge according to the conditions of the  
Creative Commons Attribution-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.

To subscribe to the print edition: <ias@giga-hamburg.de>  
For an e-mail alert please register at: <[www.CurrentChineseAffairs.org](http://www.CurrentChineseAffairs.org)>

The *Journal of Current Chinese Affairs* is part of the GIGA Journal Family which includes:  
Africa Spectrum ● Journal of Current Chinese Affairs ● Journal of Current Southeast  
Asian Affairs ● Journal of Politics in Latin America ● <[www.giga-journal-family.org](http://www.giga-journal-family.org)>



# Regional Organizations in China's Security Strategy for Africa: The Sense of Supporting "African Solutions to African Problems"

Sara VAN HOEYMISSEN

**Abstract:** African regional organizations play a significant role in maintaining peace and security on their continent. This article looks at how China, as an emerging power in Africa, has incorporated these organizations into its policies on African security crises. It asserts that China has explicitly endorsed regional conflict resolution mechanisms, which it perceives as having a less intrusive impact on third world countries' sovereignty than have initiatives taken under the global collective security system led by the UN Security Council. Moreover, China strengthening cooperation with African regional organizations and aligning its stance with the views emerging from these regional bodies is an important way in which China has tried to respond to the rising security challenges and political demands it is faced with in Africa. The article briefly considers what influence China's increased attention to African regional bodies is having on efforts by Africa's traditional donors to help build – but also shape – Africa's emerging peace and security architecture.

■ Manuscript received 15 June 2011; accepted 12 December 2011

**Keywords:** China, African regional organizations, regional security cooperation, sovereignty

**Sara Van Hoeymissen** is a Ph.D. researcher at the Sinology Department of the University of Leuven. Her research interests include China's foreign policy and China's Africa policy in particular. In recent years, she has contributed book chapters and published articles on various aspects of China's diplomacy vis-à-vis conflicts in Africa, including a study published in 2011 on China's policy on the protection of civilians in armed conflicts in Africa. Prior to joining the Sinology Department of the University of Leuven, the author worked as a project manager with the Taipei Representative Office to the European Union and Belgium.

E-mail: <Sara.VanHoeymissen@arts.kuleuven.be>

## Introduction

African regional and sub-regional organizations play an important role in maintaining peace and security on their continent. Since the 1990s, organizations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the African Union (AU) (formerly the Organisation of African Unity, OAU) have intervened in various peace and security crises in their member states through mediation, peacekeeping and peace enforcement (see for instance Adetula 2008; Boulden 2003a; Moller 2009; Murithi 2008). This article looks at China's response to the African aspiration to find so-called "African solutions to African conflicts" and the ways in which China has incorporated African regional organizations into its policies regarding security challenges on the African continent. As a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), China has an important and potentially decisive voice on African peace and security issues. Moreover, since the end of the 1990s Africa has quickly gained importance on China's foreign policy agenda. While the People's Republic of China has a decades-long history of engagement with Africa, the more ideological relations of the past have now been substituted for "a new type of strategic partnership", marked by vibrant economic cooperation (Wen 2009). China's openness to cooperation with all African countries, including some that are suffering from political instability or domestic conflict, has attracted particular attention. A key principle of China's foreign policy is a deep disinclination to get involved in the internal affairs of other states. China has thus been accused of embracing "pariah regimes" and has been faced with international calls to use its increasing influence and leverage with African governments to contribute more actively to resolving African security crises (Alden 2007: 59-66). This article asserts that African regional bodies play a significant part in China's response to the demands and challenges it is faced with as an emerging economic and political power in Africa. Strengthening cooperation with African regional bodies and aligning its policies on particular conflicts with the consensus emerging from these regional organizations is an important way in which China has tried to respond to rising international expectations. Moreover, China has endorsed regional security cooperation to promote its views on acceptable methods of conflict resolution and the proper management of international affairs.

In the first section, the article<sup>1</sup> provides some historical background on regional conflict resolution in Africa and China's early response to the trend of advancing regional solutions to African conflict situations. This response was mainly informed by considerations of South–South solidarity and by a sense that regional conflict resolution mechanisms have a less intrusive impact on third world countries' sovereignty than those stemming from the global collective security system led by the UNSC. The second part of the article deals with some of the demands and reputational challenges that China is currently faced with as an emerging power in Africa. It looks at how supporting regional solutions at times provides a way for China to offset these challenges. Each part of the article briefly expands on how China's policies compare with those of Africa's traditional partners in the West. Since the mid-1990s, Western governments have generally become unwilling to deploy troops on long-term missions in Africa and have supported the trend of seeking to find "African solutions to African problems". Donors declared that bringing peace and stability to the African continent was primarily an African responsibility. They perceived their role in resolving African conflicts as confined to providing diplomatic, logistical and financial support to African regional organizations (Olsen 2009; Williams 2008: 310-312). The article briefly considers what influence China's increased attention to African regional bodies is having on efforts by Africa's traditional donors to help build – but also shape – Africa's emerging peace and security architecture.

## Historical Background on African Regional Security Cooperation and China's Position

Chapter VIII of the UN Charter establishes the possibility of cooperation between the United Nations (UN) and regional organizations in order to safeguard international peace and security. Since the end of the Cold War, the topic has been a recurring theme in the workings and conceptual discussions of the UN. During the 1990s it became particularly relevant with regard to Africa. The continent had lost its strategic importance to the great powers as a battleground for influence. While this created room for the UN to become more involved in conflict reso-

---

1 I wish to thank Gudrun Wacker, Jonathan Holslag and the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on an earlier version of the manuscript.

lution, the state-centric and sovereignty-based approach inherent in the UN Charter combined with the UN's overstretched resources rendered the organization ill-equipped to deal with the complex, mostly domestic conflicts that Africa was faced with. After the international community stood by as genocide unfolded in Rwanda in 1994 and the UN withdrew from Somalia in 1995, African elites came to see strengthening Africa's capacity to solve its own crises as a necessity. They turned to regional organizations to fill the gap left by the UN's retrenchment (Boulden 2003b: 12; Esmenjaud and Franke 2009).

Africa's first regional intervention in the post-Cold War era took place in 1990, when the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) deployed the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to Liberia to address the crisis that was growing there as a result of civil war and the collapse of the central government. Despite allegations of geopolitical machinations on the part of the interveners, excessive use of force, and human rights abuses, the enforcement operation was considered by many a model for Africa (Ero 2000). China's initial official response to the new development of relying primarily on regional solutions in African peace and security crises reflected the support for African unity, independence and self-reliance that had been a consistent part of its Africa policy discourse since the Bandung Conference (Alden 2007: 32). China called on the UN to heed the views of African countries and regional organizations on African issues and to give full play to these entities to settle conflicts in their own region by themselves (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China 2000; *PLA Daily* 2003; United Nations 1995, 1997a; UN Doc. A/C.4/52/SR.14 16 February 1998). ECOWAS' intervention in Liberia did spark some discussions in Chinese academic circles about the legality and desirability of such a peace enforcement operation (Interview 1 2009). However, the initiative was generally perceived as having been borne out of necessity and reflecting a mentality change among Africans in favour of greater regional involvement in conflict resolution (Luo 2003; Xia 1993). One Chinese analyst concluded that "relying on collective strength to solve domestic conflicts" was "the proper direction" for Africa to take (Xia 1993: 28).

China not only supports a greater role for African regional organizations in conflict resolution, it also considers them well placed to make certain judgements on issues that impact the sovereignty and internal affairs of their members. In the words of one prominent Chinese Africa analyst:

China respects the AU's principles and the goal to end conflict on the continent, but views itself as having no right to intervene in the domestic affairs of African countries as an outsider. [...] China does not consider itself qualified to make judgements on the domestic affairs of African countries and considers the AU more qualified to do so (Li 2007: 76).

By the 1990s, Chinese analysts had already conceded that states could voluntarily relinquish part of their sovereignty to achieve certain long-term goals or political ideals (Chan 1999: 77). China therefore has relatively little difficulty with African regional organizations engaging in conflict mediation and resolution if they have been given a mandate by their members to do so (Luo 2002: 30). China particularly favours a greater role for regional organizations with regard to issues that potentially encroach on domestic affairs, such as early warning and international responses to domestic conflicts and humanitarian crises (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China 2005; United Nations 1995, 2007; Teitt 2008: 20). On these issues, fears of the UN becoming an instrument for powerful countries to interfere in the affairs of the weak are particularly acute for China (United Nations 1995).

The views of African regional bodies have emerged as an important factor influencing China's position in the Security Council on African crises (International Crisis Group 2009: 23-25). China is particularly likely to consider the views of key regional players when the Council is considering domestic crises in African countries or the imposition of Chapter VII measures, such as sanctions and the non-consensual use of force. When China is assured that a proposed measure is in keeping with the wishes of relevant regional organizations, it is more likely to be favourably disposed to it. In principle, China maintains that international measures invoking the use of force are only legitimate if the host nation's consent can be obtained. However, lacking such consent, the support of regional organizations emerges as a critical factor in swaying China to take a cooperative stance. According to one Western diplomat, an effective way of getting China on board when a Chapter VII resolution is tabled pertaining to an African issue is to first forge a consensus among key African stakeholders and African members of the UNSC (Interview 2 2009). Examples abound of instances in which China reluctantly accepted UNSC actions in part or in their entirety because of the positions taken by key African countries and regional organizations. For instance, China expressed reservations about imposing economic sanctions on Sierra Leone in 1997 but ended up voting in favour of a UNSC resolu-

tion because of clear support for the measures from ECOWAS, which had already imposed its own sanctions (Department of Public Information UN 1997; United Nations 1997b, 1997c; Teitt 2008). In recent years, China has been a strong advocate of greater UN involvement in Somalia and of a takeover by the UN of the AU's peacekeeping tasks in that country. China's position in this regard is remarkable given the fact that most other permanent members of the UNSC do not favour the deployment of UN peacekeeping troops in Somalia. One important factor behind China's position is that the African Peace and Security Council has long pushed for a UN takeover of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), the force that has been deployed in Somalia since 2007 (International Crisis Group 2009: 24). According to Chinese diplomats, China was reluctant to take on the issue but felt compelled to do so since African governments had requested China's assistance due to a lack of interest on the part of other major powers (Lynch 2006). African support of UN intervention in Somalia was also an important factor in getting China to agree to the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force there in the early 1990s (Wheeler 2000: 186; He 2007: 29-30).

In another instance, in May 2009, the AU took the unprecedented step of requesting that the UNSC impose sanctions on Eritrea, an AU member state, for its alleged support of Islamist insurgents attempting to overthrow Somalia's government. China, which enjoys good relations with Eritrea (AFP 2007; Shinn 2005), agreed to abstain from voting on a Uganda-sponsored resolution that eventually succeeded in imposing an arms embargo and other sanctions on Eritrea in December 2009. China's ambassador to the UN, Zhang Yesui, expressed his country's reservations about sanctions but also stressed China's appreciation for the AU's efforts to "resolve African issues in an African way" (*People's Daily* 2009; United Nations 2009c). Lastly, in March 2011 China abstained from voting in the UN Security Council on Resolution 1973 (2011), which imposed a no-fly zone over Libya and authorized member states to use "all necessary measures" to protect civilians under direct threat of attack in the country. Before and after the passing of the resolution, China expressed strong reservations about the use of force in international relations (*Reuters* 2011a), but its diplomats explained that it had not blocked the action with a negative vote in consideration of the "special situation in Libya" and the wishes of the Arab League, the AU and African countries (Jiang 2011; United Nations 2011). The reference to the AU was somewhat awkward given the fact that the AU had spoken out

against outside military intervention days before the vote in the UNSC. However, all three AU members in the Council voted in favour of Resolution 1973.

On the other hand, when a proposed resolution clearly lacks the support of key African leaders and regional organizations, China is more comfortable expressing its opposition to it (Teitt 2008: 16). For example, in July 2008 China joined Russia in casting a rare double veto against a US-sponsored resolution that sought to impose sanctions on the government of Zimbabwe. Also voting against the resolution was SADC-appointed facilitator and regional key player South Africa, which was a non-permanent member of the SC at the time. South Africa's ambassador to the UN, Dumisani Kumalo, explained that his country's vote reflected the positions of the SADC and the AU, which were both promoting dialogue to resolve the situation in Zimbabwe and had decided against taking measures that might negatively impact the climate for dialogue (United Nations 2008a). He called on the UNSC to allow Africa to solve its own problems (*New York Times* 2008). Chinese statements on Zimbabwe concurred with the view that punitive measures against the Zimbabwean government would be counterproductive. China also expressed support for ongoing SADC and AU mediation initiatives in Zimbabwe, which it felt needed to be given more time to succeed (Liu 2008; United Nations 2008a).

It is important to point out that while China has been sympathetic to the African position and has often sided with African countries in the SC, it is not keen on taking the lead on behalf of the African continent on sensitive issues. China has generally not been willing to invest political capital or incur heavy diplomatic costs by actively promoting African positions that go against the prevailing opinions of key SC members – particularly those of Western permanent members. In those cases, China prefers to leave the initiative to others. For example, Pakistan's ambassador to the UN declared in 2006 that China was not as active in opposing Western-sponsored efforts in the UN Security Council to impose sanctions on Sudan over the Darfur issue as was commonly assumed but that the initiative actually came from Pakistan and Algeria (Traub 2006). During the course of 2008 and 2009, China also repeatedly hinted that while it shared African and Arab opposition to the International Criminal Court's (ICC) case against Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, it believed it would be "more appropriate" if one of the UNSC's African members took the initiative to try to defer the case (Heavens 2009).



## Deepening Patterns of Engagement as China's Presence in Africa Increases

Since the end of the 1990s China has made significant efforts to upgrade its decades-old ties with the African continent to the level of a so-called “new strategic partnership” (Taylor 2008; Alden, Large, and Soares de Oliveira 2008). China turned to Africa in search of energy and mineral resources to fuel its economy, new export markets, and international political support and has been particularly successful at putting its vision of mutually beneficial cooperation into practice. For example, trade between China and Africa increased roughly tenfold between 2000 and 2008, with energy and mineral resources taking up the lion's share of China's imports from Africa (Taylor 2008: 38). China stepped up its economic cooperation with practically all African countries, but its ties with a number of unstable or conflict-ridden states have attracted particular attention both within Africa and on the international stage. This scrutiny presented China with security and political risks. On the one hand, local movements that perceive China as siding with or assisting the government that they oppose have occasionally targeted Chinese interests and citizens in countries such as Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria and Sudan (*Associated Press* 2007; Holslag 2009: 24). China has thus found out the hard way that its non-interference policy does not prevent it from getting drawn into existing domestic conflicts in African countries (Large 2009). On the other hand, internationally, economic cooperation with China is often presented as a lifeline that helps recalcitrant regimes of countries such as Sudan, Zimbabwe and Guinea avoid having to mend their ways. China has been accused of not using its rising power and influence in Africa to assist international efforts to address African security issues (Eisenman 2005; Harman 2007; Richardson 2006; *The Times* 2009).

Calls for China to use its leverage with African governments and to contribute more actively to African peace and development present Beijing with a number of challenges. China is not yet an important player in the global multilateral crisis response architecture, and it is relatively inexperienced when it comes to international conflict resolution (Large 2008). China's non-interference policy and its preoccupation with state sovereignty also make many of the solutions that outside powers advocate, such as sanctions or military interventions, in principle unacceptable. Moreover, China takes a state-centric approach in the expansion of its commercial interests in Africa and probably does not wish to com-

promise its ties with sitting African governments. As the next section will show, closer cooperation with African regional organizations provides some way out of Beijing's conundrum. China's ties with African regional organizations and the assistance it has provided to their conflict resolution initiatives have become more substantial and pronounced in recent years. By closely aligning its policies with those of key African regional players, China is attempting to respond to international expectations and advance its views on appropriate conflict resolution models while safeguarding its increasing interests in Africa.

## African Regional Bodies in China's Security Strategy toward Africa

As noted by a 2008 American report comparing American and Chinese influence in the developing world, China has expanded its ties and the channels for exchange and cooperation with regional organizations in Africa in recent years (Congressional Research Service 2008). For example, in 2005 China appointed representatives to the AU and SADC after having earlier appointed representatives to ECOWAS and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) (*Xinhua* 2006). China has an established tradition of attending AU summit meetings in an observer capacity while the AU Commission has evolved from being an observer to serving as a full member of the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). At the launch of its first policy paper on Africa in January 2006, the Chinese government announced plans to step up its cooperation with African regional and sub-regional organizations in the field of peace and security (*Xinhua* 2006). Channels for bilateral exchange and consultation between China and the African Union on security issues have subsequently been expanding. Since 2008 China and the AU have been holding annual strategic dialogues, which include exchanges of views on “major international and regional issues of common concern” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China 2011). The dialogue has alternated each year between being held in Addis Ababa and in China. It complements other multilateral consultation mechanisms such as the Political Consultation launched by Chinese and African foreign ministers at the UN in 2007 to coordinate responses to regional security issues more closely (Huang 2011: 264–265). In September 2010 the AU Commission was invited to the second edition of this Political Consultation (Ping 2010).

In its 2006 Africa policy paper, China promised to provide assistance “within its own capacity” to regional efforts to settle conflicts (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 2006; *Xinhua* 2006). A serious lack of predictable and sustainable funding has hampered the increase in regional institutional capacity in Africa to deal with peace and security issues as well as operations in the field. China’s assistance in alleviating these constraints has so far mainly taken the form of logistical and financial support of peacekeeping, with the AU and ECOWAS appearing to have been the main beneficiaries. China has provided aid to the AU’s peacekeeping operations in Sudan and Somalia, while ECOWAS has been given grants to help augment its peacekeeping and mediation capacities (*Africa Files* 2008; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 2004). Apart from providing aid to regional entities, China has also provided military assistance on a bilateral basis to nations that contribute troops to regional peace operations, such as Burundi, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania and Uganda (Shinn 2008; United Nations 2009a).

What are the characteristics of China’s role in African peacekeeping? First, China’s aid is not channelled through a fund or programme such as the African Peace Facility of the European Union or the United States’ Global Peace Operations Initiative, but is given on a rather *ad hoc* basis. At times, China’s assistance is a reflection of the rise of a certain African issue on China’s foreign policy agenda. For example, China made its most substantial donation to the AU Mission in Darfur (AMIS) in 2006 when international criticism of China’s ties with Sudan and its failure to raise the issue of the Darfur crisis with the Sudanese authorities was getting louder (Shichor 2007). In early 2009, as the world’s attention was focused on the problem of piracy off the Somali coast and as China joined international anti-piracy efforts there, Beijing also started providing financial assistance to AMISOM. Since then, China has repeatedly stated that a fundamental settlement to the Somali piracy issue hinges on the restoration of peace and stability on land. Second, China’s financial assistance remains fairly limited. China made its largest donations to regional peacekeeping to date to AMIS and AMISOM. By the time the AU–UN hybrid force took over in Darfur at the beginning of 2008, China had reportedly donated 1.8 million USD to AMIS (He 2008). However, this amounted to only a fraction of the total budget of AMIS, which was estimated at 466 million USD in 2006, the bulk of which was paid by the US and the EU (Boshoff 2005; De Coning 2007: 12). With

regard to AMISOM, China contributed a total of about 700,000 USD in 2009. This financial support again lagged far behind actual needs – AMISOM's operating costs were estimated at 2 million USD per day (Gill and Huang 2009: 29) – and also behind the support given to AMISOM by Africa's traditional Western donors. The EU, for example, provided 35.5 million EUR from its African Peace Facility to AMISOM during 2008 and 2009 (Franke 2009: 261). EU statistics reveal that in total the EU had contributed a total of 142.5 million EUR to AMISOM through the Peace Facility as of November 2010. China is reported to have donated 2.2 million USD in cash to AMISOM by the end of 2011 (*Xinhua* 2011b).

It is clear that for the time being, China's direct aid to African peacekeeping initiatives remains limited. China's 2011 White Paper on Foreign Aid also does not list security cooperation among the major focal areas of China's foreign aid. China's main contributions to peacekeeping on the African continent thus remain channelled through the UN. Its financial support to UN peacekeeping is small compared to Western P-5 countries and Japan (International Crisis Group 2009: 7-8), but it is the biggest contributor of troops to UN peacekeeping among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, and approximately three-quarters of its troops are deployed in Africa (September 2011 statistics of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations). Participation in UN peacekeeping offers China rewards that are not immediately available when providing assistance to regional efforts, such as reimbursements for troop contributions, learning opportunities, the opportunity for Chinese personnel to rise in the UN hierarchy and a non-threatening way to gather military experience and first-hand intelligence in Africa. China participates only in UN peacekeeping missions, not in regional missions or coalitions of the willing. This distinguishes China from Western powers, which, with a few exceptions, have generally withdrawn from active participation in peacekeeping at the UN level. They prefer to focus their energies on conducting their own operations outside of the UN and often perceive their role in resolving African conflicts as confined to providing diplomatic, logistical and financial support of Africa's emerging peace and security architecture (Bellamy and Williams 2009; Olsen 2009; Vines 2010; Williams 2008: 310-312).

## Chinese Levering of the “African Consensus” to Protect Its Increasing Interests in Africa and Reduce Image Costs

China’s rising profile in Africa has led to reputational challenges as a result of its ties with a small number of so-called “pariah states” such as Sudan and Zimbabwe. An increasingly important way China attempts to deflect international criticism is by closely aligning its policies with those of the AU or a relevant regional organization and pointing out where its views and those of key African players converge on a conflict issue. China maintains a more conservative interpretation of the right of multilateral security arrangements to get involved in issues of sovereignty than that embedded in, for example, ECOWAS documents and the AU Charter. However, in practice, China’s stance on specific issues is very often in agreement with African regional bodies, whose positions are frequently premised on the principles of sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs (Taylor 2007). As Hentz, Sonderbaum, and Tavares (2009: 214) remark, in Africa’s emerging regional security cooperation, “the reality remains the protection of state security, even if the rhetoric supports human security”. An important factor in this is the prevailing political culture among African political elites, which shapes the dominant security culture within African regional organizations more than these organizations’ founding documents and charters do (Taylor and Williams 2008: 139-144).

The socialization of African elites into new norms such as the “non-indifference” principle, which creates a legal basis for the AU to carry out collective interventions in “grave circumstances” such as war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity, is weak (Williams 2007). An explanation for this can be found both within states and at the inter-state level. At the domestic level, the dominant political culture in many African states remains one of neopatrimonialism, a system under which personalized authority structured around patron–client relationships coexists with modern bureaucracy (Taylor and Williams 2008). Hentz, Sonderbaum, and Tavares point out that many African states are struggling with what they term the “African paradox” (2009: 213). While African states enjoy *de jure* sovereignty over their territory and population, *de facto* sovereignty is actually eluding many of them. In their fight for survival and control, political elites resort to the threat and actual use of violence and the disbursement of material benefits to supporters. From

this perspective, regional cooperation in Africa should be understood as an effort intended to boost sovereignty rather than to cede it to the regional level. Regional cooperation thus serves mostly as “the pooling of sovereignty, resources and legitimacy in order to preserve regime and state stability” (Hentz, Sonderbaum, and Tavares 2009: 215). For elites in clientelist and neopatrimonial states, participation in regional interventions sometimes can also serve as a way to acquire patrimonial resources under the cloak of legitimate regional cooperation (Hentz, Sonderbaum, and Tavares 2009: 214). As remarked by Jeffrey Herbst (2007), African leaders are thus often only enthusiastic about regional cooperation to the extent that it “highlights sovereignty, helps secure national leaders and asks little in return” (cited in Williams 2008: 320).

It is important to point out that while many African countries fit the patterns described above, significant differences exist between African countries. For instance, in his analysis of the SADC's security culture between 1992 and 2003, Laurie Nathan discerns two key lines of division among SADC members: one being their approach to regional security, which ranges from pacific to militarist, and the other being their orientation in domestic politics, which ranges from democratic to authoritarian (Nathan 2006: 614-616). However, even African governments that do not share the same values still tend to act according to the logic of the “politics of solidarity” (Clapham 1996: 106-133) that developed during the liberation and post-colonial era. Inter-state relations in Africa remain characterized by a personalization of politics, with African elites often acting in unison to protect fellow incumbent governments from outside pressure or internal adversaries (Hentz, Sonderbaum, and Tavares 2009: 212; Nathan 2006: 616; Williams 2008: 316-319). The salience of this sense of solidarity can be discerned for instance from the tension that has marked post-Apartheid South African foreign policy, which has oscillated between the promotion of human rights and democracy on the one hand and the politics of solidarity on the other hand. The latter induced South Africa to offer a stringent defence of the sovereignty of weaker states and to promote the idea of applying “African solutions to African problems” on several occasions during its tenure as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council in 2007/2008 (Bischoff 2009; Kagwanja 2008; Van Nieuwkerk 2007).

The lack of common values and the sense of solidarity among African elites mean that the compromise that emerges in African regional arrangements on specific security crises is often the “lowest common

denominator” in terms of its impact on the target state’s sovereignty. For China, this compromise stance provides a reference point that does not greatly challenge its cherished principles of sovereignty and non-interference. An important discursive strategy for China to deal with the political and reputational challenges it has encountered as an emerging power in Africa is to draw a parallel between its policies and those of key African players. For example, during the height of the Zimbabwean crisis in 2008, China repeatedly deflected criticism of its opposition to international sanctions against the country by stating that its policies followed the positions of the SADC and the AU, which were taken as “the consensus of African countries on the current situation” (Li 2008; United Nations 2008a). However, this somewhat disregarded the fact that some individual African leaders, such as President Ian Khama of Botswana and Prime Minister Raila Odinga of Kenya, held views that were considerably more critical of the Zimbabwean leadership than those of the SADC or AU. These more critical views were the ones that Western countries and analysts often referred to in their criticisms of events in Zimbabwe (Raine 2009: 155-156). The conflict in Libya in 2011 again revealed China’s penchant for referring to the “African consensus” to legitimize its position. Libya provided a rare instance in recent African history in which Western nations got involved militarily in an African conflict under a UN mandate. China felt that the West went beyond the mandate set by the UN Security Council in its interpretation of Resolution 1973 and was among the countries that disagreed with the “Qaddafi must go” policy of NATO, the EU and the Arab League (Barry 2011). As China called for an immediate ceasefire in Libya, it expressed its support for the AU’s views and initiatives on the Libyan crisis (*Reuters* 2011b; *Xinhua* 2011a). As Alex Bellamy and Paul Williams remark, the Libya crisis raised the question of which views the UNSC should heed in case of conflicting views between different relevant regional organizations. Libya served as a reminder of the potential for Council members to go “forum shopping” in search of views that most suit their own (Bellamy and Williams 2011: 846, 848). By explicitly backing the AU, China engaged in forum shopping to some extent. One China analyst even asserted that events in Libya showed that “the Arab League is weakening [...] while the African Union is in a state of ascendance” (Gao 2011). However, China was also careful to avoid the impression of disagreeing outright with the Arab League (Cohen 2011).

The utility of providing rhetorical support to regional conflict resolution initiatives for China as an emerging economic power in Africa became particularly prominent during the initial years of the UN's involvement in the conflict in Sudan's Darfur area. When the conflict in Darfur erupted in 2003, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) had been investing in Sudan's oil industry for a couple of years already. By 2004 Sudan had become a top energy investment destination for China and the supplier of 4.7 per cent of China's oil. China was also an important supplier of military equipment and technology to Sudan (Large 2007; Shinn 2008). When the UNSC held its first discussions on Darfur in 2004, it quickly became clear that China did not wish to see the imposition of sanctions on Sudan and sympathized with the Sudanese government's aversion to international involvement in Darfur. In the Council, China referred to ongoing AU mediation and peacekeeping initiatives as a valuable and sufficient alternative for UN action. China stated that AU mediation in Darfur had to be given priority and could only be negatively affected by UN sanctions on Sudan (see e.g. United Nations 2004, 2005, 2006a).

China repeatedly declared its support for and appreciation of the efforts of AMIS, the AU's peacekeeping mission in Darfur. The force was overstretched and under-resourced but had been deployed with the consent of the Sudanese government, and hence enjoyed China's support. In March 2005 China endorsed the deployment of a UN mission (UNMIS) to Southern Sudan but did not allow cooperation between UNMIS and AMIS. The Sudanese government had agreed to the deployment of UN troops in Southern Sudan but still opposed UN involvement in Darfur (Holslag 2008: 76). Increasingly, China was accused of outsourcing conflict resolution in Darfur to the AU as it focused on safeguarding and expanding its economic presence in the whole of Sudan. One analyst called China's 2005 donation of 400,000 USD to the AU's mediation efforts in Sudan, which China itself described as a contribution to peace-making, a "disconcertingly cynical move" (Tull 2008: 125). Providing support to the AU's efforts in Darfur came to be seen as a convenient way for China to respond to international calls to alleviate the Darfur crisis, to enhance its image in Africa and to prevent its economic interests in Sudan from being adversely affected by international intervention or sanctions. Ironically, this was in essence not very different from Western powers' use of the mantra "African solutions to African problems", often denounced as an excuse to shirk their responsibilities in



Africa (Badescu and Bergholm 2009; Esmenjaud and Franke 2009; Williams 2008: 322).

While the early years of the Darfur crisis highlighted the benefits that supporting AU initiatives as a substitute for UN action brought to outside powers such as China, they also revealed the limitations of such a strategy: It was only credible for as long as African countries were not advocating greater UN involvement. For quite some time after the AU launched its mission in Darfur in 2004, the conflict was described by many key African leaders as a purely African issue that did not require international intervention (Williams 2008: 310-311, 324). Logistical and financial difficulties in sustaining its peacekeeping mission in Darfur along with US pressure eventually led the AU to endorse a UN handover of the peacekeeping mission in March 2006 (De Waal 2007). As more African states began to disapprove of Khartoum's actions in Darfur and contributors to AMIS worried about the safety of their troops, insisting on African self-reliance became an unsustainable position for Beijing. In August 2006 China declared in the Security Council that it was in favour of "replacing AMIS with UN operation", and this "[in accordance with] the African Union's decision" (United Nations 2006b). Darfur thus became one of the more prominent instances of China carefully reading the AU's positions and aligning its policies to those, even if those positions did not necessarily correspond to China's own preferences. From the end of 2006 onwards, China used its diplomatic clout to press Khartoum discretely but decidedly to accept the Annan Plan, which advocated an expanded UN peacekeeping role in Darfur. During his visit to Sudan in February 2007, Hu Jintao proposed a solution for Darfur that envisioned a peacekeeping role for both the AU and the UN. Behind the scenes, China lobbied for Khartoum's acceptance of a new hybrid AU-UN peacekeeping operation (Holslag 2008; Large 2007). Even though China insisted on Sudanese acceptance of any hybrid peacekeeping force, its policies at the time reflected the preferences of the AU more closely than those of the Sudanese government, which continued to oppose UN involvement (Gill, Morrison, and Huang 2008; Holslag 2008; Lynch 2007).

## Bringing in the West

What influence is China's increased attention to African regional bodies having on Western policies regarding Africa's emerging security architec-

ture? As Romain Esmenjaud and Benedikt Franke have pointed out, Western governments have tried to use their support of African regional organizations to shape Africa's security culture according to their own foreign policy priorities – for example, by calling for greater attention to anti-terrorism and human security issues (Esmenjaud and Franke 2009: 24). Western insistence on human security in particular often sits uneasily with the continuing trend among African elites to prioritize regime security over human security. China is extremely sensitive about Western-initiated humanitarian initiatives behind which it suspects a regime change agenda lurks, and is deeply sympathetic of Africa's opposition to this (Taylor 2008: 17). In the UNSC, China often renders diplomatic support to African opposition to Western initiatives that threaten regime security. China no longer dismisses human security concerns outright but states that these can be effectively addressed only in a stable political environment. According to China, sanctions and the removal of key political leaders are detrimental to such stability. For example, China has repeatedly expressed support for the AU and Arab League view that no solution can be found to Darfur in the absence of President al-Bashir and that execution of the arrest warrant issued by the ICC against him in 2009 threatens the peace process and regional stability (Qin 2009; *Xinbua* 2009). In the SC, China repeatedly called on all parties to respect the AU's opposition to the arrest warrant (United Nations 2008b, 2009b).

The outcomes of African regional mediation processes that safeguard the position of ruling elites enjoy considerable legitimacy in China and are likely to receive unconditional diplomatic and material support (Bellamy and Williams 2005: 174-175). Western donors, on the other hand, express support for African-led mediation initiatives, but are often disappointed with what they perceive as a lack of decisiveness in their outcomes (Williams 2008: 318; Esmenjaud and Franke 2009: 32). This difference in views resulted, for example, in China being one of the first countries to send a high-level delegation to Zimbabwe and resume aid after the SADC-brokered government of national unity took office in February 2009. During the mediation process, Western governments had on several occasions expressed support for the SADC's efforts. However, they turned out to be highly reluctant to recommence ties with a Zimbabwe still ruled by Robert Mugabe (Grignon 2009). However, it is important to point out that signs are emerging that when a government does not have the support of the regional grouping to which it belongs, China is hesitant to at least openly pursue cooperation with it. When

Guinea's military rulers revealed in 2009 that they had struck a 7 billion USD mining and oil agreement with the China International Fund (CIF), Beijing was quick to point out that the deal did not concern an official agreement but was struck by merely "an international company registered in Hong Kong" (Ma 2009). China had earlier indicated its awareness of international "sensitivities" about business dealings with the military junta and had signalled its intention to heed the views of the AU and ECOWAS on the situation in Guinea, both organizations having suspended the country's membership (Alden 2010).

Writings by Chinese analysts suggest that China does approach African regional organizations from the perspective of a perceived battle for influence in Africa with the West (Luo 2006: 306-307). Jeremy Paltiel has described how China tries to forge a "favourable interpretative community" around sensitive issues such as human rights and sovereignty in order to influence the international consensus around these issues (Paltiel 2008: 205). Developing countries are often a key target in this effort. Chinese analysts point out the importance of sustained resistance on the part of developing countries and their organizations against Western power politics and attempts to violate developing countries' sovereignty under the pretext of human rights concerns (Luo 2002: 34, 2006: 306). Since much of the UNSC's agenda is concerned with peace and security in Africa, and since both Westphalian and post-Westphalian views coexist in African organizations, these bodies are interesting partners in China's efforts to build a global consensus that is favourable to its position on sovereignty and non-interference. Moreover, with African insistence on the right to solve its own problems, the times seem to be conducive for such efforts. For example, during the time of South Africa's non-permanent membership in 2007/2008, China cast two vetoes in the SC – on Burma and Zimbabwe. On both occasions, South Africa voted with China against the proposed resolutions, arguing that the domestic situations in these countries did not pose a threat to international peace and security and therefore did not warrant UNSC intervention. In his keynote speech during a five-nation tour in Africa in February 2009, Hu Jintao approvingly took the pulse of the continent when he slightly altered China's decades-old phrase of support for African regionalism to state: "China firmly supports the efforts of African countries, the AU and other regional organizations *to safeguard state sovereignty* and independently resolve African issues" (emphasis added) (Hu 2009).

## Conclusion

Although China is a permanent member of the SC with a rising profile in Africa and increasing ties with African regional bodies, little attention has been devoted to its views on the role of regional organizations in conflict resolution in Africa. This article fills some of the gaps and also contributes to the literature on how the countries of the “global South”, which constitutes a majority in global institutions and is therefore essential to global governance, work together in multilateral settings (Morphet 2004). Even though China is a major rising power and a formal member of neither the G-77 nor the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), it continues to identify strongly with the interests and concerns of the third world. As a proclaimed all-weather partner of Africa, China would probably find it embarrassing to be seen as going against the preferences of African countries. This article has shown, however, that China is also paying attention to regional bodies in Africa and their role in conflict resolution from a more instrumental perspective as an emerging power in Africa. China has increasingly acknowledged and supported the work of regional organizations on security issues that affect its interests in Africa. It occasionally supports regional solutions in conflict situations to enhance its image and protect its economic interests against the backdrop of global competition for African resources. To this end, China has tried to utilize convergences between its own views and those of key African regional bodies. Indeed, China's commitment to working with the AU and other regional bodies can also be understood as part of an effort to promote conflict resolution models that respect sovereignty. African regional organizations are emerging as key forums in defining norms for intervention on their continent. Both Western countries and China are trying to exert influence over the outcome of norm-formulation processes and specific conflict resolution initiatives in Africa. While the West has used its financial aid to shape Africa's regional security infrastructure, China has mostly provided diplomatic support in international forums. African regional organizations still share many of China's views when it comes to issues of sovereignty and non-interference in conflict resolution. China is therefore likely to continue reaching out to these potentially like-minded African partners.

## References

- Adetula, Victor A. O. (2008), The Role of Sub-Regional Integration Schemes in Conflict Prevention and Management in Africa, in: Alfred Nhema, and Paul Tiyambe Zeleza (eds.), *The Resolution of African Conflicts: The Management of Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Resolution: A Framework for A Working Peace System*, Oxford: James Currey, Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, Pretoria: Unisa Press, 9-21.
- AFP (2007), *Eritrea Boosts Economic Ties with China*, 5 September.
- Africa Files* (2008), China Gives U.S.\$100,000 to ECOWAS Peace Fund, 18 December.
- Alden, Chris (2010), What Is China Doing in Guinea?, in: *The Guardian*, 19 October.
- Alden, Chris (2007), *China in Africa*, London: Zed Books.
- Alden, Chris, Daniel Large, and Ricardo Soares de Oliveira (eds.) (2008), *China Returns to Africa: A Rising Power and a Continent Embrace*, London: Hurst & Company.
- Associated Press* (2007), Nigerien Rebels: Chinese Hostage to Be Freed Imminently, 11 July.
- Badescu, Cristina G., and Linnea Bergholm (2009), The Responsibility To Protect and the Conflict in Darfur: The Big Let-Down, in: *Security Dialogue*, 40, 3, 287-309.
- Barry, Ben (2011), Libya's Lessons, in: *Survival*, 53, 5, 5-14.
- Bellamy, Alex J., and Paul D. Williams (2011), The New Politics of Protection? Côte d'Ivoire, Libya and the Responsibility to Protect, in: *International Affairs*, 87, 4, 825-850.
- Bellamy, Alex. J., and Paul D. Williams (2009), The West and Contemporary Peace Operations, in: *Journal of Peace Research*, 46, 1, 39-57.
- Bellamy, Alex J., and Paul D. Williams (2005), Who's Keeping the Peace? Regionalization and Contemporary Peace Operations, in: *International Security*, 29, 4, 157-195.
- Bischoff, Paul-Henri (2009), Reform in Defence of Sovereignty: South Africa in the UN Security Council, 2007-2008, in: *Africa Spectrum*, 44, 2, 95-110.
- Boulden, Jane (ed.) (2003a), *Dealing with Conflict in Africa: The United Nations and Regional Organizations*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Boulden, Jane (2003b), United Nations Security Council Policy on Africa, in: Jane Boulden (ed.), *Dealing with Conflict in Africa: The United Nations and Regional Organizations*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 11-33.

- Boshoff, Henri (2005), The African Union Mission in Sudan: Technical and Operational Dimensions, in: *African Security Review*, 14, 3, 57-60.
- Chan, Gerald (1999), *Chinese Perspectives on International Relations: A Framework for Analysis*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Clapham, Christopher (1996), *Africa and the International System: The Politics of Survival*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Cohen, David (2011), China and Non-intervention, in: *The Diplomat*, 3 December.
- Congressional Research Service (2008), *Comparing Global Influence: China's and US Diplomacy, Foreign Aid, Trade and Investment in the Developing World*, Washington: Congressional Research Service.
- De Coning, Cedric (2007), *Peacekeeping in Africa: The Next Decade*, NUPI Working Paper, 721.
- Department of Public Information United Nations (1997), *Security Council Unanimously Approves Sanctions Regime against Sierra Leone*, Press Release SC/6425, online: <[www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1997/19971008.SC6425.html](http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1997/19971008.SC6425.html)> (23 January 2012).
- De Waal, Alex (2007), Darfur's Elusive Peace, in: Alex de Waal (ed.), *War in Darfur and The Search for Peace*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 367-388.
- Eisenman, Joshua (2005), Zimbabwe: China's African Ally, in: *China Brief*, 5, 15, 9-11.
- Ero, Comfort (2000), *ECOMOG: A Model for Africa?*, Institute for Security Studies Monograph Series, 46.
- Esmenjaud, Romain, and Benedikt Franke (2009), *Who Owns African Ownership? The Africanisation of Security and Its Limits*, Geneva: Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies.
- Franke, Benedikt (2009), Support to AMIS and AMISOM (Sudan and Somalia), in: Giovanni Grevi, Daniel Keohane, and Damien Helly (eds.), *European Security and Defense Policy: The First 10 Years (1999-2009)*, Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 255-264.
- Gao, Zugui (2011), 中东地区格局新变化分析 (Zhongdong diqu geju xin bianhua fenxi, An Analysis of the New Changes in the Middle East Setup), in: 和平与发展 (*Heping yu fazhan, Peace and Development*), 5, 60-63, 77-80.
- Gill, Bates, J. Stephen Morrison, and Chin-Hao Huang (2008), China-Africa Relations: An Early, Uncertain Debate in the United States, in: Chris Alden, Daniel Large, and Ricardo Soares de Oliveira (eds.),

- China Returns to Africa: A Rising Power and a Continent Embrace*, London: Hurst & Company, 167-179.
- Gill, Bates, and Chin-Hao Huang (2009), *China's Expanding Peacekeeping Role: Prospects and Policy Implications*, Solna: SIPRI.
- Grignon, François (2009), The Race for Influence in Zimbabwe, in: *The Guardian*, 25 July.
- Harman, Danna (2007), How China's Support of Sudan Shields A Regime Called "Genocidal", in: *Christian Science Monitor*, 26 June.
- He, Wenping (2008), China's Unceasing Efforts to Resolve Darfur Issue, in: *China Daily*, 3 January.
- He, Yin (2007), *China's Changing Policy on UN Peacekeeping Operations (Asia Paper)*, Stockholm: Institute for Security and Development Policy.
- Heavens, Andrew (2009), China Urges Deferral of Bashir War Crimes Case, in: *Reuters*, 7 January.
- Hentz, James, Fredrik Soderbaum, and Rodrigo Tavares (2009), Regional Organizations and African Security: Moving the Debate Forward, in: *African Security*, 2, 2, 206-217.
- Herbst, Jeffrey (2007), Crafting Regional Cooperation in Africa, in: Amitav Acharya, and Alastair Iain Johnston (eds.), *Crafting Cooperation: Regional International Institutions in Comparative Perspective*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 129-144.
- Holslag, Jonathan (2009), China's New Security Strategy for Africa, in: *Parameters*, 39, 2, 23-37.
- Holslag, Jonathan (2008), China's Diplomatic Manoeuvring on the Question of Darfur, in: *Journal of Contemporary China*, 17, 54, 71-84.
- Hu, Jintao (2009), *Work Together to Write a New Chapter of China-Africa Friendship*, Dar es Salaam, 16 February, online: <[www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/zyjh/t538257.htm](http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/zyjh/t538257.htm)> (9 December 2011).
- Huang, Chin-Hao (2011), Principles and Praxis of China's Peacekeeping, in: *International Peacekeeping*, 18, 3, 257-270.
- International Crisis Group (2009), China's Growing Role in UN Peacekeeping, in: *Asia Report (International Crisis Group)*, 166.
- Interview 1 (2009), senior Chinese Africa specialist, Beijing, March.
- Interview 2 (2009), Western diplomat, Brussels, June.
- Jiang, Yu (2011), *Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Jiang Yu's Remarks on the Adoption of UNSC Resolution 1973 on the Libya Issue*, 21 March, online: <[www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/t808091.htm](http://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/t808091.htm)> (9 December 2011).

- Kagwanja, Peter (2008), Cry Sovereignty: South Africa and the UN Security Council in a Hegemonic World, 2007-2008, in: *International Journal of African Renaissance Studies*, 3, 1, 35-58.
- Large, Daniel (2009), China's Sudan Engagement: Changing Northern and Southern Political Trajectories in Peace and War, in: *China Quarterly*, 199, 610-626.
- Large, Daniel (2008), *China's Role in the Mediation and Resolution of Conflict*, OSLO Forum, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 35-41.
- Large, Daniel (2007), Arms, Oil and Darfur: The Evolution of Relations Between China and Sudan, in: *Small Arms Survey Sudan Issue Brief*, 7.
- Li, Anshan (2008), China's New Policy toward Africa, in: Robert I. Rotberg (ed.), *China into Africa: Trade, Aid and Influence*, Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 21-49.
- Li, Anshan (2007), China and Africa: Policy and Challenges, in: *China Security*, 3, 3, 69-93.
- Liu, Jianchao (2008), *Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Liu Jianchao's Remark on the Failed UNSC's Draft Resolution to Sanction Zimbabwe*, 14 July, online: <[www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/t456279.htm](http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/t456279.htm)> (9 December 2011).
- Luo, Jianbo (2003), 对非洲自主维和行动的思考 (Dui Feizhou zizhu weihe xingdong de sikao, Thoughts on Africa's Independent Peacekeeping), in: 西亚非洲 (*Xiya Feizhou, West Asia and Africa*), 3, 45-50.
- Luo, Jianbo (2002), 西共体在利比里亚的维和行动反思 (Xigongti zai Libiliya de weihe xingdong fansi, Introspection on ECOWAS Peacekeeping Mission to Liberia), in: 西亚非洲 (*Xiya Feizhou, West Asia and Africa*), 2, 29-34.
- Luo, Jianbo (2006), 非洲一体化与中非关系 (*Feizhou yitibua yu Zhong Fei guanxi, African Integration and Sino-Africa Relations*), Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe (Social Sciences Academic Press).
- Lynch, Colum (2007), AU Peacekeeping Mission in Darfur Faces Collapse – Officials, in: *Washington Post*, 14 May.
- Lynch, Colum (2006), China Filling Void Left by West in UN Peacekeeping, in: *Washington Post*, 24 November.
- Ma, Zhaoxu (2009), *Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Ma Zhaoxu's Regular Press Conference*, 15 October, online: <[www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cgedb/eng/fyrth/t620826.htm](http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cgedb/eng/fyrth/t620826.htm)> (9 December 2011).



- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China (2011), *China, AU Hold the Fourth Strategic Dialogue*, 5 May, online: <[www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zygy/gyhd/t820459.htm](http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zygy/gyhd/t820459.htm)> (9 December 2011).
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China (2006), *China's African Policy*, online: <[www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t230615.htm](http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t230615.htm)> (9 December 2011).
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China (2005), *Position Paper of the People's Republic of China on the United Nations Reforms*, online: <[www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/ceun/eng/hyyfy/t199101.htm](http://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/ceun/eng/hyyfy/t199101.htm)> (9 December 2011).
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China (2004), *China Offers Peacekeeping Assistance to ECOWAS*, 19 July, online: <<http://ng.china-embassy.org/eng/xw/t158027.htm>> (9 December 2011).
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China (2000), *Spokesperson on Conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo*, 15 November, online: <[www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/fzs/gjlb/2959/2962/t16487.htm](http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/fzs/gjlb/2959/2962/t16487.htm)> (9 December 2011).
- Moller, Bjorn (2009), *The African Union as A Security Actor: African Solutions to African Problems?*, Crisis States Research Centre Working Paper, 57, online: <<http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/28485/1/WP57.2Moller.AU.pdf>> (9 December 2011).
- Morphet, Sally (2004), Multilateralism and the Non-Aligned Movement: What Is the Global South Doing and Where Is It Going?, in: *Global Governance*, 10, 4, 517-538.
- Murithi, Tim (2008), The African Union's Evolving Role in Peace Operations: The African Union Mission in Burundi, the African Union Mission in Sudan and the African Union Mission in Somalia, in: *African Security Review*, 17, 1, 70-82.
- Nathan, Laurie (2006), SADC's Uncommon Approach to Common Security, 1992-2003, in: *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 32, 3, 605-622.
- New York Times* (2008), 2 Vetoes Quash UN Sanctions on Zimbabwe, 12 July.
- Olsen, Gorm Rye (2009), The EU and Military Conflict Management in Africa: For the Good of Africa or Europe?, in: *International Peacekeeping*, 16, 2, 245-260.
- Paltiel, Jeremy T. (2008), Peaceful Rise? Soft Power?: Human Rights in China's New Multilateralism, in: Guoguang Wu and Helen

- Lansdowne (eds.), *China Turns to Multilateralism: Foreign Policy and Regional Security*, London, New York: Routledge, 201-227.
- People's Daily* (2009), Security Council Should Act Prudently in Imposing Sanctions, Chinese Envoy Says, 24 December.
- Ping, Jean (2010), *Speech by the Chairperson of the Commission of the African Union H.E. Dr. Jean Ping, At the Second Political Consultation between Chinese and African Foreign Ministers*, online: <[www.africa-union.org/root/ar/index/Speech%20by%20the%20CP-New%20York-23%20Sept%20VERSION%20ANGLAISE%20Discours%20avec%20les%20Chinois.pdf](http://www.africa-union.org/root/ar/index/Speech%20by%20the%20CP-New%20York-23%20Sept%20VERSION%20ANGLAISE%20Discours%20avec%20les%20Chinois.pdf)> (9 December 2011).
- PLA Daily* (2003), China's Principles on Peacekeeping Operations, 31 July.
- Qin, Gang (2009), *Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang's Regular Press Conference*, 5 March, online: <[www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/2511/t540975.htm](http://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/2511/t540975.htm)> (9 December 2011).
- Raine, Sarah (2009), *China's African Challenges*, Abingdon: Routledge.
- Reuters* (2011a), China Voices "Serious Reservations" on Libya No-Fly Decision, 18 March.
- Reuters* (2011b), China's Hu Says Backs African Plan to End Libyan Crisis, 21 July.
- Richardson, Sophie (2006), China Can Help the People of Sudan and Zimbabwe, in: *Human Rights Watch Commentary*, 3 November, online: <[www.hrw.org/en/news/2006/11/02/china-can-help-people-zimbabwe-and-sudan](http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2006/11/02/china-can-help-people-zimbabwe-and-sudan)> (9 December 2011).
- Shichor, Yitzhak (2007), China's Darfur Policy, in: *China Brief*, VII, 7, 5-8.
- Shinn, David (2008), Military and Security Relations: China, Africa and the Rest of the World, in: Robert I. Rotberg (ed.), *China into Africa: Trade, Aid and Influence*, Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 155-196.
- Shinn, David (2005), Dueling Priorities for Beijing in the Horn of Africa, in: *China Brief*, V, 21, 6-9.
- Taylor, Ian (2008), *China's New Role in Africa*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
- Taylor, Ian (2007), Governance in Africa and Sino-African Relations: Contradictions or Confluence?, in: *Politics*, 27, 3, 139-146.
- Taylor, Ian, and Paul D. Williams (2008), Political Culture, State Elites and Regional Security in West Africa, in: *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 26, 2, 137-149.
- Teitt, Sarah (2008), *China and the Responsibility to Protect*, Brisbane: Asia-Pacific Center for the Responsibility to Protect.

- The Times* (2009), China Tightens Grip on Africa with \$4.4bn Lifeline for Guinea Junta, 13 October.
- Traub, James (2006), The World According to China, in: *The New York Times*, 3 September.
- Tull, Denis M. (2008), The Political Consequences of China's Return to Africa, in: Chris Alden, Daniel Large, and Ricardo Soares de Oliveira (eds.) (2008), *China Returns to Africa: A Rising Power and a Continent Embrace*, London: Hurst & Company, 111-128.
- United Nations (2011), *Security Council, Sixty-sixth Year, 6498<sup>th</sup> Meeting*, 17 March, S/PV.6498, online: <[www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Libya%20S%20PV%206498.pdf](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Libya%20S%20PV%206498.pdf)> (7 December 2011).
- United Nations (2009a), *Security Council, Sixty-fourth Year, 6158<sup>th</sup> Meeting*, 9 July, S/PV.6158, online: <[www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Somalia%20SPV%206158.pdf](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Somalia%20SPV%206158.pdf)> (7 December 2011).
- United Nations (2009b), *Security Council, Sixty-fourth Year, 6170<sup>th</sup> Meeting*, 24 July, S/PV.6170, online: <[www.undemocracy.com/S-PV-6170.pdf](http://www.undemocracy.com/S-PV-6170.pdf)> (7 December 2011).
- United Nations (2009c), *Security Council, Sixty-fourth Year, 6254<sup>th</sup> Meeting*, 23 December, S/PV.6254, online: <[www.undemocracy.com/S-PV-6254.pdf](http://www.undemocracy.com/S-PV-6254.pdf)> (7 December 2011).
- United Nations (2008a), *Security Council, Sixty-third Year, 5933<sup>rd</sup> Meeting*, 11 July, S/PV.5933, online: <[www.undemocracy.com/S-PV-5933.pdf](http://www.undemocracy.com/S-PV-5933.pdf)> (7 December 2011).
- United Nations (2008b), *Security Council, Sixty-third Year, 5947<sup>th</sup> Meeting*, 31 July, S/PV.5947, online: <[www.undemocracy.com/S-PV-5947.pdf](http://www.undemocracy.com/S-PV-5947.pdf)> (7 December 2011).
- United Nations (2007), *Security Council, Sixty-second year, 5735<sup>th</sup> Meeting*, 28 August, S/PV.5735, online: <[www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/CPR%20S%20PV%205735.pdf](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/CPR%20S%20PV%205735.pdf)> (7 December 2011).
- United Nations (2006a), *Security Council, Sixty-first year, 5423<sup>rd</sup> Meeting*, 25 April, S/PV.5423, online: <[www.undemocracy.com/S-PV-5423.pdf](http://www.undemocracy.com/S-PV-5423.pdf)> (7 December 2011).
- United Nations (2006b), *Security Council, Sixty-first year, 5519<sup>th</sup> Meeting*, 31 August, S/PV.5519, online: <[www.undemocracy.com/S-PV-5519.pdf](http://www.undemocracy.com/S-PV-5519.pdf)> (7 December 2011).

- United Nations (2005), *Security Council, Sixtieth year, 5153<sup>rd</sup> Meeting*, 29 March, S/PV.5153, online: <[www.undemocracy.com/S-PV-5153.pdf](http://www.undemocracy.com/S-PV-5153.pdf)> (7 December 2011).
- United Nations (2004), *Security Council, Fifty-ninth year, 5040<sup>th</sup> Meeting*, 18 September, S/PV.5040, online: <<http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/PRO/N04/515/29/PDF/N0451529.pdf?OpenElement>> (7 December 2011).
- United Nations (1997a), *Security Council, Fifty-second Year, 3819<sup>th</sup> Meeting*, 25 September, S/PV.3819, online: <[www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/CP.R%20SPV%203819.pdf](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/CP.R%20SPV%203819.pdf)> (7 December 2011).
- United Nations (1997b), *Security Council, Fifty-second Year, 3822<sup>th</sup> Meeting*, 8 October, S/PV.3822, online: <[www.undemocracy.com/S-PV-3822.pdf](http://www.undemocracy.com/S-PV-3822.pdf)> (7 December 2011).
- United Nations (1997c), *Letter Dated 7 October 1997 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council*, 7 October, S/1997/776, online: <[www.undemocracy.com/S-1997-776.pdf](http://www.undemocracy.com/S-1997-776.pdf)> (7 December 2011).
- United Nations (1995), *Security Council, Fiftieth Year, 3492<sup>th</sup> Meeting*, 18 January, S/PV.3492, online: <<http://www.undemocracy.com/S-PV-3492.pdf>> (7 December 2011).
- Van Nieuwkerk, Anthoni (2007), A Critique of South Africa's Role on the UN Security Council, in: *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 14, 1, 61-77.
- Vines, Alex (2010), Rhetoric from Brussels and Reality on the Ground: The EU and Security in Africa, in: *International Affairs*, 86, 5, 1091-1108.
- Wen, Jiabao (2009), *Building the New Type of China-Africa Strategic Partnership*, Sharm El Sheikh, 8 November, online: <[www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/zyjh/t628676.htm](http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/zyjh/t628676.htm)> (9 December 2011).
- Wheeler, Nicholas J. (2000), *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Williams, Paul D. (2008), Keeping the Peace in Africa: Why "African" Solutions Are not Enough, in: *Ethics and International Affairs*, 22, 3, 309-326.
- Williams, Paul D. (2007), From Non-Intervention to Non-Indifference: The Origins and Development of the African Union's Security Culture, in: *African Affairs*, 106, 423, 253-279.

- Xia, Jisheng (1993), 冷战结束后非洲的一个新课题: 依靠集体力量解决内部冲突 (Lengzhan jieshu hou Feizhou de yige xin keti: Yikao jiti li-liang jie jue neibu chongtu, A New Problem for Africa After the Cold War: Relying on Collective Strength to Solve Internal Conflicts), in: 西亚非洲 (*Xiya Feizhou, West Asia and Africa*), 5, 23-29, 37.
- Xinhua* (2011a), China Calls for Prompt Ceasefire in Libya, 9 June.
- Xinhua* (2011b), China Says Military Action Not Final Solution to Somali Piracy, 18 November.
- Xinhua* (2009), Chinese Envoy: ICC's Arrest Warrant Disturbs Sudan's Stability, 5 March.
- Xinhua* (2006), China to Enhance Co-op with African Regional Organizations, 12 January.

# Contents

## Introduction

- Jonathan HOLSLAG  
China's Evolving Behaviour in Africa and the Options of  
Cooperation with Europe 3

## Research Articles

- Bert JACOBS  
A Dragon and a Dove? A Comparative Overview of Chinese  
and European Trade Relations with Sub-Saharan Africa 17
- Lucy CORKIN  
Redefining Foreign Policy Impulses toward Africa: The Roles  
of the MFA, the MOFCOM and China Exim Bank 61
- Sara VAN HOEYMISSEN  
**Regional Organizations in China's Security Strategy for  
Africa: The Sense of Supporting "African Solutions to  
African Problems"** 91
- Susanne KAMERLING and Frans-Paul VAN DER PUTTEN  
An Overseas Naval Presence without Overseas Bases:  
China's Counter-piracy Operation in the Gulf of Aden 119
- Anna Katharina STAHL  
Contrasting Rhetoric and Converging Security Interests of  
the European Union and China in Africa 147

- Contributors 175